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                                                     ABSTRACT 
Over the past decades, there has been an increased focus on politically exposed persons (PEPs), 
and through outrageous examples, their ability to misappropriate huge sums of public funds 
from Nigeria, which is then laundered domestically or transnationally through financial 
institutions and other methods adopted in laundering the proceeds of grand corruption. The 
prevalence of grand corruption and money laundering and the number of PEPs involved in the 
plunder of state resources in Nigeria is staggering. Grand corruption and money laundering, is 
for Nigeria, a pervasive and devastating socio-economic and political problem; because many 
of Nigeria’s pressing concerns such as underdevelopment, slow economic growth, abject 
poverty and poor health care systems have all been exacerbated and prolonged by grand 
corruption through the misappropriation of public funds.  
The link between PEPs, corruption and money laundering is well established. This has led to 
the promulgation of laws and regulations, the creation of institutions and the design of policies 
aimed at combating these phenomenon in Nigeria. Yet, addressing the serious challenge of 
grand corruption and money laundering remains an acute challenge facing Nigeria. 
Constraining, disrupting, and deterring PEPs from misappropriating and laundering public 
funds is fundamental for Nigeria’s development. The continued search for effective solutions 
to the problem of grand corruption and money laundering is the catalyst for this thesis.  
Thus, drawing from several research methodologies such as the qualitative approach through 
interviews, this study was undertaken to provide a critical analysis and assessment of the 
efficacy of the Nigerian anti-money laundering (AML) legal and institutional frameworks for 
combating the laundering of the proceeds of corruption by PEPs; and their operation in practice. 
Given the unique political, economic and financial power of PEPs by virtue of their access to 
state resources and influence over government institutions; this study, inter alia, critically 
explores the political, constitutional and legal challenges that impedes the implementation of 
AML laws on PEPs in Nigeria. The analysis and assessment of the effectiveness of these 
frameworks targeting PEPs in Nigeria causes this thesis to conclude that the AML laws and 
practice relating to money laundering in Nigeria do not in any significant way disrupt the 
laundering of the proceeds of corruption. Ultimately, the research proposes a new legal model 
and takes the position that what is needed is the introduction of the Unexplained Wealth Orders 
which presents more opportunities and gives law enforcement greater latitude to facilitate the 
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                                                    CHAPTER ONE 
                             GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
                                                       
1.1        INTRODUCTION 
For years, the menace of grand corruption and money laundering has remained an intractable 
challenge which has continued to loom large in Nigeria. History is littered with outrageous 
examples of the way in which public officials, or what in today’s legal parlance are called 
politically exposed persons (PEPs) have misappropriated and plundered state resources which 
are public funds, while utilising domestic and international financial institutions to launder the 
proceeds of corruption. Every year, vast sums of public funds are misappropriated and 
laundered illegally from Nigeria to foreign jurisdictions. The colossal scale of grand corruption 
and money laundering in Nigeria, and the number of PEPs involved in the outright 
misappropriation, conversion, diversion and theft of public funds is staggering. 
A simple definition of money laundering is to describe it as the conversion, transfer or 
concealment of illegally obtained money, so that it appears to have come from a legitimate 
source.1 Simply put, it is legitimising the proceeds of crime, in this case, corruption. On the 
other hand, grand corruption refers to corruption which occurs at the highest level of 
government and involves the misappropriation or embezzlement of public funds for the benefit 
of a few at the expense of the public good.2 
Grand corruption and money laundering have grown exponentially over the years, and with 
this growth has come an increase in socio-economic underdevelopment in Nigeria. Rapacious 
PEPs have been culpable of stealing public funds rather than contributing to the socio-
economic development of Nigerians. The pursuit of short-term gains in the exercise of public 
office have allowed grand corruption to become endemic in Nigeria. Most public officials are 
not moved by the desire to serve, but the desire to have access to public funds for self-
enrichment. These activities facilitate the vicious cycle of grand corruption in Nigeria. The 
problem is particularly dire in Nigeria where good governance, integrity, accountability and 
transparency are uncommon attributes in the conduct of public affairs.  
Acts of corruption by PEPs have become the rule, rather than the exception, and corruption has 
become a euphemism for describing the political leadership in Nigeria. Based on research, 
                                                             
1 Tim Bennett, Money Laundering compliance (2nd edn, Tottel Publishing 2007) 1 




illicit proceeds derived from grand corruption and other economic and financial crimes in 
Nigeria are predominantly perpetuated by persons entrusted with prominent public functions; 
elected or appointed into various government positions who disregard public interest to 
misappropriate public funds.3  
Consequently, Nigeria has been plagued with the risk, threat and damage resulting from the 
misappropriation and laundering of public funds by corrupt PEPs. This is so because, many of 
Nigeria’s pressing concerns such as underdevelopment, slow economic growth, abject poverty, 
poor health care systems, poor infrastructure, massive inequality and low life expectancy have 
all been exacerbated and prolonged by corruption through acts of diversion of federal and state 
resources by corrupt PEPs.4 These risks have long been an inherent challenge in Nigeria’s 
political system, thereby affecting the nation in an adverse manner.  
Considering the plethora of corruption related money laundering cases involving PEPs, Nigeria 
represents a prototypical example of the links between corruption and money laundering. 
Grand corruption provides a free territory for money laundering to thrive in Nigeria. This is 
also as the perennial nature of money laundering in Nigeria is inextricably intertwined with 
grand corruption perpetuated by PEPs. Grand corruption in Nigeria, especially those involving 
PEPs constitutes a major threat and underlies majority of the money laundering cases reported 
in recent times.  
To buttress these facts, research done by Global Financial Integrity held that between 2005-
2015, some $182 billion was lost through illicit financial flows from Nigeria to developed 
countries as a direct consequence of money laundering.5 In similar vein, between 2014-2015, 
the startling sum of $37billion was laundered into London alone from Nigeria.6 In other words, 
the amount of money that is the proceeds of grand corruption and money laundering from 
Nigeria is huge, with severe ramifications for the provision of basic services. 
                                                             
3 Daniel Agbiboa,’ As it was in the Beginning: The vicious cycle of corruption in Nigeria’ (2013) 4 Studies in 
Sociology of Science 21 
4 Gabriel Lanre Adeola,’ The Deepening culture of corruption in Nigeria society: Implications for Governance, 
Development and Stability’ (2018) American International Journal of Research in Humanities, Art and Social 
Sciences 2328 
5 Global Financial Integrity, ‘Illicit financial flows to and from Developing countries: 2005-2014 (April 2017) < 
http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/GFI-IFF-Report-2017_final.pdf> accessed 14 
November 2018 
6 The Guardian,’ Nigeria not seeking a Cameron apology but wants its assets back’ < 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/may/11/nigeria-not-seeking-cameron-apology-wants-assets-




Grand corruption is the main predicate offence in Nigeria as far as money laundering is 
concerned, and as such, how Nigeria deals with the scourge is directly linked to the success or 
otherwise of its anti-money laundering (AML) legal frameworks.7 The need to disrupt the flow 
of the proceeds of crime generally gave rise to the promulgation of laws and regulations, the 
creation of institutions, the design of policies and mechanisms aimed at combating money 
laundering. However, despite the legal regimes in existence to combat money laundering in 
Nigeria, they have not translated into practical successes in the fight against money laundering, 
particularly as it relates to PEPs. Nigeria faces serious obstacles in combating grand corruption 
and money laundering. The AML legal frameworks are ineffective and does not in any 
significant way disrupt or deter corrupt PEPs from engaging in corruption related money 
laundering activities. Thus, PEPs in Nigeria continue to misappropriate public funds, while 
acquiring assets far above their legitimate income, emboldened by the deficiencies in the 
Nigerian legal system. 
The prevalence of these acts perpetuated by PEPs in Nigeria has attracted significant local and 
international attention due to the fact that these acts have led to a developmental problem of 
the greatest magnitude in Nigeria. Nigeria provides a quintessential example of the destructive 
effects of grand corruption and money laundering on a country, and the impact it has in slowing 
down its development. This has also affected Nigeria’s global image and earned it an 
unenviable reputation by international organisations who for years have statistically adjudged 
Nigeria to be among the most corrupt nations on earth.8 The prevalence of scandals involving 
the misappropriation of public funds in Nigeria points to the conclusion that grand corruption 
is immense and has metastasised throughout the body politic, and has continued to maintain its 
upward trend in Nigeria. 
1.2                      AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE THESIS 
This thesis begins to make evident the nature of grand corruption and money laundering in 
Nigeria, specifically those perpetuated by PEPs. This is because, grand corruption has become 
an issue of major political and socio-economic relevance in Nigeria. The fact that grand 
corruption and money laundering involving vast sums of wealth and assets too often go 
undisrupted and unpunished indicates severe loopholes in the extant legal framework in Nigeria. 
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This research is motivated by the imperativeness of finding solutions regarding the menace of 
corruption related money laundering in Nigeria. 
All things considered, the objective of this research is to provide the readership with a critical 
and holistic assessment of whether the Nigerian AML legal and institutional frameworks are 
effective and robust enough in combating and disrupting the prevalence of grand corruption 
and money laundering activities involving PEPs, and the level of implementation of these laws 
in Nigeria. This is in line with policy debate on the efficacy of using AML regimes to combat 
corruption related money laundering; because AML measures can contribute significantly to 
the detection, disruption and reduction of grand corruption.9 To reiterate, grand corruption is 
the main predicate offence in Nigeria as far as money laundering is concerned, and as such, 
how Nigeria deals with the scourge is directly linked to the success or otherwise of its AML 
legal frameworks.   
 In pursuit of the objective of analysing Nigeria’s AML legal framework, the research focuses 
on issues relating to AML compliance, which consists of a set of extant anti-money laundering 
practices which the law requires regulated persons (such as banks) to establish and maintain 
for the disruption of money laundering. Banks are a crucial component in this analysis because 
they are the main conduits for corrupt PEPs laundering the proceeds of corruption10; they also 
assume a substantial role because they are the first line of defence in combating money 
laundering. However, most commercial banks in Nigeria have been complicit in the unpatriotic 
and economically destructive involvement in aiding the corrupt launder the proceeds of 
corruption. The research ultimately aims to propose new legal models that could help reinforce 
the law and practice relating to financial crime in Nigeria, to increase the effectiveness of the 
extant legal frameworks in Nigeria.  
 1.3                                     METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is focused on and presents the first socio-legal assessment of the Nigerian AML 
legal and institutional frameworks in combating the prevalence of money laundering activities 
of PEPs. The research reviews the conceptual, theoretical and empirical literature on grand 
corruption and money laundering in Nigeria; and the effectiveness of the legal frameworks to 
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combat same. By virtue of the fact that this study is an exploratory research which is directed 
at discovering whether the AML legal frameworks actually disrupt money laundering 
perpetuated by PEPs, the analysis in the thesis draws from a mixture of methodologies 
conducted through the analysis of primary and secondary sources. The research took 
methodological approaches that builds on and goes beyond what has been done before. In this 
regard, the doctrinal, socio-legal, qualitative and comparative approaches were employed.  
Firstly, the study applied the doctrinal legal approach which focuses on analysing the laws, 
such as the Money Laundering Prohibition Act 2011(as amended in 2012) (MLPA 2012), the 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act 2004 (EFCC) and Central Bank of Nigeria 
(Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism in Banks and other 
Financial Institutions in Nigeria) Regulation 2018 which addresses issues under investigation. 
The thesis examines the law related mechanisms used by financial institutions to control money 
laundering through their institutions. It also examines some cases in foreign and local courts as 
it relates to issues explored in this thesis. Secondly, to ensure a practical focus, the research 
utilises a qualitative methodology through conducting interviews with a range of key 
stakeholders at the frontline of combating money laundering in Nigeria.  
Qualitative interviews are considered to be one of the most powerful ways of gaining insights 
on a field of study in order to enable the appreciation of multiple perspectives for a greater 
understanding of the subject being studied. 11  The practitioners interviewed were 
representatives of law enforcement, such as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
and the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU). This contributes to the quality, depth and 
originality of this research. It was therefore one of the appropriate methodological approach to 
use for this study, allowing an understanding of how AML regimes are applied practically.  
Thirdly, the thesis also employs socio-legal approach whereby political, economic and other 
factors that influence, impact or impinge on the efficiency and effectiveness of the AML 
framework are discussed. Issues such as immunity clause, lack of political will and lack of 
independent judiciary are some contextual factors which would be discussed that hinder the 
implementation of a robust AML framework that can deter PEPs from engaging in money 
laundering. 
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Finally, based on the fact that the research finds that the extant legal, regulatory and 
institutional AML frameworks in Nigeria are ineffective, the research ultimately aims to 
propose new legal models that could help reinforce the law and practice relating to financial 
crime in Nigeria. In this regard, the Unexplained Wealth Order (UWO) legislation is considered. 
The UWO targets the significant increase in the assets of a PEP that he/she cannot reasonably 
explain in relation to their lawful income; essentially deeming a PEPs unexplained 
accumulation of wealth to be a form of corruption.12 Such laws have operated with significant 
success in Ireland and the United Kingdom (UK).  
Therefore, a comparative approach of the UK and Ireland will be used in this study with a view 
to providing recommendations to identified problems. Under the parameters of this study, these 
jurisdictions were selected for comparative analysis because they are both common law 
jurisdictions like Nigeria; and the high level of development in their legal systems in disrupting 
financial crime. 
1.4                           STRCUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is comprised of an introductory chapter and five substantive chapters. These 
chapters broadly present the findings from the research as described in the methodology. 
Chapter 1 introduces this work. It proceeds by giving an overview of the whole work. Chapter 
2 is the first substantive chapter which serves as a foundation for the discussion which is to 
follow in subsequent chapters. A definition of the concept of corruption and grand corruption 
is an essential starting point for discussions in this chapter. The chapter provides some insight 
on corruption, particularly grand corruption involving PEPs in Nigeria using case studies; a 
theme that will be continued in subsequent chapters. It would also be paramount to analyse and 
discuss the problem of grand corruption and its manifestations and challenges in Nigeria. The 
chapter discusses the destructive powers of grand corruption wherein the chapter highlights 
corruption as a major obstacle to economic and social development in Nigeria. 
A holistic analysis of corruption in Nigeria will benefit from looking at the social dimensions 
that sustain this phenomenon. The chapter argues that factors affecting the stimulation of 
corruption are found in the larger social matrix of resilient social norms which constitute the 
environment of corruption in Nigeria. Some invaluable work has been advanced on the 
theoretical understanding of social norms and practices which have been instrumental in 
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making corrupt behaviour optimal in Nigeria, thus, producing vicious cycles of corruption. The 
impact of social norms is evident in attitudes to corruption in Nigeria because they determine 
accepted forms of behaviour in a society. 
Furthermore, in this chapter, a number of contributory factors that play a role in stimulating 
grand corruption are examined. In this regard, it is argued that weak institutions, constitutional 
constraints, lack of political will and problems in the administration of justice have all 
developed as core reasons why grand corruption remains endemic in Nigeria. The chapter 
argues that PEPs often enjoy impunity for grand corruption because the judicial system is 
unable or unwilling to hold them accountable.  
Chapter 3 critically discusses and examines the subject of politically exposed persons. Within 
the confines of this thesis, PEPs are individuals who are or have been entrusted with prominent 
public functions, their families and close associates. This is fundamental in order to understand 
the scope of individuals who fall within this bracket. The chapter discusses and explains the 
potential heightened money laundering risk when entering into financial transactions and 
business relationships with PEPs by those in the regulated sector. The chapter analyses PEPs 
definitions in the context of the Nigerian PEP. It argues that some definitions have been 
construed on principles outside the socio-legal context of the Nigerian PEP, and thus, difficult 
to implement.   
Other issues examined in this chapter includes the level of prominent public function necessary 
to be classified as a PEP, how long a person remain a PEP after leaving office, who constitutes 
an immediate family member or business associate of a PEP, the distinction between domestic 
and foreign PEPs, the exclusion of junior or middle ranking PEPs. The chapter analyses some 
of the contentious issues and challenges associated with PEPs, and the impact of their activities. 
Also, the chapter examines some of the major conundrums that impedes effective 
implementation of AML laws against PEPs in Nigeria. 
Chapter 4 provides a complete understanding of money laundering and anti-money laundering 
phenomenon. Inter alia, the chapter discusses money laundering in the context of corruption. 
It analyses certain typical stages in the money laundering process, as well as examining some 
of the common methods used in laundering the proceeds of corruption by PEPs in order to 
conceal the nature and ownership of such proceeds. It presents examples that illustrate the 
variety of methods available in money laundering schemes. This is followed by an analysis of 




such as lawyers and banks in particular. Also, the chapter discusses some of the economic and 
social effects of money laundering activities in Nigeria. 
Furthermore, the chapter offers insights to enhance understanding of the nexus between 
corruption and money laundering; both are symbiotic, not only do they tend to co-occur, but 
the presence of one tends to create and reciprocally reinforce the incidence of the other. The 
chapter argues that the crux of the nexus or relationship between these crimes extends to the 
fact that mechanisms within the framework of combating money laundering can contribute 
significantly to the detection of corruption and related offences by providing the basis for 
financial intelligence and asset recovery. The chapter examines some of the salient and 
intrusive set of AML measures to prevent money laundering and aid in combating corruption, 
such as suspicious transaction reports, enhanced due diligence et cetera.  
The crux of Chapter 5 is to critically analyse the anti-money laundering legal, institutional and 
regulatory framework for combating money laundering in Nigeria. This is with a view to 
assessing the effectiveness of the various laws, enforcement mechanisms and whether the AML 
laws as they are today disrupt money laundering in Nigeria vis-à-vis the prevalent nature of 
corruption related money laundering in Nigeria. In achieving this objective, the chapter 
examines provisions of some notable pieces of legislations such as the MLPA 2012, EFCC Act 
2004 and the Central Bank of Nigeria (Anti-money Laundering and Combating the Financing 
of Terrorism in Banks and other Financial Institutions in Nigeria) Regulation 2018. It analyses 
the money laundering offences created by law, penalties and punishments for non-compliance 
by those in the regulated sector.  
In order to add substance, the chapter offers an original perspective on the efficacy of the AML 
framework by eliciting the views of stakeholders such as law enforcement through interviews 
which expresses an informed opinion of the impact of the AML laws in Nigeria. One of the 
key findings were that banks have fallen significantly short by non-compliance with critical 
AML preventive measures such as filing suspicious transaction reports when they suspect 
money laundering, especially from high risk customers. The chapter examines the potency of 
law enforcement institutions like the EFCC in combating money laundering as it relates to the 
success or failure in the area of prosecutions and convictions of PEPs charged with money 
laundering offences in Nigeria.  
Importantly, the chapter considers the suitability of utilising the criminal justice system as 




related money laundering committed by powerful PEPs. It provides an examination of the 
deficiencies and challenges in the criminal justice system in Nigeria which frustrates the trial 
of PEPs. The analysis in this chapter reveals significant weaknesses in the AML legal 
framework. It causes this chapter to conclude that these frameworks are ineffective and do not 
disrupt or deter PEPs from engaging in money laundering activities in Nigeria. 
Acknowledging the serious problem of grand corruption and money laundering, and the need 
for improved approach to combat same, Chapter 6 prescribes solutions and recommendations 
which can improve and reinforce the extant legal frameworks in Nigeria. Presently, little can 
be done in Nigeria to act swiftly on highly suspicious wealth of PEPs when the origin of such 
wealth cannot be explained by anything other than grand corruption. The extant approaches in 
Nigeria’s legal framework has produced a mere trickle of results against a torrent of corrupt 
funds being misappropriated and laundered by PEPs in Nigeria. In this regard, the thesis 
recommends the urgent promulgation of the Unexplained Wealth Order in Nigeria as a viable 
option in disrupting money laundering and fighting grand corruption. A definition of the UWO 
is a natural starting point to begin this chapter. It proceeds by providing an in-depth analysis of 
the way in which non-conviction-based asset forfeiture regimes can contribute immensely to 
the fight against grand corruption and money laundering unlike the traditional criminal law 
which is hampered by the procedural safeguards inherent in criminal proceedings which 
provides excessive protections for criminals.  
Additionally, the chapter examines the radical features of the UWO, such as placing the burden 
of proof on the respondent whose wealth is in dispute, the extra-territorial and retroactive effect 
of the UWO. Importantly, the chapter analyses the scope and impact of the UWO, its potential 
benefit as well as challenges to implementation. This includes the prospect of depriving 
individuals their property which may be in conflict with constitutional and human rights. 
Against this background, the chapter assesses the scope of application, procedure, and impact 
of the UWO in the UK and Ireland. It considers the argument for and against this legislation 
arising from their promulgation in these countries. The findings from this comparative research 
are applied to the Nigerian context, to draw potential lessons and to consider the extent to which 







                                               CHAPTER TWO 
AN OVERVIEW OF GRAND CORRUPTION AND THE DIVERSION OF PUBLIC 
FUNDS IN NIGERIA 
    2.1                             INTRODUCTION 
To begin with, corruption is a global phenomenon. It is not peculiar to Nigeria. Corruption is 
an insidious plague that has a wide range of deleterious effects on societies. It has remained a 
perplexing issue and an inherently clandestine phenomenon with international and local 
dimensions.13 The degree of its prevalence, persistence and gravity differs from country to 
country; and this in turn has a significant impact on development of an individual country. 
Some jurisdictions such as Hong Kong, New Zealand and United Kingdom have found ways 
to curtail corruption, inter alia, because they are more committed, better equipped and have the 
necessary political will to achieve positive results.14  Others are ill-equipped and lack the 
political will to combat this scourge. Unfortunately, Nigeria falls in the latter category due to 
the crisis of corruption despite the promulgation of laws and institutions to combat it.  
From the military era, down to recent democratic administrations, the issue of corruption 
particularly as it involves public officials or in today’s legal parlance, politically exposed 
persons (PEPs) have continued to loom large in Nigeria. Corruption remains deeply rooted in 
Nigeria especially in public service where massive personal wealth is acquired from criminal 
diversion of public funds using corrupt means.  The advent of democratic governance in 
Nigeria after several years of military rule led to an upsurge in the passage of laws, the creation 
of institutions, the design of policies and mechanisms aimed at combating corruption. 
Yet it remains ubiquitous in the functioning of society and economic life in Nigeria. 15 
Corruption’s evil flows not just from the fact that some corrupt PEPs are able to become very 
rich by dishonest means; it causes untold hardship because many of Nigeria’s pressing concerns 
such as underdevelopment, slow economic growth, poverty, poor health care systems, massive 
inequality, unequal distribution of wealth and low life expectancy have all been exacerbated 
and prolonged by corruption through acts of diversion of federal and state revenues by corrupt 
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public officials.16 Not only does corruption hinder and distort development and economic 
growth, it endangers the stability of democratic institutions.17 
Socially, it pulls down the moral foundation of society as corruption is seen and accepted as a 
way of life in Nigeria; and continues to characterise the way of life for majority of Nigerians 
and its institutions.18 Now, it is very easy to talk about corruption, but like many other complex 
phenomena, it is difficult to define corruption in concise and concrete terms. Nevertheless, 
there have often been a consensus as to what exactly constitutes the concept of corruption. In 
recent years, a plethora of theoretical and empirical research on corruption have emerged. 
Empirical research in particular has flourished, with scholars and reputable organisations all 
defining corruption.19 Corruption has often been defined as the misuse of entrusted power for 
private gain.20  
To avoid the confusion of defining corruption, and in sticking with the core context of this 
thesis; this thesis adopts an operational definition of corruption as conceptualised by some 
studies. It involves behaviour on the part of politically exposed persons or public officials in 
which they improperly and unlawfully advance their private interests of any kind, or those of 
others contrary to the interest of the office or position they occupy.21  The loss of stolen 
resources through endemic corruption and abuse of office by corrupt PEPs has had destructive 
effects on majority of Nigerians who barely live above poverty levels despite the country’s vast 
resources earned primarily from petroleum.22 Some scholars argue that the discovery of oil has 
led to a litany of ignoble corrupt practices in Nigeria.23 This is because the energy resource 
sector yields majority of Nigeria’s wealth; and the nature of the sector often makes it possible 
for monumental corruption.24 
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Furthermore, Nigerians have grown cynical about corruption by PEPs.25 Examples abound of 
corrupt PEP’s criminal diversion of public funds and laundering same to offshore jurisdictions. 
This has affected Nigeria’s global image and earned it an unenviable reputation for being 
among the most corrupt countries on earth. This proposition is substantiated by evidence from 
reputable organisations such as Transparency International (TI) through its annual Corruption 
Perception’s Index (CPI) which have over the years statistically adjudged Nigeria to be among 
the most corrupt nations in the world.26 Such concerns are further echoed in the findings of 
several reports such as reports commissioned by Inter-Governmental Action Group Against 
Money Laundering in West Africa  (GIABA) describing corruption in Nigeria  as ‘prevalent, 
virtually endemic and institutionalised’.27  
In fact, a former British Prime Minister, David Cameron, described Nigeria as ‘‘fantastically 
corrupt’’ during an anti-corruption summit held in London.28 As will be discussed in later 
sections of this chapter29, although several criticisms have emerged about the use of TI’s CPI, 
the CPI has for years since its inception in the mid 1990’s had a significant impact in the fight 
against corruption. This is because its yearly publications generate widespread interest across 
the world and contributes to galvanising international anti-corruption initiatives such as those 
sponsored by the World Bank.30 This thesis adopts TI’s index and methodology to prove the 
levels of corruption in Nigeria. 
 Due to lack of transparency, accountability, enforcement of anti-corruption laws and a number 
of other contributory factors discussed in the course of this chapter, corruption by PEPS 
remains prevalent and deeply rooted in Nigeria. It is against this background that this chapter 
aims to provide some insight on corruption, particularly grand corruption involving public 
officials in Nigeria. Due to brevity constraints and in keeping with the word limits, no attempt 
is made in this chapter to review the vast growing literature on other forms of corruption by 
academics and practitioners.31   
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However, this chapter takes cognisance of the existence of other classifications of corruption 
such as petty corruption; which refers to the kind of corruption that manifests itself at a lower 
level which people can experience daily in their encounter with public administration and 
services such as government agencies where civil servants make unjustified demands to 
perform or not perform services that are ordinarily functions of their role.32 This is not to state 
that petty corruption does not pose its own dangers. It is also widespread in Nigeria and carries 
with it many of the economic and governance liabilities as grand corruption. 
However, given the scope and nature of corruption and its broad classifications, this chapter 
focuses on grand corruption as it has been identified as perhaps the most damaging type of 
corruption, not only in the sums of money stolen; but because of its broader societal 
consequences.33 Moreover, the type of figures that exist in this category of corruption are 
immense, and in the context of underdevelopment and poverty, almost unimaginable as it 
impacts negatively on Nigerians who can least afford the diversion of large sums of public 
money into the hands of corrupt PEPs.  
This chapter begins to make evident the nature of grand corruption in Nigeria, specifically 
those perpetuated by public officials, a theme that will be continued in subsequent chapters. 
The chapter is based on research from scholars in the anti-corruption and anti-money 
laundering field. It draws from the literature on corruption, particularly in Nigeria. The chapter 
aims to provide an analysis of grand corruption in Nigeria and the contributory factors as to 
why corruption flourishes in Nigeria. To this end, it is identified and argued that weak 
institutions, poor enforcement of laws, lack of political will, cultural and social norms have all 
developed as core reasons why corruption and grand corruption have remained endemic in 
Nigeria.  
The chapter posits that one of the primary reasons for endemic corruption in Nigeria is 
underpinned by social norms, and this becomes paramount given that those who emerge as the 
leaders of tomorrow and who might have the opportunity to engage in corrupt practices are still 
the same members of the society. In addition, the chapter argues that although laws and 
implementation of laws are fundamental in tackling corruption, strong political will is 
paramount and must be exhibited by the leadership by showing strong resolve to fight 
corruption. The chapter also argues for strong institutions because where there are weak 
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institutions, particularly in the enforcement and implementation of laws and regulations, this 
gives room for corruption to thrive. 
To this end, the chapter is outlined as follows: The first section deals with definitional 
considerations of corruption, the destructive powers of corruption, evidence of the extent of 
corruption in Nigeria and why corruption flourishes in Nigeria; with an analysis of social norms 
as the root cause of corruption. This is followed by the second section which analyses grand 
corruption in Nigeria with some case studies; factors affecting the curbing of grand corruption 
in Nigeria such as weak institutions, lack of political will, as well as delays in the dispensation 
of justice. The third section concludes the chapter. It must be remembered that this chapter 
serves as a foundation for the discussion which is to follow in subsequent chapters. 
It is apposite to mention to the readership that money laundering is dealt with extensively in 



















2.2                            DEFINITIONS OF CORRUPTION 
Corruption has attained uncanny monstrosity and sophisticated dimensions, rendering the task 
of conceptualising it, as herculean as the fight against it.34 Various definitions abound, each 
emanating from different perspectives depending on the intellectual or political stand point of 
the scholar. According to Bright, the difficulty in defining corruption is linked to its secret and 
clandestine nature; as well as its many manifestations, dimensions and forms.35  Statutory 
definitions exist both at the domestic and international levels.  
Corruption has many connotations and interpretations, varying by time, place as well as 
discipline. It has been simply defined as the act of doing something which is done for some 
benefit either personally or for someone else, contrary to the rights of others.36 Adopting a 
narrow view of the concept, Pogoson stated that despite different views through which 
corruption is viewed, a common ground opinion conceives corruption as the perpetration of a 
vice against the well-being, an effort to secure wealth or power through illegal means- the abuse 
of public office in exchange for private benefits.37  
The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) defines corruption to include all 
of the following activities: the active and passive bribery of domestic and foreign public 
officials as well as officials from international organisations; the embezzlement or diversion of 
public property by an official; trading in influence or illicit enrichment by a public official; and 
bribery and embezzlement in the private sector.38 In Nigeria, the Corrupt Practices and Other 
Related Offences Act 2000, an act that is dedicated to curbing corruption in Nigeria defines 
corruption simply by saying that corruption includes bribery, fraud and other related offences.39 
This thesis considers this definition vague and makes one wonder if corruption is closely 
viewed in the context of bribery. 
In the same vein, Transparency International defines corruption as the abuse of an entrusted 
power for private gain.40 Similarly, World Bank defines corruption as the abuse of public office 
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for private gain.41 In the context of this thesis, it involves behaviour on the part of politically 
exposed persons in which they improperly and unlawfully advance their private interest of any 
kind, or those of others contrary to the interest of the office they occupy.42 It becomes apparent 
when a public official experiences a conflict of interest in circumstances of having to exercise 
the powers of public office in the public interest on the one hand, and personal interest in 
attaining private gain on the other hand.  
Ackerman is of the view that the UNCAC definition encompasses several corrupt activities, 
which is also, how corruption manifests in Nigeria. For instance, bribery, embezzlement, 
contract inflation, nepotism, cronyism, influence peddling, conflicts of interest43 are all forms 
of how corruption manifest in Nigeria. These definitions find support in the case of AG Ondo 
v AG Federation,44 wherein Mohammed Uwais stated that ‘‘Corruption is not a disease which 
afflicts public officers alone but society as a whole. If it is therefore to be eradicated effectively, 
the solution to it must be pervasive to cover every segment of the society’’.  
Essentially, the common denominator in all these is that corruption is the abuse of office, abuse 
of due process for personal or selfish interest against the common good. It is a crime of which 
the society is the victim.45Although most of the definitions place the public sector at the centre 
of corruption, it must be pointed out in this chapter that this should not be taken to mean that 
corruption cannot occur or that its effects are minor in the private sector. It exists in the private 
sector as much as in the public sector. Private sector corruption deserves as much attention as 
public sector corruption due to close synergies between those in the private sector and those in 
the public sector.46 This is so because, in modern times, the private sector performs roles that 
were previously discharged by public officials in national governments. Therefore, they have 
the same opportunity and propensity to act corruptly like any other public servant. As a matter 
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of fact, most government public projects are contracted to and handled by private actors such 
as procurement in sectors like defence, health, infrastructure and energy.47 
To demonstrate, in Nigeria, government corporations such as the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC) go into partnership, joint venture agreements and other similar 
contractual obligations for the discharge of public functions with those in the private sector, i.e. 
in the oil and gas industry.48 For this reason, it can create opportunity in the sense that some 
private actors can often exploit their connections with influential politicians to perpetuate acts 
of corruption. Therefore, it can be held that the private sector can also be involved in most 
government corruption. Having said that, private sector corruption is beyond the scope of this 
chapter. 
2.3 A SUCCINCT HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF NIGERIA’S CORRUPTION STRUGGLE 
The history of corruption in Nigeria is one of periodic deterioration. The scope and complexity 
of corruption in Nigeria is immense. Corruption has progressively eaten into the fabric of the 
Nigerian society for decades and this has consequently earned Nigeria the status of being 
among the most corrupt countries on earth.  
However, it is not enough to say that people in Nigeria are corrupt, but to ask who and what is 
corrupting them? Some indication to these questions comes from the fraudulent accumulation 
of public funds which has resulted in the phenomenal enrichment of Nigerian public officials 
at the expense of the populace. Consequently, this has created poverty for majority of the 
citizens while concentrating wealth on politically exposed persons.  Nigeria is thus, in a 
paradoxical situation in which the scandalous wealth of public officials exits in the midst of 
unspeakable mass poverty. Rampant corruption among the ruling class, overtime taught a 
dangerously disruptive lesson to the generality of the people that being honest does not pay; 
this situation is also highly indicative, at the attitudinal level as the society is conducive to, or 
largely tolerant to corruption.49  
Historically, pre-colonial Nigeria made up of villages and tribes was regarded as moral; 
whereby theft, extortion and misappropriation of property was considered morally 
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unacceptable within these societies which had orthodox ways of preventing and penalising 
corrupt practices.50  Many scholars of Nigerian politics hold the view that corruption and 
unethical practices in Nigeria are symptoms of perversion of traditional values and beliefs such 
as honesty, kingship and ethnic solidarity by the exploitative colonial era.51 The implication 
being a cultural transformation in areas of value system, governance and politics which led to 
people’s moral values being eroded while giving room for corruption. Despite the existence of 
pre-colonial moral codes, it did not prevent public officials who benefited from the newly 
created opportunities which arose from independence from engaging in acts of corruption, even 
though it was inconsistent with historical, traditional and moral codes under which they grew 
up.  
Nigeria gained independence in 1960 and its immediate aftermath in Nigeria led to political 
authority and exploiting maximally the public wealth of the state which was previously 
unavailable.52 After independence, the theme of corruption dominated the general perception 
of government activities. Thus, the corruption of public office arguably existed in Nigeria since 
the establishment of modern structures of public administration in the country, post the British 
colonial government. Furthermore, the misrule, ineptitude and massive corruption of the first 
republic after independence set the agenda for military rule in Nigeria as a corrective form of 
governance committed against corruption.53 
 However, the long periods of various military rule in Nigeria from 1966-1998 was identified 
and characterised by corruption, greed, abuse of power by military dictators such as General 
Sani Abacha, who transformed governance into kleptocracy and institutionalised the 
plundering of public funds.54 It is pertinent to state that one of the paramount reasons given by 
the masterminds of several military coups in Nigeria was widespread corruption.  
 Return to democratic government in 1999 brought respite and optimism in Nigeria from the 
massive corruption that existed during various military regimes. Nonetheless, from a catalogue 
of examples which would be provided in the course of this chapter and thesis, grand corruption 
has been immense and proved to be substantially worse than ever before in the history of 
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Nigeria because of the sheer number of democratic public officials involved in the 
misappropriation and theft of public funds which should have been channelled towards the 
provision of infrastructure and used for the general welfare of Nigerians. The lack of basic 
amenities, poverty, unemployment, has contributed to general citizens disenchantment. The 
World Bank posits that 4 in 10 Nigerians were living in poverty and millions more are 
vulnerable to falling below the poverty line.55 Economic hardship and crass poverty have 
rendered attempts to stem the tide of corruption in Nigeria because poverty makes people 
amenable and irresistible to corruption.56 
Corruption breeds poverty and poverty aids corruption to flourish. Generally, citizens attitudes 
to corruption vary, as well as their reactions to and experience of corruption.57 Corruption is 
practiced for a combination of reasons, such as low salaries which are sometimes delayed or 
not paid as a result of the embezzlement of workers salaries and pensions by public officials.58 
When paid, salaries are too meagre to meet the needs of the people. Most people tend to engage 
in corruption as a response to their immediate and pressing circumstances due to the hardship 
caused by grand corruption.59 This has led to most people taking care of their wants and needs 
for economic survival, even if dishonestly. It also explains why many Nigerians give into 
corruption, same corruption they blame for their economic woes. In Nigeria, governance is 
more about sharing spoils rather than promoting overall prosperity.  
Some members of the society who have learnt that corruption pays with little or no consequence 
have taken to a culture of corruption, learning to steal and engage in corrupt practices as their 
leaders when they themselves assume positions of authority. Like scholars hold, corruption 
tends to foster more corruption, perpetuating and entrenching social injustice in daily life. Such 
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an environment weakens societal values of honesty and integrity, as the impunity of dishonest 
practices and abuses of power or position steadily erode citizens sense of moral responsibility.60  
There are also systemic factors that combine with social norms to sustain corruption in Nigeria. 
These include politics of ethnicity and tribalism, and societal pressures on public servants who 
are expected to live in affluence. Based on ethnicity or regional affiliations, if a person from a 
particular state or constituency wins an election or is appointed into public office, people from 
his/her state or constituency expect benefits from having a home-grown government official in 
office. This is also as certain segments of the citizenry do not hide their expressions of solidarity 
with persons of their tribe being arrested or prosecuted for corruption. Demonstrations by 
supporters such as market women, business people, artisans who express sympathy for the 
ordeal of public officials accused of corruption are some of the ways that it has been sought to 
convey social antipathy to the anti-corruption fight thereby letting corruption flourish. These 
are some of the ways that corruption as a way of life have become pervasive and popularised 
in Nigeria.  
On the positive side, corruption is being discussed in public fora in Nigeria; because of 
increasing awareness that unless corruption is controlled, it will be impossible to arrest an 
imminent degeneration of society. 
2.4         UNDERSTANDING THE DESTRUCTIVE POWERS OF CORRUPTION  
Chief Afe Babalola addressing the court in A-G Ondo State v A-G Federation held as follows:61 
It is a notorious fact that one of the ills which have plagued and still plaguing the     
Nigerian Nation is corruption in all facets of our National Life. It is an incontrovertible 
fact that the present economic morals and or quagmire in which the country finds itself 
is largely attributable to the notorious virus known as corruption. This court is bound 
to take judicial notice of these facts and is so invited to do so. 
 There is no doubt that corruption is a widespread phenomenon and a global problem which 
has often been linked to poor and developing countries. This is because corruption is usually 
highlighted as one of the core reasons for underdevelopment in these countries. 62  Also, 
historically, the most egregious cases of grand corruption emanated from these countries and 
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have contributed to their persistent fall in several corruption index such as Transparency 
Internationals CPI.63  
Corruption is now appreciated as a global concept that requires global solutions; because it is 
found in all countries regardless of its stage of development.64 In other words, no country is 
immune from corruption and even developed countries can be linked to corruption. For 
instance, the prevalence of bribery of foreign politicians and failing to tackle bribery by their 
companies in other countries contributed to the promulgation of the United States Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act 1977(FCPA 1977), which outlawed and criminalised US companies 
from bribing foreign public officials.65 Likewise in the UK, the controversy involving  BAE 
systems (British Defence Contractors) payment of bribes to foreign public officials to secure 
arms contract led to the promulgation of the UK Bribery Act.66 
Nevertheless, developing countries are disproportionately affected by corruption. The above 
preposition finds justification in a statement made by the then United Nations Secretary 
General, Kofi Annan in his statement to the United Nations General Assembly on the adoption 
of the United Nations Convention against Corruption.  
This evil phenomenon is found in all countries big and small, rich and poor but it is in 
the developing world that its effects are most destructive. Corruption hurts the poor 
disproportionately by diverting funds intended for development, undermining a 
government’s ability to provide basic services, feeding inequality, injustice, and 
discourages foreign investment. Corruption is a key element in economic under-
performance, and a major obstacle to poverty alleviation and development.67  
Transparency International estimates that at least $1trillion dollars is being taken out of 
developing countries each year through a web of corrupt activities like money laundering that 
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involves the use of anonymous shell companies.68 The World Bank identified corruption as the 
single greatest obstacle to economic and social development.69 According to the World Bank, 
corruption undermines development by distorting the rule of law and weakening the 
institutional foundation on which economic growth depends. It undermines accountability and 
transparency in the management of public affairs. It also undermines socio-economic 
development as economic goals of growth, poverty alleviation, are all undermined by 
corruption.70  
Not only the World Bank, but also the International Monetary Fund is of the view that 
corruption causes significant macroeconomic failures. 71  This is also as scholars such as 
Klitgaard is of the view that persistent developmental failures are often caused by corrupt 
states.72 Corruption’s evil flows not just from the fact that some corrupt individuals are able to 
become very rich by dishonest means, it causes untold damage to the state itself from the 
diminution of public funds and the wastage of funds to private pockets.  
When a corrupt PEP diverts public funds, he does so from the people on whom that money 
should be spent and thereby deprives them of schools, hospitals, roads et cetera.73 Nigeria is a 
popular and quintessential example of the destructive effects of corruption on a country, and 
the impact corruption has in slowing down its development. Although Nigeria is plagued with 
many other problems, the upsurge of corruption, particularly grand corruption in recent decades 
has been troubling. 
To demonstrate, Nuhu Ribadu, Nigeria’s pioneer chairman of the Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission (EFCC), once held; that between 1960 when Nigeria gained her 
independence from Britain to 1999 which marked the start of civilian rule in Nigeria, public 
officials had stolen or wasted $440 billion. According to Ribadu, this was approximately the 
total sum of money needed to rebuild a devastated Europe in the aftermath of the Second World 
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War.74 In similar vein, the Global Financial Integrity held that between 2005 and 2014, some 
$182 billion was lost through corruption and illicit financial flows from Nigeria.75  
These outflows are not abstract numbers. They translate to and explain the apparent destructive 
effect corruption has on a nation riddled with poverty, lack of education, lack of good health 
care and lack of basic social amenities. For instance, it is held that 70% of Nigeria’s population 
live below poverty line;76 and according to UNICEF,77 at an estimated 10.5 million, Nigeria 
has the world’s largest number of out of school children. From these examples, it could be seen 
that stolen public resources by PEPs could be used for legitimate and beneficial purposes for 
the common good rather than being squandered by corrupt PEPs on illegitimate and 
unproductive activities.  
In effect, acts of corruption disproportionately targets the poor, and helps keep them poor in 
Nigeria.78 It is likely to deliver private benefits for unscrupulous public officials and enormous 
hardship for the public. Not only does corruption hurt the poor, it also deprives every citizen 
of access to basic infrastructures and economic development. Corruption also tends to foster 
more corruption, perpetuating and entrenching social injustice in daily life. 79  It weakens 
societal values of fairness, honesty, and integrity as the impunity of dishonest practices and 
abuses of power or position steadily erodes citizen’s sense of moral responsibility to follow the 
rules in the interest of wider society.80 No true sustainable national development can take place 
in Nigeria if her national wealth is diverted for the benefit of a few.  
Thus, to put it succinctly, the cost and consequences of corruption for Nigeria in terms of 
damage to public life can generally speaking be summed up as follows: Enormous loss of 
government revenue, as government has less money to spend on public projects and 
infrastructures; the undermining of national development efforts and economic potentials; 
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erosion of efficiency, effectiveness and productivity of public services; the tainting of national 
image81, as Nigeria is reputed for being one of the most corrupt Nations in the world.  
 2.5              WHY CORRUPTION FLOURISHES IN NIGERIA 
In the literature, there are a plethora of reasons and factors for the prevalence of corruption in 
Nigeria. Prominent among these factors are: a corrupt leadership that lacks the necessary 
political will to curtail corruption,82and the society’s tolerance of corruption83. Furthermore, 
other factors identified include: weak government institutions, poverty, greed, lack of 
accountability and transparency in public service, tolerance and acceptance of corruption by 
the populace, and ineffective anti-corruption agencies have all contributed to the prevalence of 
corruption in Nigeria.84  
Kazeem is of the view that corruption in Nigeria is a by-product of the failure of leadership.85 
Contributing to the discourse of factors responsible for the prevalence of corruption in Nigeria, 
the former Deputy Governor (Financial System Stability), Central Bank of Nigeria, Mr. 
Adebayo Adelabu, stated at a compliance conference held in Lagos, Nigeria, that some of the 
factors responsible for the prevalence of corruption in Nigeria includes the following. Social 
value (Placing high value on the accumulation of wealth without regard to its source, Legal 
(Inadequate laws or poor implementation of legal/regulatory provisions), Individual attitudes 
(Insatiable appetite for wealth)86.   For the purposes of this chapter, societal acceptance of 
corruption as a way of life, lack of political will, weak anti-corruption laws/institutions, delay 
in the administration of justice/ judicial corruption have been highlighted as contributory 
factors that aid in stimulating corruption. These factors will be analysed in the sections that 
follow. 
 
                                                             
81 Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money laundering in west Africa (GIABA REPORT),’Corruption-
Money laundering nexus: An analysis of risks and control measures in west Africa’ 2010 
<https://www.giaba.org/media/f/114_corruption-and-money-laundering-nexus---english-rev051810-1-.pdf> 
accessed 17 March 2018 
82 Akume Albert,’ Combating Corruption in Nigeria and the Constitutional issues arising: Are they facilitators or 
inhibitors?’ (2016) 23 Journal of Financial Crime 700 
83 Lanre Olu-Adeyemi and Tomola Obamuyi,’ Public accountability: Implications of the Conspiratorial 
Relationship between Political appointees and Civil servants in Nigeria’ (2010) 2 iBusiness 123 
84 ibid 
85 Kazeem AF,’ A philosophical appraisal of leadership and development in Nigeria?’ in Tony Edoh and 
Terhemba Wuam (eds), Democracy, leadership and accountability in post-colonial Africa: Challenges and 
possibilities (Aboki Publishers 2009) 110 
86 Adebayo Adelabu,’ Fraud and Corruption: The Role of Banks and Other Corporate entities’ (Compliance 




2.5.1   INVESTIGATING SOCIAL NORMS AS THE ROOT CAUSE OF CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA 
The importance of social norms and practices in understanding corrupt behaviour in Nigeria is 
paramount. In this regard, it is pertinent to lay a groundwork with theories from scholars while 
discussing social norms. Mishra argues that widespread or endemic corruption as it is in Nigeria 
indicates that corrupt behaviour is the norm itself despite the fact that it is generally 
condemned. 87  He further argues that the pervasiveness of corruption contributes to its 
persistence in a significant way. When there are many corrupt individuals in the society, it 
becomes optimal to be corrupt despite the presence of anti-corruption policies and incentives.88 
This way corrupt behaviour becomes the equilibrium or the social norm.  
Similarly, Collie argues that the pervasiveness of corruption gives individuals little cause to 
feel guilty about their own behaviour, and this combined with low risk of punishment and high 
social expectations of corruption makes corruption self-perpetuating.89 Corroborating Mishra 
and Collie, Ackerman states that when corruption is endemic and the stigma is low, this has 
the tendency for more people to be corrupt, producing vicious cycles.90 Furthermore, it has 
been held that though laws and the implementation of same are essential in fighting corruption; 
they cannot themselves foster a sustainable, comprehensive reversal of long-established 
assumptions and practices in the absence of a decisive shift in public apathy and a collective 
will to achieve collective behavioural change.91  
A holistic analysis of corruption in Nigeria will benefit from looking at the social dimension 
that sustains this phenomenon. This is so because one of the reasons for wide spread corruption 
is the fact that it is sustained by social norms, beliefs and societal expectations.92 This section 
argues that factors affecting the stimulation of corruption in Nigeria are found in the larger 
societal matrix of resilient social norms which constitute the environment of corruption in 
Nigeria; therefore, creating a society that is either conducive to, or largely tolerant to corruption.  
According to Bicchieri, social norms are markers of how people behave in a society, and is 
indicative of how people choose to act in different situations. Ocheje on his part sees social 
norms as a pattern of behaviour which people conform to on the belief that most people engage 
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in the same conduct.93 They determine accepted forms of behaviour in a society.94 Norms are 
also very important factor for consideration in any attempt to change social behaviour. Scholars 
are of the view that people’s behaviours are often influenced by what others do and by what 
others think should be done.95  This is because if a practice is widespread, like corruption is in 
Nigeria, there is a risk that most people will endorse it, hence reinforcing a social norm. 
Therefore, people may decide to act corruptly because they believe others do so, thus producing 
a vicious cycle and contributing to the persistence of corruption in the society. 
Lawal observes that corruption in the Nigerian society has with the passage of time, become a 
convention, a psychological need, and a necessity. In Nigeria, the impact of social norms is 
evident in attitudes to corruption. 96  The ‘every-one-is- doing it’ (everyday corruption) 
mentality or the mind-set that is usually obtainable in Nigeria, the idea that someday it may be 
your day to get yours has taken hold of the Nigerian society and precipitated a slide in moral 
standards.97 This is partly why many Nigerians have resorted to corruption as a strategy both 
for coping and for survival because most believe that the benefits of corruption outweigh the 
harm or that corruption makes everything easier.  
Corruption has become a way of life in Nigeria to the extent that not to be corrupt tends to be 
regarded as an aberration.98 This explains why corruption has become a phenomenon to be 
condoned and accommodated and why the stigma of being labelled corrupt is rarely seen as a 
problem in Nigeria.  In Nigeria, public officials are expected to get richer and grant favours to 
family, friends and members of their community, putting pressure on them to engage in corrupt 
practices like nepotism, and criminal diversion of public funds. 99  Most PEPs engage in 
nepotism,100 a form of corruption, which is usually practiced in Nigeria with those in power 
giving undue advantage to relatives or friends, i.e. offering them jobs upon that relationship 
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rather than an objective evaluation of ability or suitability.101 In other words, a bestowal of 
patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit.  
Furthermore, in Nigeria, many still see the election or appointment of a relative into a public 
office as an opportunity for one of their own to partake in the national patrimony. Once a person 
is appointed into any political office, the expectations from his people and the society will be 
extremely high in terms of what the office offers.102 Overtime, this belief and expectations from 
people in public office in Nigeria has helped sustain a culture of grand corruption in Nigeria. 
When such practice is taken as the norm in a society where public officials are put under 
pressure to exploit their positions, corrupt practices becomes entrenched. 
As Alina states, in such a society where tolerance of corruption exists, it becomes part of the 
political process whereby winners of elections and appointees of public office treat state 
resources as the major source of spoils, feeding off public resources rather than promoting 
overall prosperity.103 This creates an environment that sustains corrupt behaviour and tolerance 
of corruption by members of the society. Such tolerance revolves in vicious cycles as members 
of the society such as the younger generations become leaders of tomorrow. Some will 
transcend to becoming political figures and public officials who might find themselves in 
positions that create opportunity for corruption.  
Socially, corruption has eaten deep into the society. Igwereme states that there is a tendency 
from the Nigerian society to celebrate corrupt officials who divert public funds. 104  The 
Nigerian society expects public office holders or politicians to live in affluence, having an array 
of assets attached to them with little or no attention paid to the source of such wealth; despite 
the knowledge of the levels of corruption among public officials.  
 According to Bamidele, the society’s attitudinal weakness has contributed to sustaining 
corruption in Nigeria.105 Bamidele questions why the society recognise public officials who 
have corruptly enriched themselves in the course of serving the country?106 Why do Governors, 
some of whom have been implicated in engaging in corrupt practices be given awards, or 
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elected into the other positions of public service? Why would religious institutions ordain 
corrupt public officials, and sometimes organise thanksgiving services for corrupt ex-convicts 
after serving prison sentences?107 
This attitudinal weakness in the society has contributed in eroding the right ethical standards 
required of public officials. Many exhibit expressions of solidarity with persons being 
investigated or prosecuted for corruption. For instance, when Chief Diepreye Alameiseigha 
was sentenced to prison for corruptly enriching himself in the course of serving as Governor 
of Bayelsa State, upon his release, he was eulogised and celebrated.108  
Based on the above analyses, it becomes apparent that breakdown in social values has 
negatively impacted the prevalence of corruption in Nigeria. It has been a contributory factor 
in stimulating corruption and promoting the wealthy, which most times are public officials. 
Societal acceptance in respect of attitudes towards corruption and corrupt Nigerian public 
officials has made it doubly difficult to fight corruption in Nigeria. Thus, this thesis agrees with 
Pogoson who believes that combating corruption, especially in Nigeria where it is endemic, 
pervasive, and deep-rooted, must involve more than the promulgation of laws and institutions 
to fight corruption. Anti-corruption regime must involve multifaceted strategies that address 
the underlying social problems that spur correction.109 
 2.6        GRAND CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA AND SOME CASE STUDIES 
The focus of this section is on grand corruption in Nigeria. The section examines grand 
corruption in Nigeria as a framework for the analysis undertaken in the entire research. Over 
the years, issues of grand corruption have frequently dominated Nigerian political space. 
Successive governments in Nigeria have at different times been accused of grand corruption 
and their inability to tackle same in Nigeria. There have also been several legal and institutional 
efforts to combat it, such as the creation of anti-corruption agencies110 and the ratification of 
regional and international instruments on corruption.111 However, the spate of grand corruption 
remains unaffected by Nigeria’s domestic anti-corruption initiatives, and undermines its 
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commitment to the ratified regional and international treaties.112  So far, none has proved 
successful and Nigeria remains one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Records show 
that political leaders at different levels have misappropriated Nigeria’s resources,113 and have 
institutionalised corrupt practices, which has severely constrained her development 
potentials.114  
Just like corruption, grand corruption as a form of corruption has been a major obstacle to the 
achievement of sustainable development in Nigeria.115 It has deepened poverty, inequality and 
has contributed to an increase in social ills in Nigeria. 116  According to scholars, grand 
corruption is the abuse of high-level power that involves the misappropriation or embezzlement 
of public funds for the benefit of a few at the expense of many, and causes serious and 
widespread harm to individuals and society.117 Transparency International posits that grand 
corruption occurs when a public official deprives a particular social group or substantial part 
of the population of a fundamental right; or causes the state or any of its people a loss greater 
than 100 times the annual minimum subsistence income of its people; as a result of bribery, 
embezzlement or other corruption offences.118 
Rose Ackerman submits that grand corruption refers to corruption at the highest level of 
government and involves a small number of powerful players and large sums of money.119 
Ackerman states that deals involved in grand corruption are by definition the preserve of top 
public officials.120 Usually, the ingredient present in grand corruption cases is the seniority of 
public officials involved, and the size of public funds that is diverted.121 To buttress, the 
Halliburton $180 million bribery scandal in Nigeria involving kickbacks and bribes in 
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facilitating contract on the construction of liquefied natural gas in Nigeria,122the diversion of 
$2 billion defence budget in 2015 by retired Colonel Sambo Dasuki, former National Security 
Adviser,123 and a significant number of cases which would be accessed in the course of this 
chapter are all instances of established cases of grand corruption in Nigeria. 
Grand corruption represents a dangerous social phenomenon plaguing Nigeria despite legal 
and institutional efforts to combat it; and the most adversely affected victims are the citizens. 
Extensive research has shown that misappropriation of resources intended for economic 
development by the grand corruption of public officials is the major driver of economic 
underperformance and the perpetuation of the cycle of poverty.124 This is because public funds 
that ought to be used to propel industrialisation, build schools, provide water, adequate 
transportation system, alleviate poverty and ensure good life for the people are criminally 
diverted and laundered by those who have access to the public treasury. Consequently, 
depriving and impoverishing many to the advantage of a few.  
Grand corruption in Nigeria is so pervasive that it has turned public service for many into a 
kind of criminal enterprise.125 The pursuit of short-term gains by Nigerian public officials in 
the management of public resources have allowed grand corruption to become endemic. Acts 
of corruption by political office holders have become the rule, rather than the exception and 
corruption has become a euphemism for describing the political leadership in Nigeria because 
they often provide a fertile ground for corruption to thrive.  
What is obtainable among Nigerian public officials is a state of affairs where the exercise of 
public office is subverted by public officials who act self-interestedly and think of public office 
as a realm in which their self-interest supersedes the interests of the public at large; and where 
public officials pursue such self-interest with impunity. Public office is seen as financially 
attractive as they offer opportunities for self-enrichment. The problem is particularly dire in 
Nigeria where good governance, integrity, accountability and transparency are uncommon 
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attributes in the conduct of public affairs;126 rather the political leadership is mired in the 
pursuit of selfish personal gains at the expense of broader national interest and development.127 
Awofeso and Isaac blame the prevalence of grand corruption solely on a crisis of leadership, 
accusing most Nigerian leaders of a lack of self-discipline.128 It is my submission that this 
preposition is an apt assertion of the current situation in Nigeria, especially when juxtaposed 
with the overwhelming sums of money stolen by public officials in Nigeria on a daily basis, 
which has resulted in a depletion of Nigeria’s material resources. Suffice to say that there are 
quite a number of Nigerian politicians, and public officials who have conducted and discharged 
their duties with integrity, and who have rendered honest service to the nation while in office.  
However, those are in the minority. Due to the rampancy of public officials embezzling vast 
sums of funds and laundering same to offshore financial centres around the world, Nigeria have 
been inundated by local and global corruption scandals perpetuated by public officials. Some 
have been convicted, albeit in foreign jurisdictions such as the case of James Ibori, a Nigerian 
PEP convicted and sentenced to 13 years in prison for diversion of public funds and money 
laundering in the United Kingdom. 
Several reported grand corruption scandals in Nigeria point to the conclusion that corruption 
in Nigeria is immense and has metastasised throughout the body politics. There are a catalogue 
of corruption cases involving PEPs in Nigeria who are being investigated or prosecuted for 
abuse of office, money laundering, and other related crimes. These public officials include past 
Governors, Ministers, lawmakers and top military officers. 
2.6.1    A CASE STUDY OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS INVOLVED IN GRAND CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA 
To illustrate the alarming nature of grand corruption perpetuated by public officials in Nigeria, 
it is pertinent to provide some examples. Enforcement institutions such as the Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission and other enforcement agencies continue to uncover cases of 
corrupt practices and money laundering among Nigerian public officials.  
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2.6.2     The case of Joshua Dariye (Former Governor Plateau State): 
Firstly, Joshua Dariye, a former Governor of Plateau State was found to operate numerous bank 
accounts in London which was used to transfer and launder stolen public funds.129 In the course 
of investigation, a discovery of £810,000 pounds was traced to a UK account held by Dariye. 
Like many other corrupt public officials in Nigeria, Dariye used front agents to acquires assets 
in real estate where he purchased expensive properties. The London Metropolitan Police 
determined that Dariye had laundered about £10 million through London.130 
Furthermore, Mr Dariye, a serving senator in Nigeria was accused of embezzling N1.6 
billion(naira) ecological funds belonging to his state and siphoning money out of the country 
to foreign banks. Although he was initially arraigned in 2007, his trial was stalled for over eight 
years after he lodged several appeals to quash the charges against him. He was eventually 
sentenced to 14 years in prison in June 2018,131 one of the very few convictions ever recorded 
in Nigeria involving a public official. 
 2.6.3     The case of Diepreye Alamieyeseigha (Former Governor Bayelsa State): 
Secondly, another corruption scandal was that of Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, a former Governor 
of Bayelsa State. He was first detained upon arrival in London for money laundering, and being 
in possession of large quantity of undeclared cash. Following subsequent raids, $1.5 million in 
cash was recovered from his home in London. In addition, a further $2.7 million was also 
discovered in a Royal Bank of Scotland account linked to him. It was discovered that he 
purchased real estate worth $15million in London, and found to be the owner of four private 
properties in London worth millions of pounds.132  In May 2006, a London court ordered 
confiscation of the seized cash pursuant to the Proceeds of Crime Act after breaching bail 
conditions. Upon returning to Nigeria, he pleaded guilty to criminal diversion of public funds 
and money laundering in a Nigerian court and was subsequently sentenced to 2years in 
prison.133 
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2.6.4        The case of James Ibori (Former Governor Delta State): 
Thirdly, one of the most highly criticised and sensational case of corruption in Nigeria involved 
a former Governor of Delta state, James Ibori. Initially, Ibori was charged in Nigeria with 170 
counts for offences that includes theft of public funds, abuse of office, money laundering and 
failure to make full disclosure of his assets in the Declaration of Assets form.134 During the 
trials in Nigeria, and according to the former chairman of EFCC, Ibori attempted to disrupt and 
evade the course of justice by bribing officials of the EFCC to the tune of $15 million to set 
aside his case.135  
In December 2009, he was discharged by a federal high court sitting in Delta State of all 170 
charges of corruption brought against him by the EFCC. The court’s decision was based on a 
no-case submission made by the accused. The court held that the prosecution had failed to 
make out a prima facie case in respect of counts of money laundering preferred against Ibori. 
In April 2010, a new allegation of embezzlement of N40 billion(naira) ($266million) was 
pressed against him.136 All attempts made to secure his arrests proved to be futile, and Ibori 
fled Nigeria, prompting the EFCC to request assistance of the Interpol. As a result of these 
corruption allegations, the UK courts froze Irori’s assets valued at about £17 million137.  
In May 2010, Ibori was arrested in Dubai under Interpol arrest warrant, issued by UK courts. 
On 27th February 2012, accused of stealing $250 million from the Nigerian public purse, Ibori 
pleaded guilty to ten counts of money laundering and conspiracy to defraud at Southwark 
Crown court in London contrary to s328 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.138 The court was 
told how the amount he stole was unquantified.139 It was the Crowns case that Ibori corruptly 
and fraudulently used nine companies to defraud the state, and that he purchased six properties 
outside Nigeria with stolen money and also operated bank accounts all over the world.  
The properties acquired included a house in Hampstead, London, purchased for £2.2 million 
in cash, a mansion in South Africa for £3million, and a house in Houston, Texas, purchased 
for $1.8million. In 2005, he also instructed a solicitor to purchase a private jet for a sum of $20 
million. One of the counts he was charged with involved the use of a client account of Arlington 
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Sharma solicitors, a firm of solicitors in Mayfair, as a private bank account for himself and his 
family through which he laundered money. 
 The law firm helped facilitate the laundering of the proceeds of corruption through the creation 
of a series of complex financial transactions involving several sophisticated money laundering 
schemes, such as the creation of trusts to ensure Ibori’s assets were obscured. This case serves 
as a quintessential example of how most corrupt Nigeria public officials launder stolen wealth 
using corporate vehicles such as the incorporation of shell companies, the creation of trusts, 
and the use of gatekeepers like lawyers in facilitating money laundering schemes, which will 
be analysed in more detail in the chapter that follows. 
2.6.5       The case of Orji Uzor Kalu (Former Governor of Abia State) 
Fourthly, the case of Orji Uzor Kalu is another quintessential example of the involvement of 
PEPs in the plunder of public funds. Kalu served as a two term Governor of Abia State. Shortly 
after stepping down as Governor, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission received 
several petitions from concerned indigenes against Kalu bordering on abuse of office, 
corruption and money laundering. Upon receipt of the petitions, the EFCC investigated the 
petitions which revealed that he plundered state resources.140 
He was later charged to court alongside his company Slok Nigeria Limited on a 39-count 
charge of illegal diversion of public funds and money laundering to the tune of N7.1 billion 
(naira). According to the prosecution, the 7.1 billion formed part of the funds illegally diverted 
from the treasury of Abia State Government which was converted by the defendant. The EFCC 
alleged that Kalu incorporated a company in which he used for money laundering purposes and 
to retain the proceeds of grand corruption. These offences were in contravention of the Money 
Laundering Prohibition Act 2012.141 The EFCC secured the conviction of Mr Kalu, a serving 
senator alongside his co-defendants on 39 counts of money laundering involving N7.1 billion 
at the Federal High Court in Lagos. The trial judge, Mohammed Idris, who is now a Justice of 
the Court of Appeal, sentenced Mr Kalu to 12 years imprisonment and wound up his company. 
However, there was palpable surprise throughout the country, when the Supreme Court, in a 
unanimous judgment of its seven-member panel, nullified the judgment and ordered a retrial. 
The apex court ruled and held that the trial was a nullity on the grounds that Justice Idris, had 
                                                             





been elevated to the Court of Appeal and no longer a judge of the Federal High Court as at the 
time he concluded the trial and handed down his verdict. At the time of writing, Mr Kalu has 
filed a fresh application at the Federal High Court, contending that having been convicted and 
sentenced in the same charge, it would amount to double jeopardy for him to be subjected to a 
fresh trial on the same charge.  
Equally important in the discourse of grand corruption and one of the most compelling 
evidence to prove the levels of grand corruption in Nigeria perpetuated by public officials was 
a list of names released on the 1st of April 2017 by the Nigerian Federal Government through 
the Minister for Information, Lai Mohammed.142 This list contained names of public officials 
alleged to have diverted public funds. It includes more than two dozen individuals, namely 
ministers, lawmakers, aides to high ranking officials and top military officers, all accused by 
the Nigerian federal government of criminal diversion of public funds.  
It is instructive to note that the released names was as a result of a judgment delivered by Justice 
Hadiza Rabiu Shagari in favour of Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) 
where it ordered the federal government to immediately release to Nigerians information 
regarding the names of high ranking public officials from whom public funds were recovered 
and the circumstances under which such funds were recovered; as well as the exact amount of 
funds recovered from each public official.143  
The judge agreed with SERAP that by virtue of the provisions of s4(a) of the Freedom of 
Information Act 2011, the federal government has a legally binding obligation to disclose the 
names of all suspected public officials who have diverted public funds, past and present.144 
SERAP argued that the public interest to know was greater than any other legitimate interest 
the government might wish to protect. A highlight of some names included in the list is as 
follows: 
• Former National security adviser (Sambo Dasuki) accused of diverting $2.1 
billion dollars in the scandal involving the procurement of military equipment. 
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In addition to this, a total of $1.5 billion and £5.5 million pounds was allegedly 
embezzled through his office.145 
• Rtd Lt-Gen Kenneth Minimah: N13.9 billion and N4.8 billion recovered by the 
EFCC in cash and property. 
• Rtd Lt-Gen Azubuike Ihejirika: N4.5 billion recovered by EFCC 
• Air Marshall Adesola Amosun: N21.4 billion recovered by the EFCC 
• Inde Dikko, former Controller General Customs: N40 billion in cash recovered 
and properties 
• Former Petroleum Resources Minister Dieziani Alison-Madueke: In just one of 
the cases the EFCC is investigating involving her, about N23 billion is alleged 
to have been embezzled. 
• Former Niger State Governor Babangida Aliyu is alleged to have diverted N1.6 
billion from office of National security adviser.146 
2.7           EVIDENCE OF THE EXTENT OF CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA 
In light of the fact that this chapter has made, and this thesis will be making postulations about 
endemic corruption, particularly grand corruption involving PEPs in Nigeria, it is paramount 
to advance some proof to that effect. In this regard, existing surveys and assessments provide 
an overall picture of the extent of corruption in Nigeria and other countries around the world. 
The best-known corruption assessments are the various Transparency International corruption 
indices, which includes the Global Corruption Barometer, and Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception’s Index. 147  Others include World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators.  
To demonstrate, the Worldwide Governance Indicator regarding control of corruption which 
ranges from 0 (lowest control of corruption) to 100 (highest control of corruption), shows that 
the levels of corruption in Nigeria have remained alarmingly high during past years accessed.148 
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The country scored as little as 11 on control of corruption in 2012, and 12 in 2017, and little 
significant variation can be seen since the first assessment in 1996, when Nigeria scored 
approximately 9.149  
Similarly, data from the 2017 Global Corruption Barometer, assessed by Transparency 
International, also suggests that the population’s perception of corruption is increasing.150  
The CPI is the best known of these indices and has been widely credited with making the issue 
of corruption and good governance measurable on a relatively fair and rational basis, creating 
accepted criteria that allow for international comparisons of levels of corruption across the 
globe.  This index has played a pivotal role in focusing attention on corruption, creating 
pressures for reforms across countries and influencing the actions of government, corporations, 
civil society organisations and the media.151 The most compelling evidence of corruption in 
Nigeria has been the annual CPI published by Transparency International.  
The CPI is calculated by aggregating and analysing data from independent sources that measure 
the level of public and private corruption in various countries. This data is then consolidated 
and standardised with a matching percentiles technique.152 In achieving this objective, TI uses 
a compilation of data, which is measured on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean) 
with lower scores signifying countries where corruption is prevalent.  
Evidence from this index upon examination indicates that Nigeria has consistently performed 
poorly. To demonstrate, in 2012, Nigeria ranked 139 out of 177 countries, with a score of 27.153 
In 2013, it ranked 144 with a score of 25.154 In 2014, it ranked 136 with a score of 27.155 In 
2015, it ranked 136 with a score of 26.156 In 2016, it ranked 136 with a score of 28.157 Also in 
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2017, Nigeria scored 27, and ranked 148.158 In 2019, Nigeria ranked 146 out of 183 countries 
with a score of 26.159 In the latest 2020 CPI index, Nigeria scored 25, and ranked 149.160 These 
appalling scores is an attestation of endemic corruption in Nigeria. 
Some criticise TI’s CPI holding that the index is only a prominent measure because TI has 
established a near monopoly role among non-governmental organisations fighting 
corruption.161 Furthermore, it is said that the CPI gained advantage being the first systematic 
attempt to develop a cross national measure of corruption thereby not only setting the standard 
for corruption, but also defining the field. Most scholars are sceptical about measuring 
perceptions rather than reported cases, prosecutions or even proven incidences of corruption.162  
This is so because perceptions are difficult to demonstrate empirically as one element 
contributing to perceptions of corruption in different countries is precisely their ranking in 
previous indices; therefore, introducing a certain endogeneity to the index that is compounded 
by the incorporation of rankings from previous indices into each new release.163  
Others opine that the CPI should be interpreted with caution in that the sources used in the 
measurement of corruption are subjective and can be influenced by the occurrence of visible 
scandals in a country at a particular time which do not reflect underlying conditions and 
therefore prone to bias. 164  Although these arguments hold substance, the index remains 
instrumental and continue to exercise great influence in shaping the political focus in the 
politics of anti-corruption efforts, in academic research and also in galvanising support for 
measures aimed at fighting corruption.  
Moreover, other surveys such as the World Bank’s widely used Worldwide Governance 
Indicators face the same criticism for being perception based in general.165 Nevertheless, TI is 
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candid that the CPI is a measure of how corruption is perceived, and is transparent about its 
methodology. The index remains popular and is still used to create awareness on a country’s 
level of corruption. Therefore, these figures are reflective of endemic corruption in Nigeria, 
and not unconnected to the plunging of Nigeria’s resources by corrupt politically exposed 
persons. Based on the foregoing, this thesis adopts TI’s CPI as evidence to prove the level of 
corruption in Nigeria. 
    2.8     THE OIL INDUSTRY AND ITS ROLE IN FACILITATING GRAND CORRUPTION 
Nigeria is abundantly rich in natural resources and one of the largest oil producing nations in 
the world.166 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has stated that the oil industry accounts 
for more than 75 percent of government revenue,167  and 80 percent of foreign exchange 
earnings making Nigeria one of the most oil-dependent economies in the world.168 As a result, 
the Nigerian economy has been heavily interlinked with the oil industry and massive 
dependence in this industry is rife, with the downside that it is a sector notorious for grand 
corruption as oil revenues constitutes majority of the public funds misappropriated by Nigerian 
political elites.169 This is because oil resources contributes significantly in providing resources 
for the public sector and for capital projects which is appropriated by the President, Ministers, 
Federal Agencies and Departments, State Governors, Commissioners et cetera.170  
With the billions of dollars in government revenues from this industry, Nigeria could probably 
solve its serious development and infrastructural problems. However, since the commercial 
discovery of oil in Nigeria, the phenomenally large revenue it has brought over the years has 
exacerbated the problem of grand corruption in Nigeria.171 Scholars have held that the shift 
from dependence in agriculture and other sectors to a near total dependence on oil has fuelled 
corruption.172 This is because it opened new, bigger, and more intensive opportunities for the 
irregular acquisition of money for private interest.173 Others from the development literature 
have also argued that Nigeria suffers from ‘resource curse’, meaning the paradox that 
developing countries with abundance of income from natural resources like minerals and fuels 
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tend to have less economic growth and worse developmental outcomes than countries with 
fewer natural resources.174  
As Martin posits, ‘‘Nigeria’s oil should have been a blessing for Nigeria to be used to build 
infrastructures and invest in social services. Instead, it has been a curse, a lubricant that has 
produced massive corruption and dysfunctional governments’’.175 This resource curse has been 
attributed to government mismanagement of resources and corruption. 176  Successive 
governments in Nigeria have been accused of high-level corruption by misappropriating vast 
amounts of oil funds. For instance, the most famous case is that of Governor of Central Bank 
of Nigeria, Sanusi Lamido, who in 2013 reported the disappearance of $20 billion in oil revenue 
that was criminally diverted by public officials.177 Recently, more than $215 million have been 
allegedly misappropriated by some public officials in the oil sector in relation to the Niger 
Delta Development Commission.178 Similar reports done by the KPMG, a leading auditing firm 
also revealed the massive corruption and misappropriation of public funds from the oil 
industry.179  
Because Nigeria so much depends on the oil sector as her source of living, income, economic 
growth and development, corrupt practice in this sector automatically affects all other sectors 
of the economy.180 The loss of revenue from the oil industry has had a devastating effect on the 
ability to carry out development actions, finance infrastructure or provide basic public service. 
181 This is primarily as a result of the fact that vast incomes generated from the oil industry in 
Nigeria are diverted to the pockets of some individuals whose responsibility it is to manage the 
resources on behalf of the nation.182 
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2.9    FACTORS AFFECTING THE CURBING OF GRAND CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA   
Nigeria faces severe crisis in its economic, social and political development that is connected 
to massive corruption, especially in the public sector. The fight against corruption has remained 
a constant priority for successive governments in Nigeria. The objective of this section is to 
elucidate the challenges in combating corruption in Nigeria. Several factors have been pointed 
out by scholars as responsible for the prevalence of corruption in Nigeria. These factors include 
the following: 
 2.9.1          A SYSTEM THAT REWARDS CORRUPTION 
According to Human Rights Watch, the broadest obstacle any effort to tackle grand corruption 
in Nigeria faces is that the country’s political system is built to reward corruption, not punish 
it.183 Too often, corruption is a prerequisite for success in Nigeria’s political process. Most 
public officials owe their illicitly obtained offices to political sponsors who demand financial 
returns that can only be raised through corruption.184 Nigeria’s political establishments, both 
the ruling party and opposition parties have at various times shown willingness to embrace and 
celebrate those convicted for criminal diversion of public funds and money laundering.  
For instance, after the release of a former Nigerian Ports Authority chairman, Olabode George, 
who was convicted on corruption and money laundering related charges; a lavish welcome 
ceremony was held in his honour and attended by prominent ruling party politicians including 
former President Obasanjo and Governor Gbenga Daniel who declared George a hero.185 In 
similar vein, former Governor Diepreye Alamiesiegha was granted a Presidential pardon by 
then President, Goodluck Jonathan, after he was convicted of large scale corruption related 
money laundering in Nigeria and other  foreign jurisdictions.186  
Furthermore, in Nigeria, some ex Governors and some corrupt PEPs who are either being 
investigated or prosecuted for diverting public funds while serving in different capacities in 
government are still active participants in the political system in Nigeria. Most corrupt PEPs 
have gone from being Governors, to legislators who make laws, while others also occupy other 
sensitive public offices such as being ministers of government despite being linked with large-
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scale corruption.187 It is submitted that no deterrence can be achieved in combating corruption 
if corrupt PEPS are rewarded for diverting of public funds. 
  2.9.2      THE POLITICAL WILL:  
One of the key points to mention affecting the curbing of grand corruption in Nigeria is lack of 
political will. No anti-corruption mechanism or strategy is bound to succeed without strong 
leadership and political will.188  Political will is a critical and paramount starting point to 
achieving a sustainable and effective anti-corruption fight.189 Political will demonstrates the 
commitment by the political leadership to address the challenges or to fulfil a political pledge, 
such as fighting corruption, by pursuing the appropriate policy responses, including widespread 
reforms.190 It involves building legitimacy, credibility, and broad-based political support and 
compliance both in society and within government.191 
 Political will is required to set an example and to demonstrate that no one is above the law. 
Unless clear and unambiguous signals of support emanate from the top, those responsible for 
administering and enforcing crucial aspects of the country’s laws may feel inhibited.192 In as 
much as anti-corruption and anti-money laundering laws might often exist, enforcement of 
these laws are usually frustrated without the necessary political will. Across the world, anti-
corruption efforts will be less effective without political will and without strong leadership.193 
This is so because, without political will or with political interference, it becomes more 
daunting on enforcement agents to carry out their functions properly.  
Consequently, this impedes the proper functioning of anti-corruption agencies which is capable 
of frustrating efforts at combating corruption and financial crimes by public officials.194 For 
example, the work of investigators working in an anti-corruption commission is likely to 
produce, at best, only limited results unless they enjoy the support of their political masters.  
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Transparency International in analysing its published CPI explained that some African 
countries like Botswana, Seychelles and Namibia all scored better on the index compared to 
some OECD countries such as Italy, Hungary and Greece. It explained that the key ingredient 
that top performing African countries had in common is the political will that is consistently 
committed to the fight against corruption.195 Furthermore, TI posits that in addition to having 
anti-corruption laws and institutions, these countries go an extra step to ensuring strict 
implementation of its laws. This is why the political will to support investigations and 
prosecutions, particularly in large-scale corruption cases cannot be taken for granted.196  
According to Hatchard, Governments may well purport to oversee the enactment of laws and 
creation of institutions ostensibly designed to combat corruption.197  Yet, in practice, this 
seeming political will is often a mere façade.198 Far too often, as it is in Nigeria, successive 
regimes, both military and democratic regimes condemn corruption, but end up not doing 
enough to combat it. Lawson has stated that those who are called upon to make the changes 
necessary to limit opportunities for corruption are the very actors who benefit most from the 
status quo. 199  Similarly, Collier asserts that where the ruling bloc is relatively cohesive, 
implementation can be expected to be lax and powerful individuals to be insulated from 
scrutiny.200  
Successful anti-corruption efforts depend on political will. It includes both the political will to 
initiate the fight against corruption in the first place and subsequently the will to sustain the 
battle over time, until results are achieved.201 Successive governments in Nigeria through 
various measures, policies and programs have ostensibly attempted to combat corruption and 
raise the hope of Nigerians with the expectations that sustained anti-corruption drive will bring 
to justice corrupt public officials and act as a deterrent to others. Unfortunately, these measures 
have made little impact in the face of enormous grand corruption in Nigeria.  
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2.9.2.1       CATEGORIES OF POLITICAL WILL 
In view of these points, Hatchard breaks down political will into several categories that can 
vary within a country from time to time. This categorisation is necessary, as it also reflects the 
problem of political will in Nigeria. These includes the following: 
2.9.2.2 Active Political will: Hatchard refers to this as the ideal position where there is a 
genuine commitment at the highest political level to supporting anti-corruption efforts 
and developing effective good governance laws and institutions.202 
 
2.9.2.3 Partial Political will: Hatchard is of the view that it is not uncommon for newly elected 
political regimes upon taking office to pursue high profile anti-corruption campaigns 
targeting members of the previous administration. This might involve supporting the 
prosecution on corruption-related charges of members of the previous regime. Even if 
justified, Hatchard holds that a President may be prepared to lead or support an anti-
corruption agenda so long as it is kept within acceptable limits that does not seek to 
investigate the incumbent or his close senior supporters, creating a perception that 
corruption is a charge levelled at opponents and enemies, and overlooked among friends.  
 
Hatchard argues that in principle this is clearly unacceptable as this usually targets 
political opponents, and also enables corrupt members of the incumbent administration 
escape justice; but is often the result of a difficult and unsatisfactory balancing act 
between providing protection for those key political supporters who helped bring the 
government into power as against the need to combat corruption203. 
 
Hatchard’s theory is neatly illustrated in Nigeria where the incumbent President, 
Muhammadu Buhari, who was elected in May 2015 based on a reputation for honesty 
and combating corruption has often been accused of using the anti-corruption fight as 
a political tool aimed at targeting political opponents while leaving out indicted 
members of his cabinet out of prosecution. For instance, most of the President’s aides 
have been tied to corruption and corrupts acts. An example involves a former Governor 
of River State and currently the incumbent Minister of Transportation, Mr Rotimi 
Amaechi.  
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The former governor and some other former political office holders under his regime 
were indicted by a judicial commission of inquiry set up by the Rivers state government 
who called for their immediate prosecution into the sale of valued state assets worth 
$400 million under his administration.204 His nomination as a minister under the current 
regime despite allegations of corruption has been largely controversial given that 
Amaechi was identified as one of those who contributed huge funds in propelling the 
President to power. This example gives credence to the widely held belief and lack of 
trust by the Nigerian society that anti-corruption fight never extends to the close allies 
of the government of the day.  
 
2.9.2.4 The Shifting political will: Hatchard explains here that the status of the political 
will in a country may vary from time to time depending upon the policies of the current 
regime or following regime change. To elaborate, in Nigeria during the tenure of 
President Olusegun Obasanjo, which signalled the start of the democratic dispensation 
in Nigeria, several state Governors were convicted of corruption and other related 
offences. The EFCC under the leadership of, Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, was instrumental 
in carrying out investigations that subsequently led to convictions. However, in 2007 
after the expiration of the tenure of Obasanjo, a new President emerged in the person 
of President Umaru Yar’adua.  
 
This led to the removal of Nuhu Ribadu as the chairman of EFCC. The consequence of 
his removal led to the shielding of corrupt former governors, most notably James Ibori, 
the former Governor of Delta State from International investigations into corruption-
related offences by blocking mutual legal assistance requests from the United Kingdom. 
It was only after the sudden death of President Yar’adua while still in office and the 
emergence of President Goodluck Jonathan that effective cooperation was resumed, 
which subsequently led to the conviction of Ibori in 2012 on money-laundering charges 
in the United Kingdom. 205  Therefore, the absence of strong political will in the 
governance against corruption is a major constraint that constitutes a major weakness 
in the fight against grand corruption in Nigeria. 
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  2.9.4        WEAK INSTITUTIONS: 
In the same fashion, weak enforcement institutions have also been identified as part of the 
pitfalls in combating grand corruption in Nigeria. 206  The strength and effectiveness of 
institutions shape the conditions in which corruption can thrive. Scholars have argued that the 
problem for Nigeria with regards attempts at combating corruption is not a lack of anti-
corruption institutions or legislative frameworks. Instead, what exists are weak institutions 
some of which are themselves major perpetrators of corruption.207 Institutions loom large 
especially in the context of corruption. In societies where the level of public-sector corruption 
is relatively low, one normally finds strong institutions of accountability that control abuses of 
power by public officials.208 
In Nigeria, anti-corruption and other institutions are weak, and in some cases, have failed out 
rightly. The incumbent Director-General of the World Trade Organisation, Ngozi Okonjo-
Iweala, stated that corruption has persisted in Nigeria because the country lacks the institutions, 
systems, and processes to prevent it.209  
In other words, what prevails in Nigeria is a state of affairs where institutions across all levels 
and branches of government have been captured in a systemic manner, and has created a social 
state of being whereby those institutions, having been designed to underpin and support the 
rule of law and good governance while delivering public services, have been deliberately 
undermined or neglected to the point where they can no longer uphold the rule of law or act in 
the best interests of the nation for ethical functioning and service delivery.210 In this regard, 
Akanle posits that corruption can never be prevented and fought without strong institutions.211  
In Nigeria, the institutions that are mandated to fight corruption, such as the EFCC and the 
Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) have often been criticised as institutions 
being used by the government as political tools to selectively fight perceived enemies of the 
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government.212 A practice that undermines the credibility of the anti-corruption institutions, 
and runs contrary to the aims and objectives for which these institutions were established.  
These institutions in the first place were created with the purpose of fighting corruption at every 
level in the society, whether among government officials who have perpetually enriched 
themselves by corruptly abusing their positions while in office or any other individual or group 
of individuals conducting financial transactions by means that go against the laws of Nigeria. 
For a country with high level of corruption and money laundering perpetuated by public 
officials, it is not enough to have institutions and laws in place to curtail these phenomenon’s, 
but these institutions must be apolitical and insulated from political manipulations from the 
government.  
The practice of using anti-corruption institutions by the government in a manner contrary to 
their establishment have continued to diminish public confidence in these institutions and raises 
questions about the government’s commitment to due process, accountability and transparency, 
due to their partisan nature in combating corruption. Therefore, in other for these institutions 
to work effectively, they must be neutral, truly independent and free of political manipulations. 
The emphasis for any government in Nigeria that aims to curtail corruption should be on 
strengthening these institutions, with a particular focus on deterrence, rather than using them 
as a tool for political opponents.  
Rulers, administrators and bureaucrats come and go, but institutions and systems remain.213 
This is why the former US President, Barrack Obama, on his first Presidential visit to Africa 
encouraged Africans to build strong institutions and not strong men. Where institutions and 
systems are lacking, corruption will thrive.214 
2.9.5     CONSTITUTINAL CONSTRAINTS: IMMUNITY CLAUSE UNDER s.308 OF THE CONSTITUTION 
Constitutional immunity granted to certain public officials, as presently constituted in Nigeria 
has been a major hindrance to combating grand corruption. Attempts to investigate, prosecute, 
or confiscate illegally obtained assets from public officials are often frustrated by the presence 
of immunity which bars any form of prosecution on certain public officials in Nigeria. 
Constitutional immunity has become controversial in Nigeria because of its deployment in 
hindering the prosecution of corrupt public officials in Nigeria by anti-corruption agencies. It 
                                                             






is recognised, that states must have in place strategies for taking appropriate action against 
public officials who abuse their office.  
This is complicated by the fact that most public officials enjoy constitutional immunity from 
both criminal and civil action during their incumbency in office. Yet, these are often the same 
public officials involved in corruption related activities in Nigeria. Section 308 of the 1999 
constitution in Nigeria has in crystal terms restricted legal proceedings against the President, 
Vice President, Governors and Deputy Governors respectively of the various states in Nigeria. 
For clarity purpose, the said section provides as follows: Notwithstanding anything to the 
contrary in this constitution 
a) No civil or criminal proceedings shall be instituted or continued against a person to 
whom this section applies during his period of office 
b) No process of any court requiring or compelling the appearance of a person to whom 
this section applies shall be issued 
c) This section applies to a person holding the office of President, Vice President, 
Governor and Deputy Governor.215  
This concept finds its root in the doctrine of ‘rex non potest peccare’ (the King can do no 
wrong).216 The rationale behind the immunity clause is that public office holders who fall 
within the definition of the provision should enjoy absolute immunity to enable them carry out 
their official duties without distractions, be it criminal or civil. In Abacha v FRN,217  the 
Supreme Court stated that the essence of the immunity clause in the constitution was clearly to 
suspend right of action or judicial relief against the officials during their tenure of office and 
to allow incumbents free hand from harassment. Thus, it is assumed that the immunity granted 
such officials is to protect them from frivolous actions in court while still in office to conduct 
the affairs of governance free from hindrance, embarrassment and possible difficulties that may 
arise if such official is being constantly pursued and harassed with court actions. It is my 
submission that though this may well be the intendment in the constitution and as interpreted 
by courts in Nigeria, however, the prevalence with which most Nigerian public officials and 
the grantees of this provision divert public funds for personal use makes it imperative to 
expunge this provision from the constitution. 
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In practice, it has overwhelmingly continued to serve as protective shield or a legitimate 
instrument for corrupt public officials in diverting the nation’s resources without any fear of 
any form of prosecution. The consequence being that the clause has technically created a class 
of individuals who are above the law, despite the fact that majority of cases involving corrupt 
practices and money laundering emanate from these same individuals that the law protects. 
Proponents of the removal of this section from the constitution have argued that the goal should 
be to ensure that corrupt public officials are called to account for his or her misdeed 
immediately it is discovered.218  
Although they lose immunity after office, what the clause provides them with is the time to 
obliterate the trail of any illicit funds before immunity lapses, in which case, it becomes 
difficult to prosecute such corrupt public officials; therefore raising serious apprehension that 
the provision of s308 is adversative to the goal of combating corruption in Nigeria.219 The 
Nigerian experience of the immunity clause has been horrendous, traumatic and yields to social 
anomaly in the sense of mismanagement of its resources which has led to underdevelopment.220 
Indeed, there has been widespread concern over allegations of corruption made against 
Nigerian sitting Governors by the EFCC.  
State Governors such as James Ibori, Joshua Dariye and Alamieyeseigha are examples of 
Governors who despite allegations of abuse of office and embezzlement of public funds were 
precluded from prosecutions because of the immunity clause. Solomon is of the view that the 
clause is abused, misused and totally out of tune with the aspirations of combating grand 
corruption in Nigeria.221 It is obvious that s308 is a provision too broad for the purpose for 
which it is meant for. A former chairman of EFCC, Nuhu Ribadu, remarked that unless we 
remove the immunity clause, it will be difficult to address the problem of corruption in 
Nigeria.222 In the same vein, at the highest level, Nigeria’s President between 2007 and 2010, 
Late Umaru Yar’adua, as a beneficiary of such legislation consistently spoke in support of the 
removal of immunity clause from the constitution. At the World Economic Forum in Davos, 
Switzerland, the President specially advocated for its removal in line with the principles of rule 
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of law and to prove his commitment to the battle against corruption, wherein he stated that 
nobody in Nigeria deserves the right to be protected by law when stealing public funds.223 
Although there is some merit in the argument that constitutional immunity saves public 
officials from frivolous and vexatious litigation, it is my submission that it does not outweigh 
the need to make public officials accountable for their actions which affects millions of people 
while in office. From the examples provided above, Governors are amongst persistent 
offenders as far as the plundering of Nigeria’s resources is concerned. Providing them with 
such immunity is completely unwarranted as this can inevitably promote corruption and serve 
as a protective shield for corrupt public officials. Given that there are 36 states in Nigeria, the 
implication of this provision is that it effectively provides immunity from prosecution for some 
76 senior public officials in Nigeria.  
Based on the foregoing, it is submitted that the immunity clause is in effect an excessive 
protection for public officials; and as a matter of urgency and necessity must be expunged from 
the constitution given the brazen recklessness of public officials in Nigeria. 
 2.9.6 DELAY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE/ CORRUPTION IN THE NIGERIAN JUDICIARY 
The role of the judiciary in combating corruption in Nigeria cannot be overemphasised. It is 
fundamental to note that owing to its constitutional responsibilities, the role of the judiciary as 
a bastion in the anti-corruption war is unique. Its ability to combat corruption is a function of 
legal and political mechanisms in place. 224  In Nigeria, these mechanisms and their 
effectiveness in the anti-corruption fight remains problematic. The traditional functions of the 
judiciary include the settlement of legal controversies, determination of facts, deciding the laws 
applicable to a particular controversy, interpretation of statutes, et cetera.225 In corruption cases 
specifically, the decisions of judges in the adjudication process is crucial as it bears the burden 
of determining the guilt or otherwise of an accused public official or any other private citizen 
engaged in financial or other crimes in Nigeria.  
However, anecdotal evidence suggests that the common perception among ordinary Nigerians 
is that the wealthy and powerful have turned the judicial system to their self-protection 
mechanism. Corruption in the Judiciary has been key to ensuring public officials go unpunished 
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and are able to maintain their positions in Nigeria.226 Corruption has attained a mind-boggling 
proportion in Nigeria, and presently at such a level that even the judiciary has virtually lost its 
perceived insulations from the plague of corruption in Nigeria.  
According to Ayoade, though corruption is seen infiltrating other arms of government, the 
effect of such infiltration in the judiciary is considered particularly insidious. 227  In his 
summation, a corrupt judiciary means that the legal and institutional mechanisms designed to 
curb corruption will generally be handicapped.228 This is because it is beyond doubt that a 
corrupt judge/s or a corrupt judicial system cannot meaningfully contribute to the fight against 
corruption. The best laws and institutions will prove insufficient to make any impact on 
corruption and money laundering if the judicial system is corrupt. 
Evidence suggest that judicial corruption is an aberration that is discernibly a major stumbling 
block in the fight against corruption in Nigeria.229 The events in the judiciary and its handling 
of corruption cases in Nigeria have placed the judiciary, often regarded as the last hope of the 
common man in the spotlight. Although the judiciary in Nigeria faces a myriad of challenges 
in the discharge of their judicial functions, such as interference by politicians, events such as 
alleged complicity by judicial officers when handling high profile corruption cases and corrupt 
practices within the judiciary itself raises questions regarding the effectiveness of the judiciary 
in the discharge and performance of its role in combating corruption in Nigeria.230 
A former President of the Nigerian Bar Association and a Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN), 
Joseph Daudu, once stated that ‘‘perception backed by empirical evidence suggest that justice 
is purchasable, and it has been purchased on several occasions in Nigeria’’.231 This statement 
is unfortunately a reflection of the views shared by most Nigerians about the Nigerian Judiciary. 
When the judiciary which is expected to serve as a guardian of the rule of law is itself corrupt, 
anti-corruption and anti-money laundering strategies are deprived of essential measures needed 
to reduce the benefits of corruption and to punish corrupt acts.232 At the root of corruption in 
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Nigeria is the inability of the criminal justice system, particularly the courts, to hold anyone 
accountable especially the rich and powerful who are usually politically exposed persons.  
This has often led to the Judiciary being criticised for contributing to the spread of grand 
corruption over its handling of high-profile corruption. This is because most criminal trials, 
especially on serious corruption charges is preceded by endless objections, applications to 
quash charges and judges granting all manner of questionable injunctions.233 According to 
Salihu, it is noteworthy that cases of corruption and money laundering are not punished in 
Nigeria, as most high-profile cases have remained inconclusive.234  
Lengthy delays are often encountered in the trial of corrupt public officials. Several corruption 
cases are held up in court for as long as 10 years without any progress being made with the 
trials. For instance, the high-profile cases of former Governors such as in FRN v Rasheed 
Ladoja235 , FRN v Orji Uzor Kalu,236  and many other high-profile corruption and money 
laundering cases are still ongoing many years after arraignment. Indeed, waiting for years to 
conclude trials of corrupt public officials using the criminal law does not ensure justice as it 
runs the risk of physical evidence becoming tainted or destroyed, weakens witness memory, 
and makes the presentation of evidence difficult.237 Therefore, the dictum justice delayed is 
justice denied becomes apt in this regard. This has had the consequential effect of people losing 
faith in the judiciary and are often discouraged about the outcome of corruption trials in Nigeria.  
Odinkalu expressed the following dissatisfaction over the judiciary and its handling of 
corruption cases. ‘‘That a few cases that manage to get to court are frustrated by a combination 
of legal and procedural technicalities, delay and a lenient disposition by the Nigerian Judiciary 
towards suspects in white collar crime. This is the only way to describe the fact that most 
suspects in cases of the most egregious corruption in Nigeria get away with it. The capacity of 
the judiciary to offer meaningful dispute resolution or remedies in the midst of habitual 
corruption has become compromised and our jurisprudence has, to put it most charitably, 
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become quite tolerant of or complicit in corruption, given room for a suggestion that some form 
of quid pro quo has taken place’’.238 
Odinkalu’s view has been a result of the judiciary’s culpability in granting questionable court 
orders in favour of public officials alleged to have diverted public funds by tolerating delay 
tactics from defence lawyers. Accused public officials charged with offences such as money 
laundering, abuse of office and other economic and financial crimes in Nigeria have on 
numerous occasions capitalised on a weak and corrupt judiciary by filing all manner of court 
documents to either delay or truncate the trial process or completely undermine it. The EFCC 
on several occasions have lamented the indiscriminate restrictions and unjustifiable injunctions 
issued by the court to sabotage its efforts on corruption trials.  
For instance, in the case of Attorney General of Rivers State v Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission239, the EFCC discovered illegal diversion of public funds totalling N100 billion 
naira against a former Governor or Rivers State. The then Governor proceeded to court 
challenging the EFCC’s investigations against him. In a shock ruling, the judge granted all 
declaratory and injunctive reliefs sought by the accused, top of which was an order restraining 
the agency from further action regarding alleged economic and financial crimes committed by 
the former Governor. The implication of granting the injunction made the former Governor 
perpetually immune from arrest and prosecution by the EFCC, an injunction which has 
continued to be used a legal excuse to evade prosecution. 
Furthermore, the actions and decisions of some judges have tended to present the judiciary as 
a formidable ally of alleged corrupt public officers, thereby truncating the anti-corruption 
efforts. This was confirmed in another controversial decision involving James Ibori, a former 
Governor of Delta State in Nigeria. The case was well criticised in Nigeria for the reason that 
Ibori was acquitted of all 170-count charge levelled against him by the Judiciary in Nigeria, 
meanwhile he was convicted in the United Kingdom and sentenced to 13years in prison on 
charges that were closely similar to charges he was arraigned for and discharged by the 
Nigerian Judiciary.240 
In recent years, the number of allegations against corrupt judicial officers in Nigeria remain on 
the increase. The pedigree of the Nigerian Judiciary has often been eroded by the corrupt 
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tendencies of most Nigerian judges even at the highest level of the bench.  For instance, in an 
unprecedented effort to eradicate corruption in the Judiciary, the Department of State Security 
Services (DSS) carried out a discreet nationwide clampdown on the Judiciary, placed 15 judges 
under investigation.241 It was reported that two Supreme Court judges and five other judges 
were arrested in October 2016. During these raids, the DSS reported that it recovered $2million 
dollars from the judges and $800,000 from one singe judge’s house.242  
 In view of the foregoing, judicial corruption presents a serious threat to the proper functioning 
of anti-corruption campaign, as well as the entire justice system. The imperativeness of tackling 
judicial corruption cannot be underestimated. In cases of corruption by PEPs, one corrupt judge 
can jeopardise the efforts of convicting a corrupt PEP. Therefore, without an honest judiciary 
and criminal justice system, the corrupt can escape the consequences of their crimes. 
 In the final analysis, as shown above in this chapter, corruption, particularly those perpetuated 
by public officials in Nigeria continue to linger in Nigeria. The pressing questions then 
becomes why aren’t Nigerian anti-corruption/anti-money laundering laws working/effective? 
Does Nigeria have laws that are difficult to interpret or unworkable? Why are politically 
exposed persons not convicted more often when compared to the amount of PEP’s that stand 
accused of corruption and money laundering? Nothing so far seems to have managed to stem 
the tide of grand corruption in Nigeria, hence the need for new thinking and new approaches. 
Subsequent chapters answer these pressing questions while providing solutions in the form of 
new legal models that can be utilised to combat grand corruption and money laundering in 
Nigeria. 
 





                                                             
241 Habeeb Abdulrauf Salihu,’ Corruption in the Nigerian Judicial system: An overview’ (2018) 25 Journal of 





2.10                                             CONCLUSION 
To summarize, endemic corruption has become a dangerous socio-economic phenomenon 
plaguing Nigeria, and has emerged as Nigeria’s biggest challenge. Corruption has been a 
destructive and complex practice, yet it remains pervasive in the functioning of society and 
economic life in Nigeria. The chapter held that this is attributable to the fact that corruption is 
seen as a way of life that cuts across classes of people in Nigeria. It is also the reason why 
Nigeria has an unenviable reputation as one of the most corrupt countries on earth as indicated 
by Transparency International’s Corruption Perception’s Index.  
Given the nature and scope of corruption and the intention of this thesis, the chapter focused 
on discussing grand corruption as it has been the most devastating type of corruption because 
of its deleterious effect on Nigerians at large. This is due to the vast sums of public funds that 
has been stolen and diverted away from legitimate and beneficial purposes, to illegitimate and 
unproductive ones. Consequently, resulting in underdevelopment, inequality and general 
discontent in Nigeria. Public officials have been blamed constantly for stealing public funds 
rather than contributing to the socio-economic development of the people. The chapter held 
that the pursuit of short-term gains in the exercise of public office have allowed grand 
corruption to become endemic as public funds are stolen with impunity. This is reflected in the 
regular scandals involving public officials or politically exposed persons enmeshed in the 
diversion and laundering of public funds. 
Furthermore, the chapter examined various contributory factors that play a role in stimulating 
grand corruption in Nigeria. Some of the factors highlighted included a lack of political will to 
fight corruption, societal pressures on public officials, weak institutions, constitutional 
constraints and delay in dispensing cases involving public officials. It was identified and argued 
that lack of political will by Nigerian leaders in relation to the fight against corruption has 
contributed to stimulating corruption. This is because Nigerian leaders have been incapable of 
fighting grand corruption holistically regardless of individuals involved.  
In addition, it was argued in this chapter that although laws and the enforcement of said laws 
are fundamental in curbing corruption, they are not sufficient for fostering a sustainable 
reversal of long-established social norms and practices. In this regard, this chapter argued that 
the mind-set of the citizenry needs to be disabused from seeing corruption as the norm. Using 
theories from Bicchieri who finds that social norms are markers of how people choose to act 




widespread, as is the case in Nigeria, there is a risk that most citizens will endorse it creating a 
vicious cycle and contributing to the persistence of corruption in the society. The rampancy of 
grand corruption scandals in Nigeria suggests deeper problems in politics and society. The 
chapter has stated that there is a tendency in Nigerian society to celebrate corrupt officials who 
steal the nation’s resources, consequently putting pressure on public officials to engage in 
corrupt practices. 
 The chapter has also examined the impact of the Nigerian oil industry in facilitating grand 
corruption because majority of the resources stolen by PEPs are funds generated from this 
industry. It was argued that in as much as the revenue from oil has brought some form of 
development, it has exacerbated the challenges of grand corruption in Nigeria. The chapter 
posited that huge amount of government revenue and foreign exchange earnings are derived 
from oil production, which has been seen by most as a resource curse. The chapter provided 
instances of corruption in this industry such as the diversion of $20 billion dollars in oil revenue, 
a staggering amount which can help develop Nigeria. 
Also, it was identified and argued that the constitutional immunity afforded to some PEPs have 
been counterproductive in the sense that it has served as a protective shield, and frustrates 
investigation and prosecution of PEPs suspected to have been abused their office by 
misappropriating public funds in Nigeria. It was also argued that very little is done from the 
judiciary and the justice system to hold public officials to account in corruption related money 
laundering cases, as there continues to be a low risk of punishment. This failure has encouraged 
corrupt practices by public officials, who regard public office as a lucrative source of private 
wealth and power in Nigeria. 
The prevalence of grand corruption and the theft of public funds have led to greater scrutiny of 
business relationships with politically exposed persons. The notion of politically exposed 
persons is central to anti-corruption and anti-money laundering legal framework across the 
world. This is because they represent a greater risk of corruption and money laundering as a 
result of the possibility that such individuals may abuse their positions and influence to carry 
out corrupt acts, and in turn use the financial system to launder these tainted proceeds. 
Laundering the proceeds of grand corruption within and outside Nigeria by politically exposed 
persons have been prevalent in Nigeria. Exploring these issues in light of the fact that grand 
corruption and money laundering are inextricably connected and self-reinforcing constitutes 




                                           CHAPTER THREE 
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPTION OF POLITICALLY EXPOSED PERSONS  
    3.1                                      INTRODUCTION 
Revelations of grand corruption and the plunder of state assets have led to a greater scrutiny of 
business relationships with politically exposed persons (PEPs); this is with a view to addressing 
potential corruption and money laundering risk associated with these individuals.243 Based on 
research, illicit proceeds coming from grand corruption and other economic and financial 
crimes are predominantly perpetuated by persons entrusted with public office who disregard 
public interest to misappropriate public funds.244 Within the confines of this thesis, PEPs have 
been identified as individuals who are, or have been, entrusted with prominent public functions 
and their family members and close associates. These persons pose difficult challenges with 
regards anti-corruption and anti-money laundering (AML) efforts to combat grand corruption 
and money laundering. This is because they are the most powerful political entity with access 
to state resources and influence over government institutions. They are also in a position to 
control AML controls, for example by undermining the development and/or effectiveness of 
anti-corruption and AML laws and institutions. In addition, they have the power to undermine 
key constitutional AML safeguards, such as through their power to appoint and remove heads 
of key AML institutions.245 
The outright misappropriation, conversion, diversion and theft of public funds by PEPs, their 
families, and close associates have led to a heightened focus on these persons because they 
represent a greater money laundering risk by virtue of having access to government funds over 
which they exert control.246  Scandals perpetuated by PEPs, have increased attention they 
receive from governments, law enforcement agencies and international organisations (e.g. 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF). This is largely due to the misappropriation of state 
resources, which are often laundered; through the financial system and other new and evolving 
methods.247 As a result, they have become a specific risk factor in the AML regime which has 
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led to calls by international organisations for more proactive actions by stakeholders both in 
financial institutions and other designated non-financial institutions regarding their 
activities.248  
A range of simple, intricate and sophisticated methods are adopted by PEPs to conceal their 
proceeds garnered from corrupt practices. Leading anti-money laundering organisations like 
FATF, are mandated to set standards and implement measures against money laundering and 
terrorism financing. Similarly, some regulatory agencies like the Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA) have all formulated requirements for dealing with PEPs. These measures by various 
organisations were designed to serve as a benchmark for subsequent legislative initiatives.249  
Among the reasons for formulating policies to combat money laundering is because developing 
countries have been severely affected by corrupt regimes and this, in turn, motivated the 
improvement of AML measures globally; with particular focus on PEPs. This gave rise, for the 
need to apply more intrusive AML preventative measures; with respect to business 
relationships involving PEPs from those in the regulated sectors (such as banks, lawyers and 
real estate agencies).  
Such preventive measures include; obtaining senior management approvals prior to 
establishing business relationships with a PEP, continuing a business relationship with a 
customer who is subsequently found to be a PEP or becomes a PEP, conducting enhanced due 
diligence, enhancing ongoing monitoring of such customers to monitor and evaluate their 
activities.250 This is an indication that PEPs constitute a distinct type of customer, considered 
high risk for money laundering; given that there is always a possibility of abuse of office by 
such persons especially in countries where grand corruption is widespread. Usually, in a 
country with the levels of widespread corruption like Nigeria, PEPs may have certain 
advantages open to them in laundering the proceeds of grand corruption. This is because they 
may have firm control over state machineries giving them the capacity to exploit institutions.251 
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It is pertinent to mention that there is nothing wrong with providing services to a PEP. Not all 
PEPs engage in corrupt activities, as some maintain appropriate levels of integrity.252 However, 
a business relationship with a PEP should trigger a higher level of scrutiny, more than what is 
required of a usual client; as they are placed in a vulnerable position by having the capacity to 
control or divert public funds for personal enrichment.253 This higher level of scrutiny, requires 
financial institutions (banks) and those in the regulated sector (lawyers, real estate agencies 
and those who deal in high value commodities) to apply additional measures to reduce the risk 
level. Therefore, all PEPs, especially, those holding senior, prominent or important positions, 
with substantial authority over policy, operations or the allocation of government owned 
resources are potentially in a position to abuse their offices for personal gain. 
As emphasised in the preceding chapter, considering the plethora of corruption related money 
laundering cases involving PEPs, Nigeria represents a quintessential example of the links 
between corruption and money laundering. The leading money launderers and those who 
engage in misappropriating public funds in Nigeria are thought to be PEPs; elected or appointed 
into various government positions. The sheer scale of corruption in Nigeria and the number of 
public officials involved in the theft of public funds is staggering as the exercise of prominent 
public function presents public officials in Nigeria with an opportunity to act corruptly, which 
must be mitigated through enhanced controls.254 
In addition to being high risk customers, there has been an increased academic focus on PEPs 
for various reasons. Firstly, there is no general consensus on the definitions of PEPs. This is 
not just fundamental, it is a prerequisite in order to understand the scope of individuals who 
fall within this bracket. Secondly, issues such as how precisely they may be categorised; and 
for how long a PEP should be considered a PEP after leaving office have also been problematic.  
To this end, the purpose of this chapter is to discuss and examine the subject of PEPs, 
particularly in Nigeria. The chapter shall examine some of the contentious issues and 
challenges associated with PEPs; and the impact of their activities and how they might be 
countered. 
This chapter examines the approaches adopted in deciding when an individual maybe 
considered a PEP, how long a person remains a PEP, factors taken into consideration as to who 
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constitutes a close associate or an immediate family member, the exclusion of junior or middle 
ranking PEPs and the distinction given regarding domestic and foreign PEPs. Additionally, the 
chapter also focuses on major challenges that inhibits enforcement of Anti-money laundering 
laws as it relates to Nigerian PEPs. In this regard, issues such as immunity clause for certain 
public office holders and the influence which PEPs have on financial institutions will be 
discussed. 
3.2        A SUCCINCT OVERVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE 
In view of the fact that the FATF is the leading international organisation in combating money 
laundering, and the fact that various countries have adopted FATFs approach in combating this 
phenomenon, it is apposite to briefly discuss this organisation in order to appreciate its 
significance in the fight against money laundering and financial crimes. The FATF was created 
in 1989 by the G7 countries to combat the growing threat of money laundering across the world. 
Essentially, the FATF is an inter-governmental organisation that was founded with the 
objective of promoting effective implementation of laws, regulations, and other measures for 
combating money laundering, financing of terrorism, and similar threats to global financial 
integrity.255  
The FATF sets the benchmark to promote national and international policies for effective 
implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money laundering 
and terrorist financing.256 In achieving this objective, they rely on a combination of annual self-
assessments and periodic mutual evaluations. Internationally, the FATF is comprised of 
associate members known as FATF-style regional bodies (FSRB); these include: a) Asia-
Pacific Group on money laundering, b) Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, c) Eastern & 
South Africa Anti-money laundering Group, d) West Africa Money laundering Group, e) 
Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, f) Council of Europe Anti-money 
laundering Group.257 These FSRBs represents most major financial centres across the globe. 
In collaboration with these FSRBs, the FATF works to identify money laundering 
vulnerabilities with the aim of protecting the international financial system from misuse. 
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Furthermore, as part of its mandate to combat money laundering, the FATF formulated a series 
of Recommendations (40+9) which sets international standards for combating money 
laundering.258 Since the terrorist’s attacks of September 11, 2001, FATFs focus and mandate 
has also included terrorist financing; FATF’s Recommendations contain inter alia: I) 
AML/CFT policies and coordination including risk assessment and the application of risk-
based approach, ii) the criminal offence of money laundering, confiscation and provisional 
measures, iii) Provisions for politically exposed persons, iv) rules on transparency and 
beneficial ownership of legal persons and arrangements, v) rules on international co-operation 
including international instruments, mutual legal assistance and extradition.259  
It is pertinent to state that though FATF Recommendations are soft laws which are not binding, 
they possess coercive powers from the enormous support of the world’s two most influential 
financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
(WB). 260  The IMF is empowered to oversee international monetary systems efficient 
operations. Besides, to promote economic development among its member states, the WB 
makes loans available to enhance economic programmes. Access to those loan facilities require 
a benchmark condition for which adherence to the FATF Recommendation is crucial and seen 
as the antidote to corruption prevention. 261 Another source of coercive powers is the 
classification of certain countries as Non-Corporative Countries and Territories (NCCT). Once 
a country is designated as NCCT, it is blacklisted, making it challenging to have financial 
transactions with other member countries. 
  
The scope of the FATF Recommendations are to prevent money laundering and terrorist 
financing. They have been the basis of the existing anti-money laundering and counter 
terrorism financing paradigm, and have been extensively mirrored in the anti-money 
laundering laws of a substantial number of jurisdictions, including Nigeria.262 They also have 
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been translated into international binding instruments such as the European Union Anti-Money 
Laundering Directives.263  
The Recommendations have been revised on several occasions to ensure that they remained 
relevant to the ever-changing ways in which criminals launder the proceeds of crime. The 
Recommendations have also been instrumental in combating grand corruption by increasing 
transparency of the financial system and facilitating the detection, investigation and 
prosecution of corruption and money laundering offences, and the recovery of misappropriated 
public funds. Thus, the FATF can be rightly considered as the main global body that sets 
standards and supervises the fight against money laundering.  
 
 3.3                      DEFINING A POLITICALLY EXPOSED PERSON 
One of the most paramount criteria which should establish immediately whether a potential 
customer is a corruption risk or not, is his classification as a PEP, which automatically triggers 
enhanced due diligence procedures.264 The issue of PEPs has been a critical subject, especially 
within the financial sector and the AML regime in general. In order to understand the scope of 
individuals who fall within this bracket, it is fundamental to understand who a PEP is, how 
does one know when one is dealing with one?265 Thus, within the context of anti-money 
laundering, the identification of customers who pose a heightened risk of money laundering 
are essential to any AML measure intended to be taken by those saddled with the responsibility 
of ameliorating the risk associated with such customers. 
There is currently no international and unanimously agreed definition of a PEP, and defining 
PEPs have been the subject of much conjecture over the years. Several definitions have been 
advanced, each with its own distinct features but finding a universally accepted one has been 
difficult to arrive at. A perusal of international legal instruments and regulatory guidelines 
proves that there is no consistent terminology or comprehensive definition of a PEP. The FATF 
and European Union directives refer to these individuals as PEPs, while the United States 
Patriot Act refer to them as senior public figures.  
The FATF, the European Union, the Wolfsberg Group and the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption have all adopted their own definitions of PEPs, with these definitions 
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ranging between a broader and narrower approach to the problem of deciding when an 
individual may be considered a PEP, those who are categorised as PEPs, and how long a person 
remains a PEP.266 
3.3.1   FATF Definition: 
By virtue of Recommendation 12 of the FATF 40+9 Recommendations, the FATF defines 
politically exposed persons as individuals who are or have been entrusted with prominent 
public functions in a foreign country. This also encompasses family members and close 
associates of such PEPs. In its glossary, the FATF Recommendations states expressly that the 
definition does not encompass middle ranking or more junior individuals in the foregoing 
categories.267  
3.3.2   EUROPEAN UNION (EU) Definition: 
Article 3(9) of the Fourth ML directive states that politically exposed person’s means natural 
persons who is or who has been entrusted with prominent public functions and includes the 
following: (a) heads of State, heads of government, ministers and deputy or assistant ministers; 
(b) members of parliament or of similar legislative bodies; (c) members of the governing bodies 
of political parties; (d) members of supreme courts, of constitutional courts or of other high-
level judicial bodies, the decisions of which are not subject to further appeal, except in 
exceptional circumstances; (e) members of courts of auditors or of the boards of central banks; 
(f) ambassadors, charges d’affaires and high-ranking officers in the armed forces; (g) members 
of the administrative, management or supervisory bodies of State owned enterprises; (h) 
directors, deputy directors and members of the board or equivalent function of an international 
organisation.268 (10) ‘family members’ includes the following: (a) the spouse, or a person 
considered to be equivalent to a spouse, of a politically exposed person; (b) the children and 
their spouses, or persons considered to be equivalent to a spouse, of a politically exposed person; 
(c) the parents of a politically exposed person. 
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3.3.3 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION (UNCAC) DEFINITION: 
In the same vein, Article 2 of UNCAC defines PEPs as ‘‘ (i) any person holding a legislative, 
executive, administrative or judicial office of a state party, whether paid or unpaid, irrespective 
of that person’s seniority; (ii) any other person who performs a public function, including for 
a public agency or public enterprise, or provide a public service, as defined in the domestic law 
of that state party; (iii) any other person defined as ‘‘public official’’ in the domestic law of a 
state party’’.269 
3.3.4   USA PATRIOT ACT DEFINITION: 
The US Patriot Act refers to PEPs as senior foreign political figure. It defines the term as current 
or former senior official in the executive, legislative, administrative, military, or judicial 
branches of a foreign government, whether or not they were elected officials; a senior official 
of a major foreign political party; and a senior executive of a foreign government-owned 
commercial enterprise. This definition also includes a corporation, business, or other entity 
formed by or for the benefit of such individual. Senior executive are individuals with 
substantial authority over policy, operations, or the use of government-owned resources. 
Also included in the definition of a senior foreign political figure are immediate family 
members of such individuals, and those who are widely and publicly known as close associates 
of a senior foreign political figure.270 
3.3.5     Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2012 (Nigeria): 
In Nigeria, by virtue of the MLPA 2012, PEPs are defined as individuals who are or have been 
entrusted with prominent public functions, both within and outside Nigeria and those associated 
with them (family and business associates). They include Heads of State or Government, senior 
politicians, senior government officials, judicial officials and military officials. 271 In the same 
vein, in the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) anti-money laundering regulation, the same 
definition is reproduced, but with the inclusion of those occupying positions such as Heads of 
State, state Governors, the inclusion of Local Government chairmen, senior politicians, senior 
government, judicial and military officials, senior executives of state-owned corporations, 
important political party officials and members of royal families.272   
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Although some aspects of the definition above vary, they contain some common denominators; 
which is that the above-mentioned persons perform prominent public functions, and are in 
positions of authority or previously been in positions of authority. With regards to prominent 
public functions, the FATF, EU Directives, UNCAC, MLPA all refer to PEPs who occupy 
‘‘prominent public functions’’. The idea of prominent public function is ostensibly linked to 
the influential positions or functions they exercise.273  
From the above definitions, it can be adduced that only high-level positions are included within 
the definitions of PEPs. Some of these definitions of PEPs are different and have varying 
degrees of detail on the types of positions that would be included in a prominent public function. 
This have resulted in limiting the scope of PEPs definitions to exclude domestic PEPs as the 
case with FATF and the US Patriot Act definition, and the exclusion of junior or middle ranking 
PEPs in the definition and categories of PEPs.  
Scholars have observed from field research that these discrepancies in various definitions of 
PEPs has affected implementation efforts leading to an overall low compliance rate in countries 
across the globe.274  As correctly noted by the World Bank, the current variations among 
approaches serve as both good excuse not to act and are seen as a real impediment to the 
development and implementation of effective PEPs controls whether by a jurisdiction, 
regulatory authority or banks.275 Arguably, FATF definition of PEPs serves as a guideline in 
assisting stakeholders in the AML industry understand who PEPs are rather than a one size fits 
all approach. This likely explains why some of the definitions may have been designed in 
varying jurisdictions, to allow for flexibility, greater efforts and resources to be expended on 
more exposed PEPs with regards to the limitation of junior or middle ranking PEPs.  
Despite the lack of uniformity in the global definitions of PEP, most jurisdictions have widely 
adopted FATF AML standards, and the expectations from regulated entities doing business 
with PEPs are universally similar, they are high-risk customers that those in the regulated sector 
must place extra attention to.  
Furthermore, as the issue of PEPs continue to draw global attention due to the transnational 
nature of their money laundering activities, questions abound considering constant changes to 
the political environment within a country. This leads to a host of new persons becoming PEPs. 
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This is in addition to those persons who would have become PEPs by virtue of marriage and 
becoming a close associate of a PEP. Other material questions that arise includes: the precise 
level of seniority which triggers the PEP requirement, the factors taking into consideration as 
to who constitutes a close associate or an immediate family member of a PEP, the duration 
within which it becomes unnecessary to refer to an individual a PEP. This is because PEPs do 
not occupy public office for a protracted period of time. This thesis expands on some of the 
reasons why these narrow definitions of PEPs might be problematic, especially in relation to 
developing countries like Nigeria. 
3.4            WHY THE FOCUS ON POLITICALLY EXPOSED PERSONS? 
Your doors are open to all sorts and conditions of men, except that you draw the line at      
dishonesty. You will not open even a deposit account with a stranger, unless he be satisfactorily 
introduced, lest you find that you have been entertaining a rascal unawares, who is making use 
of the cheque-book which you supplied him with, to victimize half a score of innocent 
people.276 
In recent decades, there has been an increased international focus on PEPs and their ability to 
embezzle huge sums of public funds from their countries and launder same through domestic 
and international financial institutions. A definite link between corruption and money 
laundering has been established, as well as the involvement of PEPs in the link between these 
phenomena.277 The World Bank, as part of its Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative said thus:  
Over the past 25 years, the world has learned about the gross abuses of corrupt 
politically exposed persons. Through outrageous examples, the way in which they have 
plundered public funds; while utilising domestic and international financial institutions 
to launder the proceeds of corruption. We do not know the amount of public funds 
misappropriated by public officials and mostly laundered through financial institutions, 
in particular, banks. The proceeds of corruption misappropriated from developing 
countries ranges from $20 billion to $40 billion per year, roughly the equivalent of the 
annual GDP of the world’s 12 poorest countries where more than 240 million people 
live.278 
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The FATF first examined the risk posed by PEPs to the financial sector in 2001, when it 
analysed the money laundering vulnerabilities of private banking.279  Public officials who 
utilised banking services provided by international financial institutions posed a risk due to the 
possibility that their source of their deposit was illicit and might have been acquired through 
the act of corruption. Furthermore, FATFs perceptions were also influenced by the landmark 
hearings and report that US multinational banks had facilitated the laundering of the proceeds 
of corruption from political leaders in countries like Nigeria, Mexico and Gabon.280  
Additionally, FATF identified PEPs as requiring additional scrutiny; as a result of the immense 
risk of money laundering. According to FATF, the money laundering risk associated with PEPs 
were spelt out in its typologies report, wherein it stated that the sources of the funds that a PEP 
may try to launder are not only bribes or illegal kickbacks, but also maybe embezzlement or 
outright theft of states assets. PEPs that come from countries or regions where corruption is 
endemic and systemic seem to present the greatest potential risk; however, it should be noted 
that corrupt or dishonest PEPs can be found in almost any country.281 The implication of the 
typologies report was that financial institutions shall be obliged to perform enhanced due 
diligence on customers identified as PEPs. FATFs view which is enshrined in its 
recommendations is that increased surveillance on the financial activities of PEPs act as a 
deterrence to serious corruption and improves the chances of detection of corruption through 
the reporting of suspicious transactions. 
An increased awareness of the links between corruption and money laundering have led to 
various initiatives to curtail these crimes, and it was anticipated that these initiatives would aid 
in particular, developing countries to recover funds stolen by their political leaders.282 Part of 
these initiatives includes the FATF 40 Recommendations which sets out measures which 
countries should implement in order to combat money laundering.283 As mentioned in the 
preceding chapter, corruption has a devastating effect on economic developmental outcomes 
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in some of the world’s poorest countries. Thus, an individual corrupt PEP can have a significant 
impact by depriving the people of desired developments. For instance, a significant amount of 
Nigerian public officials has been arraigned and convicted for laundering the proceeds of 
corruption in foreign jurisdictions. One of the most compelling evidence in this regard is that 
involving a former Governor of Delta State, James Ibori, convicted and sentenced to 13years 
in the United Kingdom for corruption, money laundering and other similar offences.  
For years, the Nigerian economy have been bereft of any significant improvement as a result 
of misappropriation of public funds which reflects pervasive grand corruption in Nigeria.284 
Corrupt Nigerian leaders have often seen foreign banks and institutions as safe havens to 
launder and conceal the proceeds of corruption. The bulk of the laundered public funds from 
Nigeria, and Africa in general finds its way into various financial institutions and investment 
portfolios in safe havens in foreign jurisdictions.285 Such proceeds are the result of illicit 
misappropriation of public funds by PEPs and those in positions of authority. The issue of PEPs 
has become problematic because they have evolved in the manner which they launder the 
proceeds of corruption. In the past, while PEPs have placed corruptly obtained funds with their 
own names, or those of their family members and associates, they have advanced to more 
sophisticated measures such as utilising shell companies to conceal their identification, and 
other legal arrangements to host illegal funds.286  
High profile investigations carried out by the Nigerian government, and some foreign 
jurisdictions like the UK and the US continue to uncover sordid revelations of how stolen 
public funds running into billions have been siphoned to foreign jurisdictions and hidden in 
shell companies, trusts, foundations, through proxies such as family members or close 
associates of PEPs.287 Such is the level of importance given to PEPs that heavy fines have been 
imposed on financial institutions that have held accounts of stolen public funds for several 
corrupt leaders without following adequate procedures, regarding due diligence. For instance, 
the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) fined Guaranty Trust Bank (UK), a subsidiary of 
Nigerian Guaranty Trust Bank PLC £525,000 for failings in its AML controls for high risk 
customers. These failures were connected to banking services provided to PEPs with disregard 
to extant AML regulations which resulted in an unacceptable risk of handling the proceeds of 
                                                             
284 RO Anazodo,’ Leadership, Corruption and Governance in Nigeria: Issues and Categorical Imperatives’ (2015) 
9 African Research Review 41 
285 Oke (n248) 
286 Joy Geary, ’PEPs-Let’s get serious’ (2010) 13 Journal of Money Laundering Control 103 




corruption.288 Also, in March 2012, the FCA fined Coutts and company £8 million pounds for 
failing to establish and maintain effective AML systems, and failure to assess the level of 
money laundering risk posed by PEPs by failing to gather sufficient information in ascertaining 
PEPs source of funds and source of wealth.289  
In the same vein, Barclays Bank was fined £72 million pounds by the FCA for failing to 
perform appropriate due diligence on transactions involving wealthy clients who were known 
to be politically exposed persons, and should therefore have been subject to enhanced levels of 
due diligence and monitoring by Barclays.290 The largest fine imposed by the FCA for a lack 
of compliance with AML obligations. Consequently, the trend of imposing big fines on banks 
by regulators primarily for weaknesses in their AML defences has led quite a number of banks 
and other obliged entities withdrawing their services from PEPs, as a result of concerns about 
the risk of money laundering by said customers. This was referred to by an FCA commissioned 
research as ‘de-risking’, where banks remove their services from certain types of customers in 
order to reduce their compliance cost.291  
While the intention of AML laws and regulations regarding PEPs are preventive, not criminal 
in nature, and therefore not intended to stigmatise PEPs, the FATF have often held that refusing 
a business relationship with such persons based on their PEP status might be seen as contrary 
to the letter and spirit of AML regulations. Nevertheless, it shows the level of seriousness 
ascribed to such customers especially in foreign jurisdictions. It is my argument that that this 
is rarely the case in Nigeria; PEPs and their close associates are sort after and given preferential 
treatment by banks and other obliged entities who consider them wealthy customers while in 
total disregard of AML regulations and extant Anti-money laundering laws in Nigeria. 
3.5      ANALYSING PEP DEFINITIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NIGERIAN PEP 
Many of the provisions of the major international organisations on anti-money laundering 
controls have rightly metamorphosed into anti-money laundering domestic criminal 
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legislations in several countries across the world, including Nigeria. 292  Although these 
initiatives have been a welcome development given that the issue of laundering the proceeds 
of grand corruption from Nigeria to foreign jurisdictions have been prevalent in modern times; 
it is this thesis contention that some of the initiatives and definitions have been construed on 
principles outside the socio-legal context of the Nigerian PEP which makes them difficult to 
be implemented in Nigeria. An analysis of these AML legislations and regulations that have 
transcended into domestic AML legislations in Nigeria will be provided in chapter five. 
However, for the purpose of this chapter, consideration is given to why some of these initiatives 
and definitions might be difficult to implement in the Nigerian context. 
In this section, the thesis shall proceed to analyse some of the contentious issues and challenges 
surrounding the identification of PEPs and money laundering as it concerns Nigeria. 
Established institutions such as the African Development Bank 293  buttresses this thesis 
assertion, which argues on the imperative of taking the peculiarities of the Nigerian context 
into consideration when developing initiatives and strategies for combating money laundering. 
 3.5.1   FAMILY AND CLOSE ASSOCIATES OF POLITICALLY EXPOSED PERSONS 
In light of the fact that FATF sets the benchmark for effective legal, regulatory and operational 
measure for combating money laundering, it is necessary to assess its inclusion of family as 
part of the definitions of PEPs. The inclusion of family members and close associates has been 
a challenge for regulated entities.294 The Recommendation is silent about the scope of this 
phrase. Although family members are not expressly defined in the definitions of PEPs, they are 
required to be subjected to increased scrutiny to the extent that they entail increased risks. 
Firstly, due to the sheer complexity of gathering and maintaining a comprehensive and up to 
date information for so many officials, relatives and friends, the expectation that large, medium 
sized and even small regulated entities will be able to determine the true family members of 
PEPs in some overseas state is patently absurd.295 This is because family and close associate 
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are fluid, and may change significantly overtime. 296  This presents significant, if not 
insurmountable challenges especially for small and medium size obliged entities.  
Secondly, the concept of family still represents a significant problem. The average family has 
classically been understood as a nuclear family. However, the typical family can no longer be 
the exact social expectation as divorce, remarriage, cohabitation of couples and births outside 
marriage constitutes changing realities of the current times.297 Confusion can arise as to the 
influence that particular types of family members generally have by virtue of how broad the 
circle of close family members tends to be. This point becomes relevant because, in some 
jurisdictions, the number of family members considered close enough as to have influence may 
be small (e.g. parents, siblings, spouses/partners).298 In other jurisdictions they maybe large.  
While family in most foreign jurisdictions are defined by blood where only immediate nuclear 
family members are considered close enough within the context of PEPs definition; in other 
countries like Nigeria it can equally be defined by culture. Who constitutes a family member 
depends upon the circumstances; however, given the nature of the extended family in many 
African societies, such individuals may be difficult to identify.299 There are communities in 
Nigeria were being affiliated with another individual by virtue of having ethno-cultural links 
and by being a native of the same local government is still seen as family, even though they 
have different genetic heritage, may fit the description of family members.  
For this reason, if the verification of a customer’s family is restricted to only those with blood 
ties, it could have the effect of excluding a whole number of significant people who could 
potentially carry the same level of risk as those recognised as family members. In as much as 
it can be argued that if culture is given prominence over the certainty entailed with blood ties, 
this could possibly open the floodgates to a peculiar situation where an avalanche of people 
will need to be investigated and scrutinized. Thus, it might not be a productive way of utilising 
resources, especially for small and medium regulated entities.300  
                                                             
296 FATF,’ Politically exposed persons: Recommendation 12 and 22’ (June 2013) <http: www.fatf-gafi.org> 
accessed 10 April 2018 
297 Rahul Sharma,’ The Family and Family Structure Classification Redefined for the Current Times’ (2013) 2 
Journal of Family Medicine and Primary Care 306 
298 Mariana Pargendler,’ The Rise and decline of Legal families’ (2012) 60 The American Journal of Comparative 
Law 1043 
299 John Hatchard, Combating Money Laundering in Africa: Dealing with the Problem of PEPs (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2020) 19 




Therefore, as a result of lack of guidance from FATF as to who constitutes family which might 
be different in various jurisdictions, it might be problematic for financial institutions such as 
banks to determine those that constitutes family, especially in jurisdictions where this concept 
might include an array of persons. Considering that the supposed family member may not even 
have the same surname as the person to whom they are supposedly related. These are some of 
the issues as it relates to family within the Nigerian context. Although the narrow definition of 
family members may be justified on the basis of a reduction in the potential target group for 
PEP AML compliance, it is over simplistic in its understanding of the complexity of family 
relationships throughout the world, especially in developing countries like Nigeria.  
As a result of the prevalence and complexities of money laundering activities in Nigeria, 
including those who perpetuate the act, one wonders if FATF Recommendations is impactful 
enough to guide and safeguard the financial systems in Nigeria from abuse. Extant Nigerian 
laws are equally silent as to coverage of those that constitutes family or close associates. 
Nevertheless, family members and family affiliation are important ingredients in Africa’s 
social life, and even more so in the life of a PEP. Therefore, from the foregoing, the issue of 
family is one which can be complicated, especially when lack of guidance is provided by FATF. 
3.5.2    THE DISCREPANCIES IN THE PERIOD FOR WHICH A PERSON REMAINS A PEP 
Equally important is the question of how long within which PEPs maybe categorised as a PEP. 
Whether such status is erased at the end of the tenure of such PEPs? International standards 
like the FATF Recommendations and UNCAC do not impose any time frame for considering 
when a PEP ceases to be considered a PEP after leaving office. However, the new European 
Union Fourth Anti-money laundering Directive states that where a PEP is no longer entrusted 
with a prominent public function, obliged entities shall, for at least 12 months, be required to 
consider the continuing risk posed by that PEP until such a time as that person is deemed to 
pose no further risk specific to a PEP.301  
Whether a person ceases to be a PEP upon leaving office is unclear. Whilst their opportunities 
for corruption and money laundering are often diminished, maintaining a check on the 
legitimacy of their source of wealth and that of their family is arguably necessary to ensure that 
there is no abuse of any remaining influence.302 Although in some circumstances, it might not 
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be appropriate to consider an individual a PEP after leaving office, most PEPs such as 
Presidents of countries and other senior public officials who have held important positions in 
government can retain influence long after the expiration of their tenures.303 This creates a 
possible potential for corruption. Because of the prevalence of grand corruption in Nigeria, it 
becomes necessary that a high level of scrutiny with regards PEPs may be warranted even after 
leaving office. To point out, it is somewhat infeasible that former Presidents or Heads of 
Governments such as Governors will lose influence within 12 months of leaving power in 
Nigeria. 
It is my argument that many cultural and political factors determine the duration of power and 
influence held by PEPs in Nigeria. In many cases, the influence held by PEPs outlasts the term 
in office by years, and misappropriated public funds do not become legitimate after a certain 
time period. To elaborate, most senior PEPs like Presidents and Governors that are powerful 
positions in Nigeria have an overbearing tendency of determining who succeeds them in office. 
In order to cover their tracks, suppress evidence, and maintain relevance in the scheme of things; 
incumbent PEPs often try as much as possible to install a successor through acts of electoral 
malpractice. Many PEPs in Nigeria believe they have absolute power to control and impose 
their candidate as successors in Nigeria.304 The implication of this is that most Nigerian PEPs 
still wield enormous powers whilst out of office, and they continue to be influential in the 
running of the government that succeeds them. This includes a demand for return on 
investments expended on their chosen successor.  
In addition, government contractors have been known to lobby former PEPs due to their 
influence to advocate for them with their successors in awarding huge government contracts in 
their favour; while such PEP gains vast amounts of public funds as commission from such 
dealings. 305 This also explains the vicious cycle of grand corruption in Nigeria. In a country 
like Nigeria characterised by weak, corrupt institutions and a lack of free and fair elections306; 
it is not feasible due to the influence that most PEPs can retain even after leaving office to have 
obliged entities perform their due diligence on these officials for such a short period like 12 
months after leaving office. The arguments that it would be disproportionate to consider an 
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individual a PEP after leaving office might be plausible for countries where grand corruption 
is not widespread, and due to their stringent implementation of laws, PEPs sparingly engage in 
acts of corruption.  
However, this argument becomes impractical taking into consideration the peculiarities of the 
Nigerian PEP that can possibly retain enormous influence after leaving office. A former PEP 
who has been de-categorised as a PEP for being low risk can remain silent for a period of time 
without exhibiting traits that may require such person being kept as politically exposed. 
Consequently, such person may thereafter start the process of laundering the wealth illicitly 
acquired while in public office while financial institutions would not be obliged to file 
suspicious transactions reports as required when dealing with such customers. 
Greenberg gives credence to the above points through findings from field research that corrupt 
PEPs still indulge in laundering illicit funds gotten corruptly even after leaving office.307 
Greenberg argued that this can arise from attention placed on them whilst in office, and thus 
most corrupt PEPs might wait until the expiration of their tenures before laundering illicit funds. 
In fact, some PEPs, due to the influence they might retain, continue to receive payments after 
leaving office.308 Such problem is largely intensified the shorter the time the PEP continues to 
be treated as a PEP. Greenberg helpfully suggests and this thesis adopts this reasoning that the 
handling of such a person by those in the financial institutions and designated non-financial 
businesses and professions (lawyers, real estate agents, casinos, dealers in precious metals and 
stones et cetera)309 should consider the ongoing PEP status of their customers on a case-by-
case basis, using a risk-based approach to ascertain the level of risk involved by carrying on a 
business relationship with former PEPs, and not on prescribed time limit. 
3.5.3 ISSUES RELATING TO THE INTERNATIONAL DISPARITIES IN THE CATEGORISATION OF PEPS 
Another difficulty that arises from the concept of PEPs is the issue of the distinction between 
domestic PEPs and foreign PEPs. The FATF considers foreign PEPs high risk customers and 
requires the application of enhanced due diligence measures to PEPs who reside in a foreign 
jurisdiction or in a third country, thus, limiting the scope of their definitions and requirements 
to only PEPs outside of their jurisdiction.310 The idea that foreign PEPs are high risk compared 
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to domestic PEPs is linked to two ideas. Firstly, as the case with developed countries, domestic 
PEPs are considered less corrupt compared with foreign PEPs, and there is no need to apply 
enhanced due diligence standards to their domestic PEPs.311 
 Secondly, foreign PEPs are more likely to conceal the proceeds of corruption using financial 
services in foreign jurisdictions because they are not well known and have greater opportunity 
of concealing their identity.312 There are strong arguments that gives support to the inclusion 
of domestic PEPs. Domestic PEPs can possess more corrupt opportunities as foreign PEPs and 
therefore can launder misappropriated public funds locally or internationally (e.g. through real 
estate). Coupled with the fact that historically, money laundering scandals and corruption cases 
involving domestic PEPs have been extensive and continuing especially in countries like 
Nigeria where domestic PEPs often engage in massive corruption.  
Issues regarding the inclusion of domestic PEPs in the PEPs definition have been controversial. 
This problem is found in both developed and developing countries such as the example 
provided below on members of parliament (MPs) in the UK. The implication of the distinction 
between domestic PEPs and foreign PEPs, and the exclusion of junior and middle ranking PEPs 
poses a risk exposure with regulated entities saddled with dealing with these individuals. The 
use of the phrase ‘‘in a foreign country’’ by FATF has little significance within the context of 
domestic circle where the PEPs operate.  Such definition might serve as a useful guide for a 
United Kingdom domiciled financial institution dealing with PEPs who are domiciled outside 
the United Kingdom. 
However, if such definition is employed in the Nigerian context, it would be of little 
significance to a Nigerian financial institution and other regulated entities in identifying PEPs 
domestically. Rather, such definition would be useful in the Nigerian context in dealing with 
PEPs who reside in a foreign jurisdiction like the United Kingdom. In essence, the ramification 
of this is that a Nigerian financial institution and other regulated entities that are desirous of 
complying and fulfilling its domestic AML compliance obligation may not find the FATF 
recommendation useful. Using FATF Recommendations as yardstick for proper and efficient 
implementation of AML laws, it will be practically absurd for Nigerian financial institutions 
and other regulated entities to focus their attention and resources on foreign PEPs, leaving out 
                                                             





domestic PEPs who rampantly engage in laundering the proceeds of corruption to foreign 
jurisdictions.  
To emphasise, a case in hand that provides an example why both domestic and foreign PEPs 
should be considered high risk customers for AML purposes was the expenses claim that broke 
out in the British Parliament in 2010. In the United Kingdom, members of parliament are 
entitled to claim expenses, including the cost of accommodation, wholly and exclusively 
incurred for the performance of their parliamentary duties.313 This privilege was abused by 
some MPs who falsely claimed expenses from taxpayer’s money through false mortgage 
applications and rent claims with most MPs involved resigning while being asked to return 
such illicitly acquired public funds. Some of the MPs include Elliot Morley, Margaret Morgan 
and Jim Devine314. These instances point to the fact that implementing such recommendation 
in a country like Nigeria would be unworkable if FATF Recommendations are adhered to. 
Despite the fact that domestic PEPs in some jurisdictions are seen as low risk elements to 
corruption and money laundering, all PEPs whether domestic or foreign should be treated as 
high risk individuals for AML purposes. 
Given the fact that corruption and money laundering are global problems that are often 
transnational in nature, and given that collective action is required to combat these phenomenon; 
if developed countries do not require enhanced scrutiny of their domestic PEPs why should 
developing countries not follow their example and apply the same minimum due diligence 
standards to their own domestic PEPs? This in itself is contrary to measures designed to 
mitigate money laundering risks by PEPs. These discrepancies have contributed to a lack of 
implementation of effective PEP controls which has led to low-level compliance with global 
PEP regulations.315  Therefore, whether or not a PEP is a domestic or foreign PEP, these 
measures in the first place were designed to mitigate the increased money laundering risk 
associated with high risk customers like PEPs are.  
Furthermore, from the examples provided in the previous chapter, Nigeria provides a 
quintessential example why no preference with regard to the distinction between foreign PEPs 
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and domestic PEPs should be accorded to any group of PEPs. Despite the fact that corruption 
is more prevalent in some countries, especially developing countries as evidenced by 
Transparency International’s CPI, domestic PEPs are still susceptible to corrupt opportunities 
as foreign PEPs as shown by the expenses scandal in the United Kingdom. Therefore, if 
corruption is to be fought effectively, measures of accountability should apply to both domestic 
and foreign PEPs.  
3.5.4         EXCLUSION OF JUNIOR AND MIDDLE RANKING PEPs 
In addition, another issue worthy of examination is the exclusion of junior and middle ranking 
officials from the definition and categorisation of PEPs by FATF and the UNCAC. The FATF 
definition and categorisation of PEPs expressly states that the definition is not intended to cover 
junior and middle-ranking PEPs. This is suggestive of the fact that the major concern of the 
international AML system is largely to combat grand corruption by senior PEPs having 
prominent public functions. It is a well-known fact that junior and middle ranking PEPs who 
have significant responsibility in dealing with public resources may be prone to corruption, 
especially when their salaries are low and other opportunities to engage in corrupt activities 
presents itself.316 
In Nigeria, certain public offices such as permanent secretaries in federal ministries, state 
commissioners, local government chairmen, directors of parastatals are all public office that 
can be classified as middle and junior ranking PEPs because they are not conventionally 
considered as having prominent public functions. However, in Nigeria, the amount of financial 
misappropriation that have been wreaked by PEPs holding those positions have been as 
immense as those classified by FATF as senior PEPs. Moreover, in Nigeria, state powers lie in 
governmental institutions; these institutions more often than not are manned by individuals 
considered junior and middle ranking PEPs who wield enormous powers. Some have enriched 
themselves by misappropriating public funds.317 
For instance, a former Chairman of Pensions Commission, Abdulrasheed Maina, his son Faisal 
Maina, and their companies are currently standing trial for embezzling civil servants’ pension 
which affected about 141,790 civil servants. Mr Maina is being arraigned by the EFCC who 
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instituted a 12-count charge bordering on embezzlement and money laundering. 318 
Investigations done by the EFCC states that Maina is allegedly complicit in diverting 2billion 
pensions fund in the office of the Head of Service of the federation into his personal bank 
account. At the time of writing, Maina jumped bail and remains at large.319 
Excluding junior and middle ranking PEPs in the definition and categorisation of PEPs despite 
the inherent corruption and money laundering risk they pose, FATF has failed to consider local 
and political factors peculiar to certain jurisdictions like Nigeria. In Nigeria, junior and middle 
ranking PEPs are equally prone to embezzling and misappropriating public funds just like those 
considered by FATF as holding prominent or important public office. Therefore, in practice, if 
FATF Recommendations on PEPs is adhered to and followed in Nigeria, it would be unhelpful 
and thus, unworkable in Nigeria. 
3.6 CHALLENGES CONFRONTING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LAWS ON PEPS IN NIGERIA  
Despite the efforts put forward by international and domestic legislation to strengthen the fight 
against money laundering, enormous deficiencies and constraints limit the efficacy of the AML 
legal framework on PEPs in Nigeria. This section seeks to examine some of the major 
conundrums that impedes effective implementation of anti-corruption and anti-money 
laundering laws against Nigerian PEPs. 
 
3.6.1 Immunity of Certain Public Office Holders (Constitutional constraint): 
One unique legal problem that PEPs present is that of legal immunities. In Nigeria, no 
criminal or civil lawsuit can be brought against some PEPs on the basis that they are 
protected by constitutional immunities. While certain PEPs are in office, there is no 
realistic opportunity for domestic law enforcement agencies to act when they suspect 
diversion of public funds and financial crimes. The constitutional immunity is an issue 
that has generated a lot of controversy in Nigeria. By the provision of s.308 of the 
Nigerian constitution, no civil or criminal proceedings shall be instituted or continued 
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against certain public officials, such as the President, Vice-President, Governors and 
Deputy Governors until the expiration of their tenures in office.320 
 
The implication of this provision is that court proceedings against the abovementioned 
persons renders such proceedings, civil or criminal, null and void and of no effect.321 
Nigerian Presidents, Vice Presidents and a plethora of Nigerian Governors constitute 
the bulk of those engaged in corruption and money laundering. Yet, those occupying 
those positions cannot be prosecuted because of the immunity clause in the constitution. 
This provision has raised profuse contestation especially in the light of the defiant and 
corrupt attitudes of Nigeria’s federal and state chief executives. From examples 
provided in the previous chapter, offences bothering on corruption and money 
laundering in Nigeria are perpetrated by PEPs holding those positions, while the 
immunity accorded these PEPs presents an opportunity for evading prosecution.  
 
Some scholars canvass for the removal of the immunity clause enshrined in the 
constitution because its retention appears to be in conflict with the fight against grand 
corruption.322 Ebenezer argues that the goal should be to ensure that public officials if 
found culpable of corrupt practices while in office be prosecuted once it is discovered. 
That way, grand corruption can be curtailed. In contrast, opponents of its removal 
anchor their argument on the grounds that said public officials need not be encumbered 
by a spate of litigations.323 This is because litigations are capable of distracting them 
from properly conducting the affairs of the state efficiently as a result of attending to 
court proceedings which often might be vexatious.324 They also argue that the removal 
of the clause may serve as a viable tool in the hands of the opposition seeking to 
destabilise these officials. 
 
Although the positions of the two opposing divides have their substance, this thesis 
accepts the views of those calling for its removal. This is because the protective shield 
of constitutional immunity as a legitimate instrument and defence of corruption and 
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money laundering by PEPs, and the unlawful transfer of Nigeria’s wealth into personal 
accounts for onward transfer to foreign jurisdictions has gotten so frequent and 
alarming that it defeats the very concept of good governance in Nigeria. The immunity 
clause has overwhelmingly continued to serve as conduit pipes that aid PEPs in 
siphoning Nigeria’s wealth without the fear of being prosecuted. Notably, the cases of 
former Governors James Ibori, Diepreye Alamiesigha and Joshua Dariye already 
discussed in the previous chapter depicts the shortcomings of the immunity clause.  
 
Despite sufficient evidence of misappropriation of public funds and money laundering 
against these PEPs while in office, law enforcement in Nigeria were precluded from 
prosecuting them because of the immunity clause.325 In the Ibori case, despite most of 
his assets being frozen in the United Kingdom and several evidence linking Ibori to 
crimes bothering on money laundering by the UK authorities, Ibori could not be tried 
for allegations of corrupt practices because of the cloak of immunity which he enjoyed. 
These examples illustrate the challenges faced by law enforcement in corruption related 
money laundering cases.  
 
In order to effectively fight grand corruption among public officials, this thesis is of the 
opinion that the immunity clause must be to be expunged from the Nigerian constitution. 
It is this thesis argument that sparring a sitting President or Governor who commits a 
crime till the end of his tenure gives room for the manipulation of evidence, the 
compromise of witnesses, and the perversion of the cause of justice. Efforts to recover 
stolen assets from PEPs are usually frustrated by the complications caused by the 
change in the character and nature of such assets as a consequence of the difficulties 
inherent in waiting until the expiration of their tenures. Such period can enable a PEP 
erase evidence.326  
The immunity clause is one of the reasons why it is difficult to enforce AML laws in 
Nigeria. For instance, where a regulated entity such as banks in compliance with their 
AML obligations discovers money laundering activities involving PEPs granted 
immunity, even if such information is passed to law enforcement, necessary actions 
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cannot be taken due to this constitutional constraint of the immunity clause. 
Consequently, implementation becomes difficult given that the same PEPs who have 
been categorised as high-risk customers in FATF Recommendations are still the same 
individuals protected by the law. 
Another justification for expunging the immunity clause is that they violate the 
fundamental principle that all persons are equal before the law.327  A Governor or 
President who steals or embezzles public funds without prosecution because of 
immunity is no different from a government minister who also commits the same act, 
but can face prosecution by virtue of having no immunity. Both have committed crimes 
which can have a devastating effect on those who they govern. 
  
To further contextualise the analysis on this point, the concept of immunity is not new 
or limited to Nigeria and most of her public officials. Immunity for public officials also 
exist in the United States of America, although such immunity does not cover the large 
number of public officials like in Nigeria. Also, US Presidents do not have absolute 
immunity like Nigerian Presidents. In the US, the Supreme Court has consistently held 
in cases such as Nixon v Fitzgerald and Clinton v Jones, that Presidents deserve some 
type of immunity from civil lawsuits for officials acts undertaken while he or she is 
President.328  
The court reasons that immunity is necessary to protect the President from excessive 
interference with their responsibilities. Furthermore, the office of legal counsel in the 
Justice Department has stated that while the Vice President and other officials are not 
immune from federal indictment and criminal prosecutions, the President is unique and 
thus entitled to immunity from indictment and criminal prosecution while in office. 329 
 
Although Presidents have uniformly testified or produced documents in criminal 
proceedings when called upon to do so by the courts. The only remedy would be for 
the President to be subject to the impeachment process in cases of abuse of power, and 
that upon removal, be subjected to criminal prosecution. To buttress this facts, 
immunity prevented the prosecution of a former US President, Donald Trump, from 
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charges bothering on financial crimes relating to investigations from the Manhattan 
District attorney; as well as other crimes such as campaign finance violations during 
his tenure as President.330 Thus, the issue of immunity is not just a Nigerian issue, 
established and developed nations also have immunity issues.  
 
This thesis is of the opinion that, rather than have absolute immunity from prosecution 
which is an excessive protection of PEPs that have been subjected to abuse in Nigeria, 
what is sought to be achieved through that section can be best achieved if such 
immunity is qualified and only covers the official acts of the office holder and not 
absolute immunity. There is no justification for public officials who misappropriate 
public funds to enjoy immunity from prosecution while in office, especially considering 
the high levels of abuse of office by Nigerian PEPs. Until this is done, corrupt PEPs 
who engage in mind-boggling theft and laundering of public funds will keep retaining 
the benefit of proceeds of corruption at the expense of the governed. 
 
3.6.2 Politically Exposed Persons having the legislative powers to enact Anti-corruption and 
financial crime laws  
Combating corruption and money laundering requires a state or country to have in place 
an effective legal and regulatory frameworks relating both to preventing and to 
criminalising these offences.331 Where there is an interference and a degree of political 
control over the law making process, this can frustrate and ensure that necessary anti-
corruption and anti-money laundering legislations or regulations are either delayed or 
so ineffective that it reduces the effectiveness of the legal regime meant to fight 
corruption and money laundering.332  
 
As corruption continues to negatively impact all aspects of Nigeria’s developmental 
agenda, it is imperative that Nigeria becomes responsive to both domestic and 
international pressures to confront corruption with all possible strategies available. One 
of such strategies which is paramount and indispensable is the promulgation of laws to 
combat the menace of grand corruption and money laundering. This is also inclusive of 
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repealing outdated extant laws to conform to modern day realities as a result of new 
and evolving approaches in confronting this phenomenon.  
By virtue of the observance of the rule of national sovereignty, the fight against 
corruption and money laundering has often been domesticated in Nigeria.333 Thus, 
while international organisations and institutions like the World Bank and FATF have 
continued to champion the need to combat corruption and money laundering, such 
initiatives can only serve as catalyst for domestic institutions to confront these 
phenomenon. 
 
Having said this, it is pertinent to state that although a broad based coalition of actors, 
particularly the three arms of government (executive, legislature and the Judiciary) are 
crucial for achieving progress in combating corruption, the role of the legislature 
particularly appears all encompassing and salient.334 This is because the legislature is 
the main institutional anchorage provided for in the constitution to make laws to combat 
corruption.335 There appears to be a convergence of views not only among international 
organisations, but also among other scholars that the legislature/national assembly’s 
stand in good stead to curb corruption.336  
Hence, the legislature, constrained only by the constitution have the authority to enact 
and repeal any law they wish. In achieving this purpose, they can create other 
institutions and frameworks to assist it and the government in the discharge of this duty 
thereby creating the necessary legal frameworks to prevent and curb corruption and 
financial crime. s85 of the Nigerian constitution vests power on the Nigerian legislature 
to, inter alia- 
 
(a) Make laws with respect to any matter within its legislative competence and correct 
any defects in existing laws; and 
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(b) Expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in the executive or administration of laws 
within its legislative competence and in the disbursement or administration of funds 
appropriated by it.337 
The first area where effective anti-corruption war may be waged by the legislature is 
combating corruption and money laundering through the law-making process. It is 
against this background that the role of the legislature in a highly corrupt society like 
Nigeria may be appreciated. The Nigerian National assembly have often been criticised 
for being weak and incapable of effectively utilising its law-making powers to curb 
corruption and money laundering.338 This is evident by its refusal to pass most anti-
corruption bills in Nigeria. For instance, the National assembly refused to pass an 
executive bill for the establishment of special courts with the exclusive jurisdiction to 
try corruption cases.339 The bill was aimed at helping the courts who are often over-
burdened with other cases to speed up trials of corruption cases in order to obviate 
undue delays in the determination of such cases.  
While the foregoing constitutional powers suggest that the legislature could pass laws that 
could effectively combat corruption, the personal gain to be derived by members of the national 
assembly in Nigeria often override the imperative to tackle grand corruption and money 
laundering. Perhaps, more than any reason, the Nigerian national assembly has been home to 
series of scandals and allegations of large-scale corruption and money laundering perpetuated 
by same individuals who have the mandate to fight these offences through making laws. It is 
argued that that this has undermined and indeed crippled the capacity of the national assembly 
to serve as anti-corruption agents. In Nigeria, the political will of legislators to fight corruption 
and money laundering is almost non-existent or weak because the legislators do not perceive 
fighting corruption to be in their best interest.340 
Equally important is the fact that legislature asserts some form of control over the AML law 
enforcement agencies by exploiting their constitutional powers of confirming the appointments 
of the heads of enforcement and regulatory agencies made by the President. To emphasise, in 
response to the determination of the government to extend the anti-corruption fight to the 
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National assembly, the legislators have often threatened to leverage their powers of approval 
and confirmation of government’s nominees by refusing to approve or confirm nominees 
regardless of their suitability for the positions.341  The aim of such actions is to frustrate 
investigations of financial improprieties by the AML enforcement institutions against 
suspected members of the National assembly. 
A recent example is the refusal to confirm the executive’s nominee for head of the premier 
anti-corruption body in Nigeria, the EFCC on two occasions. Based on anecdotal evidence, it 
is generally suspected that the opposition to the confirmation was motivated by the fear that 
the new head of the enforcement institution had an uncompromising stance against Nigeria’s 
corrupt elite.342 Several legislators, many of whom were themselves former State Governors 
who lost immunity from prosecution are under investigation or facing charges for serious 
corruption and money laundering offences. In fact, on numerous occasions legislators have 
attempted to pass a law that confers legal immunity on themselves.343 
A few concise examples of senators being tried for allegations of corruption and money 
laundering would help drive home the point. 
Danjuma Goje: A former Governor of Gombe State is being tried by the EFCC for charges 
relating to corrupt practices and money laundering before a Federal High Court in Gombe.344 
Joshua Dariye: A former Governor of Plateau State is being tried by the EFCC on allegations 
of embezzling public funds while still in office before a High Court of the Federal Capital 
Territory.345 
Adamu Abdullahi: A former Governor of Nasarawa State is being prosecuted by the EFCC for 
alleged corrupt practices, misappropriation of public funds and money laundering offences 
while in office before a Federal High Court in Lafia.346 
Abdul-Aziz Nyako: The son of former Governor of Adamawa State, who is also a senator in 
Nigeria is being prosecuted alongside his father and five companies which allegedly served as 
conduit pipes for the illegal diversion of public funds on a 37-count charge of criminal 
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conspiracy, stealing, abuse of office and money laundering.347 This is also a good example on 
why laws relating to PEPs, their families and close associates are liable to be frustrated by the 
national assembly. Thus, in Nigeria, those who have benefited from corruption tend to frustrate 
the promulgation of AML laws. 
3.6.3 Politically Exposed Persons and their influence on financial institutions in Nigeria: 
In as much as the focus of the next chapter is extensively on the AML regimes in Nigeria, it is 
pertinent, albeit briefly to discuss some of the issues surrounding utilising the AML regime to 
combat corruption-related money laundering by PEPs in Nigeria. One of those issues includes 
the influence which PEPs have on financial institutions in Nigeria. Most corrupt PEPs in 
Nigeria use their influential powers to gain control of financial institutions.348 Indeed, PEPs 
may have the resources due to their connections and sophistication to be able to capture a 
financial institution; and to use this as an avenue to move funds unimpeded to other 
jurisdictions. 
Anti-money laundering laws and regulations require financial institutions to take measures to 
identify PEPs and report suspicious transactions involving PEPs. Other measures are the 
application of customer due diligence which is intended to enable financial institutions with an 
appropriate degree of confidence form a reasonable belief that it knows each customer349, and 
enhanced due diligence when dealing with high risk customers. The enhanced due diligence 
gives financial and designated non-financial institutions a greater understanding of the 
customer and the associated risk of doing business with such customers.350  
All these becomes fundamental taking into consideration that when corrupt PEPs obtain the 
proceeds of corruption through abuse of office, the money is usually moved into the financial 
system. It has been stated that over 70 percent of the proceeds of corruption and financial 
crimes passes through financial institutions in Nigeria.351 For this reason, financial institutions 
have been put in the front line of money laundering prevention. By asking financial institutions 
to identify their customers and file suspicious transaction report where they suspect dirty 
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money, the AML regime is effectively asking these institutions to be whistle-blowers for law 
enforcement agencies.352  
In spite of several legislations and regulations regarding high risk customers such as PEPs, 
many of the known cases of illicit financial flows from Nigeria to foreign jurisdictions have 
been diverted through financial institutions that are not desirous of complying with AML 
controls as a result of the profit they stand to gain from such customers. In Nigeria, even 
obvious PEPs with stupendous resources can place public funds in financial institutions without 
having to resort to any subterfuge.353 Most financial institutions in Nigeria fail to conduct due 
diligence to determine the sources of funds and source of wealth of public officials.354 In most 
cases they readily accede to PEPs demand for secrecy.355 This happens frequently despite a raft 
of AML laws that makes it obligatory for these institutions to perform due diligence and report 
suspicious transactions.  
Too often, PEPs collude with officers of legitimate organisations and financial institutions to 
perpetuate money laundering, making them complicit in helping PEPs launder their stolen 
funds. Some financial institutions have been involved in serious omissions and misconduct 
such as ignoring indications of the possible suspicious origin of funds, not passing relevant 
information to enforcement agencies. 356  For instance, in the course of investigating and 
arraigning corrupt PEPs in Nigeria, details have often emerged on how officers of financial 
institutions aid the corrupt in perpetuating money laundering. In the case of Abdulazeez Nyako, 
a bank manager admitted to transferring public funds through verbal instructions from said PEP 
for purposes that were not stated.357  
Similarly, in the case of Sule Lamido, a former Governor of Jigawa State, the EFCC obtained 
details of how huge sums of public funds belonging to the state government were moved in 
and out of 34 bank accounts linked to the Governor and his family members without the banks 
raising suspicion of such funds.358 The avoidance of corrupt funds inevitably involves turning 
down potential lucrative businesses, and not all financial institutions in Nigeria are willing to 
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do this. They focus more on their earnings rather than on their obligations pursuant to AML 
laws. In Nigeria, unlike in foreign jurisdictions, there is little risk of financial institutions 
suffering from the repercussion of their acts, such as incurring fines for dealing with corrupt 
PEPs or withdrawal of licence.  
3.6.4 Protection of PEPs by the Ruling Political elite 
One of the threats to the enforcement of anti-corruption and anti-money laundering laws in 
Nigeria emanates from the protection of the ruling political elite. 359  The excessive 
centralisation of power and the pervasiveness of grand corruption in Nigeria has meant that 
certain PEPs are shielded from prosecution. This is partly because heads of anti-corruption 
and AML agencies in Nigeria are selected by the government of the day360, leaving room 
for political interference and making them largely influential in shaping the direction of the 
fight against grand corruption and money laundering. There is often an overarching power 
of influence in the determination of those that should be prosecuted or not. These powers 
on occasions have meant that the war on grand corruption and money laundering have been 
a cosmetic exercise in Nigeria.   
Most PEPs involved in large-scale corruption and money laundering are usually members 
of the ruling party or the sponsors of elected officials.361 For instance, the removal of the 
former chairman of the EFCC, Nuhu Ribadu, by former President Umaru Yar’adua was as 
a result of a plot to protect a few privileged PEPs from prosecution.362 Most PEPs from 
opposing political parties’ defect to the ruling party in order to be protected from 
prosecution. This was the case involving Godswill Akpabio, former Governor of Akwa-
Ibom who had an ongoing money laundering investigation against him which was 
subsequently dropped when he defected to the ruling party.363  
These are some of the fundamental issues relating to PEPs in Nigeria, and why making laws 
even those conforming to FATF standards and other leading organisations aimed at stemming 
the tide of grand corruption and money laundering is difficult to achieve in Nigeria.  
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3.7                                         CONCLUSION 
To sum up, the issue of PEPs is an increasingly high-profile subject within the AML sector. As 
a result of their activities, PEPs have become a specific risk factor in the AML sector because 
they are considered high risk customers who pose a significant risk of grand corruption and 
money laundering by the very nature of their positions of authority, which could be prone to 
abuse especially but not limited to countries where grand corruption is widespread. Hence, the 
research in this chapter has been focused on examining the subject of politically exposed 
persons. This chapter has shown that combating the laundering of proceeds of corruption 
demands a recognition that PEPs are a special case in that they are the most powerful political 
entities in any society with unique access to state assets and influence over state institutions. 
The economic and developmental problems in Nigeria and other countries caused by grand 
corruption and money laundering by PEPs remain acute. The chapter examined some of the 
unique challenges associated with PEPs when combating grand corruption and money 
laundering. As already noted, Nigerian PEPs through examples given in the course of this 
chapter and the previous chapter represents quintessential examples of why additional scrutiny 
is required to be conducted on these individuals by financial and designated non-financial 
businesses and professions.  
While it has been a challenge to find an internationally accepted definition of a PEP, the chapter 
highlighted some of the definitions of PEPs which have been advanced, each with its own 
distinctive features, with the definitions ranging between a broader and narrower approach to 
the problem of deciding individuals considered a PEP, whether foreign, domestic, or both. The 
chapter argued that FATF definition may give the impression that domestic PEPs are less of a 
risk than their international counterparts and hence, not automatically subject to enhanced due 
diligence. The chapter argued in this regard that having a distinction between foreign and 
domestic PEPs is not desirable, because it will be practically absurd for financial institutions 
in countries like Nigeria to focus their attention and resources on foreign PEPs, leaving 
domestic PEPs who in Nigeria have rampantly engaged in laundering public funds to foreign 
jurisdictions.  
In addition, given that corruption and money laundering are often transnational in nature, such 
distinctions in itself is contrary to measures designed to mitigate the risk posed by PEPs. 




concerning PEPs are there in order to guard against the laundering of the proceeds of corruption, 
the definition should extend to all PEPs in the appropriate categories, not merely senior ones. 
Additionally, considering that FATF sets the global benchmark as far as money laundering is 
concerned; together with the fact that its recommendations are meant to be operational within 
the unique environment of developing countries such as Nigeria, the chapter argued that some 
of the principles have been construed outside the socio-legal context of the Nigerian PEP and 
would be difficult to implement. Whilst these initiatives are commendable, it is widely 
recognised that the unique nature of Nigeria means that a one size fits all approach to combating 
money laundering is infeasible. In this regard, the chapter argued that the concept of family 
represents a problem, inter alia, because of how broad the circle of family members tends to be 
in countries like Nigeria. The chapter argued that while family in the west and most foreign 
countries are defined by blood, and usually a narrow knit set up, in other developing countries, 
it can equally be defined by culture or other ethno-cultural links.  
 
Also examined is the issue of the time within which PEPs maybe de-categorised as PEPs after 
leaving office. The chapter has stated that while FATF and UNCAC do not impose any time 
frame for considering when a PEP ceases to be considered, the new EU Fourth ML Directive 
specifies 12 months. On this the chapter argued that while it might be out of proportion to 
consider an individual a PEP after leaving office, most PEPs can retain influence beyond 12 
months after leaving office. The idea of de-categorising PEPs for a short period of 12 months 
can pose its own risk, as PEPs who might have acted corruptly whilst in office might have a 
need to launder such funds; and such risk is intensified the shorter the time the PEP is 
considered a PEP.  
The chapter also explored some of the challenges that impedes enforcement of anti-money 
laundering laws as it applies to PEPs in Nigeria. The chapter argued for the removal of the 
immunity clause which have been abused by PEPs and have often frustrated law enforcement 
officials from prosecuting corrupt PEPs in Nigeria as this law shields most PEPs from civil and 
criminal prosecution. Likewise, the chapter also discussed PEPs control over the legislative 
frameworks through the enactment of laws including that of anti-corruption/ant-money 
laundering laws. The chapter argued that the fight against corrupt practices and money 
laundering have been frustrated by the refusal of the legislators to pass into law most bills 
aimed at combating corruption and money laundering because the legislature in Nigeria is 
populated with PEPs who themselves face several allegations of corrupt practices while serving 





The chapter also discussed PEPs and their influence on financial institutions in Nigeria. On 
this, the chapter discussed how PEPs in Nigeria can use their influential powers to gain control 
over financial institutions, consequently, aiding corrupt PEPs make use of financial institutions 
as an avenue to hide the proceeds of corruption and transfer public funds to other jurisdictions. 
The chapter held that banks in Nigeria have wittingly or unwittingly been complicit in this, as 
they rarely adhere to extant AML laws/regulations that obliges them to make reports to relevant 
agencies when they suspect a PEP of using the financial institutions in this manner. Having 
said these, a detailed analysis of the subject of money laundering and the laws/regulatory 






















                                            CHAPTER FOUR 
MONEY LAUNDERING: KEY ATTRIBUTES OF MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE USE OF 
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING REGIMES TO COMBAT GRAND CORRUPTION 
  4.1                                           INTRODUCTION 
There is literature to the effect that the fight against corruption is inextricably intertwined with 
that against money laundering.364 In like manner, the perennial nature of money laundering in 
Nigeria is inextricably intertwined with corruption perpetuated by politically exposed 
persons.365 The link between PEPs, corruption and money laundering is well established. 366 
Corruption and money laundering are notoriously persistent in Nigeria notwithstanding the 
array of laws deployed over the years against these phenomena. Pervasive corruption in Nigeria 
especially those involving PEPs constitutes a major threat and underlies majority of the money 
laundering cases reported in recent time. A simple definition of money laundering is to describe 
it as the conversion, transfer or concealment of illegally obtained money, so that it appears to 
have come from a legitimate source.367 Simply put, it is legitimising the proceeds of crime, in 
this case, corruption. 
Both corruption and money laundering habitually occur, with the presence of one almost 
underlining the other. Chaikin is of the view that corruption and money laundering are 
symbiotic, not only do they tend to co-occur, but fundamentally, the presence of one tends to 
create and reciprocally reinforce the incidence of the other.368 Corruption produces vast amount 
of illicit funds to be laundered through local and international financial systems, the source and 
ownership of which needs to be concealed through the act of money laundering. In Nigeria, 
illicit funds obtained by PEPs from corrupt practices constitutes majority of the funds laundered 
in Nigeria. The ability to transfer and conceal funds is critical to the perpetrators of grand 
corruption. Thus, money laundering is an essential part of grand corruption. 
Research done by Global Financial Integrity (GFI) held that between 2005-2014, some $182 
billion was lost through illicit financial flows from Nigeria to developed countries as a direct 
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consequence of money laundering.369  In other words the amount of money that is the proceeds 
of grand corruption from Nigeria is huge. It is apt to say that Nigeria is a major player, at least 
from the African continent regarding money laundering to foreign jurisdictions.  Not only has 
Nigeria been seen as the money laundering capital of Africa,370 Nigeria has consistently been 
on the international illicit financial transactions global watch list,371  and the FATF have 
consistently recommended to financial institutions the need to avoid or treat transactions from 
Nigerian sources with stringent due diligence. 
Unsurprisingly, Nigeria is held out as a fantastically corrupt country.372 Perhaps, inter alia, due 
to large movement of the proceeds of grand corruption across the globe by Nigerian PEPs, and 
the inability of successive governments to genuinely tackle these phenomena. These 
conclusions are well reflected in one of the most compelling evidence of corruption in 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index ratings of Nigeria as among the most 
corrupt countries on earth.  
The ever-changing nature of money laundering threats, facilitated by a constant evolution of 
technology and of the means at the disposal of corrupt PEPs and other criminals have produced 
calls by International organisations and institutions like the FATF and World Bank to continue 
advocating for more stringent laws in combating these activities, especially those perpetuated 
by PEPs. The focus on dirty money is now firmly entrenched in policy and law enforcement 
responses to corruption and other crimes. Regular pronouncements are made as to the threat 
posed by laundering illicit funds such as recent revelations in the Paradise and Panama papers 
as well as West Africa Leaks373; its infiltration into different sectors like banking, real estate; 
and the role of professional enablers like lawyers and accountants in money laundering. These 
has once again prompted stakeholders in the AML industry all over the world to advocate for 
stricter AML laws which could help curtail the flow of illicit financial flows by corrupt PEPs. 
Furthermore, corruption-related money laundering shares same traits as the laundering of 
proceeds of other types of crime, such as cybercrime or fraud, but there are important 
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differences. In the first place, corrupt PEPs may have certain natural advantages in laundering 
their stolen resources which is not available to other criminals. On the other hand, corrupt PEPs 
also face risks in disguising and moving their money which may not be present for other types 
of criminals. Mere association with large sums of unexplained wealth can be enough to trigger 
inquiries, as mostly, greater information often exists as to the wealth and income of PEPs as a 
result of assets and income disclosure requirement which allows more accurate assessment of 
sources of income of a PEP. 
To this end, this chapter focuses on money laundering in the context of corruption. While a 
great deal of global AML effort is expended towards organised crimes and preventing terrorist 
financing, those topics are beyond the scope of this chapter. By and large, the chapters objective 
is to provide a detailed examination of money laundering and the efficacy of utilising the AML 
regimes as fundamental tools in combating corruption related money laundering. Firstly, the 
chapter aims to provide the readership with a general narrative of the phenomenon which is 
money laundering. The chapter discusses the overarching narrative which brought about the 
development of the law worldwide on money laundering and anti-money laundering; and the 
creation of a specialised AML international organisation (FATF), whose mandate is to set 
standards and promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures 
for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.374  
Secondly, the chapter considers different definitions of money laundering, both as a legal 
concept and as a criminal offence under different legislations including Nigeria. Thirdly, the 
chapter examines the effects of money laundering activities which has significant economic 
and social consequences for developing countries like Nigeria, such as economic distortions 
and risk of international sanctions. Fourthly, to combat money laundering, stakeholders must 
understand how money laundering activities operate for the imperativeness of instituting 
greater vigilance to prevent same. Thus, the chapter also analyses certain typical stages in the 
money laundering process, i.e. placement, layering and integration. However, these stages are 
not an open and shut case in the context of money laundering. 
 Fifthly, the chapter identifies and examines some of the common methods used in laundering 
the proceeds of corruption which provides increased opportunities for PEPs to obscure the true 
nature, ownership and source of funds from law enforcement. This is accomplished by using 
legal structures (companies), intermediaries (lawyers), and the financial institutions (banks) 
                                                             




because of the extent to which these methods empower PEPs to achieve disconnects from the 
ownership of such illicit funds. Corrupt PEPs rapidly develop the methodology of corruption 
and money laundering. The classic methodology of corrupt PEPs placing the proceeds of 
corruption directly into their own named accounts or that of their immediate family members 
is apparently now a rarity, hence the usage of corporate vehicles like companies. Companies 
feature frequently in majority of the cases involving corrupt PEPs in Nigeria as these 
individuals resort to using companies to conceal their identities when trying to gain access to 
financial institutions.  
Companies are desirable because they are a form of legal person that can own assets, have bank 
accounts and credit cards in their own right.375 Additionally, because money laundering is a 
highly complex industry which can be difficult for criminals to execute on their own, they have 
become reliant on the services and skills provided by professionals such as lawyers to help 
launder the proceeds of crime.376 Some financial institutions(banks) in Nigeria have often been 
used and some have been complicit in laundering the proceeds of corruption to foreign 
jurisdictions, despite the fact that a successful AML regime relies heavily on the cooperation 
of financial institutions. Methods of money laundering have become more sophisticated as the 
complexity of financial relationships has grown and paths through which funds move 
worldwide through various channels have multiplied. 
Sixthly, the chapter will analyse the nexus between corruption and money laundering. In this 
regard and as a result of the close linkage, scholars and international organisations echo this 
chapter’s argument concerning the utility of AML regime to combat grand corruption in 
Nigeria. The chapter argues that the crux of the nexus or relationship between these crimes 
extends to the fact that these inter-linked problems also have inter-linked solutions; which is 
that leveraging AML regimes are crucial in combating grand corruption. Essentially, because 
money laundering is often viewed as the flip side of corruption and other criminal activity, and 
the close affinity between these crimes, as well as the utility of policy and legal responses 
developed to fight one type of crime can also be used in dealing with the other. Tracking down 
and arresting corrupt PEPs successfully is difficult, so AML efforts offer a trail and a means to 
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apply justice that may be more cost-effective than seeking out predicate offences.377 Predicate 
offences refer to those offences which generates illicit funds that are capable of being 
laundered.378 Ultimately, this chapter argues that AML tools are vital for law enforcement and 
instructively appears to be a significant tool in the fight against grand corruption. Nevertheless, 
as it is today, the laws, regulations and institutions that have been put together have yielded 
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4.2              DEFINITIONS OF MONEY LAUNDERING  
As we start our discussion of money laundering, it is fundamental to begin with a clear 
understanding of money laundering in the literature. This understanding is paramount. There 
are numerous definitions of money laundering in different jurisdictions, both as a legal concept 
and as a criminal offence. Money laundering has been defined as the use of money derived 
from illegal activity by concealing the identity of individuals who obtained the money and 
converting it to assets that appear to have come from a legitimate source.379 It is also defined 
as a process of manipulating illegally acquired wealth in a way that obscures its existence, 
origin or ownership for the purpose of avoiding law enforcement.380 It includes a deliberate, 
complicated and sophisticated process by which the proceeds of crime are camouflaged, 
disguised or made to appear as if they were earned by legitimate means. Anti-money laundering 
scholars define money laundering as the process of disguising the origins of property which 
has been acquired through criminal conduct.381 Furthermore, the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organised crime also known as the Palermo Convention defines money 
laundering as follows: 
• The conversion or transfer of property, knowing it is derived from a criminal offence, 
for the purpose of concealing or disguising its illicit origin or assisting any person who 
is involved in the commission of the crime to evade the legal consequences of his or 
her actions. 
• The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, 
rights with respect to, or ownership of property knowing that it is derived from a 
criminal offence. 
• The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing at the time of its receipt that it 
was derived from a criminal offence or from participation in a crime.382  
In the same vein, the EU Fourth Money Laundering Directive is also extensive in its definition 
of money laundering by stating that the following conduct, when committed intentionally, shall 
be regarded as money laundering:  
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• The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived from 
criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity, for the purpose of 
concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who 
is involved in the commission of such an activity to evade the legal consequence of that 
person’s action; 
• The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, 
rights with respect to, or ownership of, property knowing that such property is derived 
from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity; 
• The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that such 
property was derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such an 
activity; 
• Participation in, association to commit, attempt to commit and aiding, abetting, 
facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the actions referred to in points 
(a), (b) and (c).383 
Lastly, the Nigerian Money Laundering Prohibition Act 2012, defines money laundering as the 
conversion or transfer, concealment, disguise, or removal from jurisdiction, acquisition, 
retention of any fund or property, knowing that such funds or property is, or forms part of the 
proceeds of an unlawful act, notwithstanding if the various acts constituting the offence were 
committed in different countries or places.384 The unlawful act in the provisions of the MLPA 
encompasses a list of predicate offences which is inclusive of corruption, fraud, terrorist 
financing, theft, participation in an organised criminal group et cetera.385  This ostensibly 
conforms to FATF recommendations which has advised countries to inter alia: 
I. Criminalise money laundering; 
II. Apply the crime of money laundering to all serious offences, with a view to including 
the widest range of predicate offences; 
III. Extend predicate offences for money laundering to conduct that occurred in another 
country when it would have constituted a predicate offence had it occurred domestically; 
and 
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IV. Apply effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal sanctions to natural persons 
convicted of money laundering.386 
To input this thesis own definition as it relates to the discourse in this chapter, essentially the 
conduct generally involves financial institutions being engaged in an arrangement with 
customers (usually PEPs) that have the effect of facilitating the transfer, retention or control by 
PEPs of the proceeds of corruption or; aiding and abetting illicit financial flows to other 
jurisdictions. Notably, a common denominator or an important prerequisite with regards to 
which there have been a convergence in several statutes defining money laundering is in the 
use of knowledge as the trigger for the offence.  
Although this thesis is not meant to cover ‘knowledge’ in great detail, it highlights the potential 
liability of banks and those in the designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBP) 
in corruption and money laundering related cases. In the legal definitions above, the phrase 
‘knowing that it is derived from a criminal offence’ is used repeatedly in different statutes. 
Knowledge is a paramount element in the offence of money laundering. This inclusion of 
knowledge in the legal definition of money laundering applies particularly to those in the 
regulated sector such as banks and those in the designated non-financial businesses and 
professions.387 Thus, a person might be considered to have knowledge of money laundering if 
he knows or has reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting that another is engaged in 
money laundering.388 
 Where a financial institution(banks) or those in the DNFBP accepts money knowingly from 
someone who has stolen public funds, the bank could be held liable for money laundering. The 
pertinent question that arises is, how is a bank or those in the DNFBP deemed to have 
knowledge of the surrounding circumstances in relation to the money it receives from 
customers, particularly high-risk customers like PEPs? In as much as banking and other 
services provided by DNFBP are profit making business, they are bound by AML laws and 
regulatory guidelines governing their operations.389 For instance, in Nigeria, the Central Bank 
of Nigeria regulates and enforces AML regulations and guidelines to those in the financial 
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institutions. 390  Financial institutions are obligated to perform due diligence by making 
necessary inquiries and satisfying itself that deposits it is accepting is not tainted proceeds of 
crime;391 and are expected to report any knowledge of suspicious transactions to the EFCC.392 
Knowledge could be information discovered during the course of performing due diligence that 
another person is engaging in money laundering. However, as well shall see, some banks in 
Nigeria have been culpable of money laundering infractions by non-compliance with AML 
laws and regulations. 
By and large, the literature characterises money laundering as a cycle, the objective of which 
is to legitimise illicit funds, making them appear clean at the end of the process. The job of the 
money launderer is to use proven and secret techniques to make money obtained illegally 
through the commission of a predicate offence appear to have been acquired legitimately. It is 
pertinent to mention that this thesis takes cognisance of the fact that various predicate offences 
exists which yields the funds to be laundered. However, this thesis is largely focused on 
corruption as a predicate offence for money laundering which is prevalent among PEPs in 
Nigeria. When an unlawful activity such as the misappropriation of public funds in Nigeria 
generates substantial profit for PEPs, they must find avenues to hide the funds without drawing 
attention to the underlying corrupt activity which generated such profits. This goal is achieved 
by changing the form or by moving the money to jurisdictions where it is less likely to attract 
attention. 
Furthermore, money launderers are constrained by laws, especially those governing the 
operation of the world’s financial system. Statutes around the world have been aimed at 
specifically making the detection of money laundering easier. Among these which will also be 
considered in this chapter includes, laws relating to currency transaction reporting and more 
fundamentally, the requirement that banks report suspicious transactions to law enforcement 
which is critical for law enforcement regarding investigation and possible prosecution of 
money launderers when necessary.  
Money laundering remains a serious challenge in Nigeria as it is a nefarious practice that is 
mainly committed by individuals such as the elite and politically connected members of the 
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Nigerian society.393 This does not imply that other criminal activities in Nigeria such as those 
who engage in cybercrime do not commit money laundering. However, from numerous 
examples as dealt with in previous chapters, the bulk of this offence is committed by those who 
are PEPs.  
4.3       THE MONEY LAUNDERING PHENOMENON: THE GENERAL NARRATIVE 
An overarching narrative informs the development of the law worldwide on money laundering 
and the growth of the AML industry. It is that dirty money, the proceeds of crime are moving 
around the world; and that this phenomenon is tremendously harmful and that action in this 
regard should be prioritised.394 Realisation dawned that colossal amounts of money generated 
from, or associated with crime were passing through the financial system. This awareness 
culminated in the characterisation of money laundering as a threat and galvanised strategies to 
contain this phenomenon. 395  Money laundering has been fuelled by rapid technological 
developments and communication that allow money to move anywhere in the world with speed 
and ease, thus, making the task of combating money laundering more urgent than ever.  
The complex electronic technologies used in today’s financial services industries more widely, 
including the internet, have allowed money launderers to develop novel methods that make 
detection, tracing and recovery more difficult than ever. They also permit the laundering of 
large quantities of money, more quickly and on an international scale.396 The size of global 
money laundering is difficult to be assessed accurately due to methodological difficulties and 
the clandestine nature of money laundering. Methods such as case studies, proxy variables, and 
other models all tend to under or overestimate money laundering.397 Nonetheless, the United 
Nations office on Drugs and Crime holds that the estimated amount of money laundered 
globally in one year is 2-5% of global GDP, or $800 billion-$2 trillion US dollars.398   
The origin of money laundering is imprecise but we know that the activity began to develop 
on an industrial scale in the United States in the middle part of the twentieth century as 
criminals, particularly drug traffickers recognised the need to demonstrate that their enormous 
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pools of wealth had been derived from legitimate sources.399 Furthermore, the criminalisation 
of money laundering occurred some decades later, again in the US.400 In an effort to curtail the 
impact of drugs in America, legislation was promulgated in 1986 that made money laundering 
a federal crime.401 The criminalisation of money laundering was a highly novel concept at the 
time. Given the global interconnectivity of financial services, the criminalisation of money 
laundering only in the US had limited impact. In 1988 through the vehicle of the UN Vienna 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic substances, all signatory 
states committed to implement a range of measures including the criminalisation of behaviour 
that came universally to be referred to as money laundering.402  
Thus, the first major international agreement to counter money laundering was the Vienna 
convention. The name alone suggests the limited view of money laundering as a facet of drug 
trade. Nevertheless, the Vienna convention set down many of the main elements of the current 
AML regimes. From the early 1990s, international AML efforts experienced a rapid and 
massive expansion as major international institutions endorsed AML rules and new specialised 
AML international organisations were created. 403  The most important of these being the 
creation of FATF in 1990, the first international institution founded specifically to counter 
money laundering and the most influential body in setting AML standards.404 Substantively, it 
was in the1990s that governments realised the value of expanding the scope of money 
laundering so that the coverage of AML laws  were expanded away from the narrow focus on 
drugs to encompass the proceeds of crime generally.  
The rationale was that if it was illegal to handle drug money, it should also be illegal to handle 
the proceeds of other offences such as corruption, embezzlement and fraud. Therefore, these 
offences became subject to money laundering legislation. Enhanced legislation has been 
supplemented by rules requiring financial institutions to obtain and verify customers, including 
obtaining information on a customer’s source of funds and source of wealth, as well as the risks 
inherent in the nature and background of a customer whether they are politically exposed being 
one of the most significant risk factors.405  
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Furthermore, one of the objectives of the AML industry is stopping criminals from enjoying 
the proceeds of crime.406 In this regard, new policies strive to curb crime by taking away the 
profits of crime rather than simply punishing the individuals who have allegedly committed 
the crimes.407 The idea that a person should not profit from crime was instrumental in shaping 
the crime of money laundering and this has undergone a profound evolution, and also been 
developed into an independent wrong, with several jurisdictions including Nigeria 
criminalising money laundering in their extant statutes.408 This reasoning of not profiting from 
crime gave rise to a crime of money laundering, and a bureaucracy which is the AML industry; 
both of which have grown rapidly and in unforeseen ways.409 Attributed to this growth is the 
idea that AML tools are critical in combating financial crimes such as corruption and in asset 
recoveries.  
In the past, when the offence of money laundering did not exist, the proceeds of crime was 
laundered with impunity. Criminals, including those who stole public funds could easily open 
an account and deposit large sums of money without difficulties, while bank employees would 
be thrilled at having obtained wealthy new customers. The position is very different now as 
money laundering is universally regarded as a necessary, if not essential component of 
criminals who desire to legitimise and conceal stolen resources and such is treated as a serious 
offence around the world.  
According to Alldridge, the one crime whose continued increase is guaranteed is money 
laundering.410 From a small and relatively marginal role in the early 1990’s, the crime of 
laundering has become central to law enforcement and has loomed larger and larger in public 
consciousness. This is also as the activities of terrorists on the 11th of September 2001 acted as 
milestone events in the history of international AML evolution. This event provided the 
impetus on the imperativeness of a universal network of combating money laundering and 
terrorist financing. Consequently, a set of legislative initiatives have been promulgated 
surrounding increasing transparency in financial institutions as well as updating domestic AML 
legislations, all of which have been active in the last decades. The term AML/CFT (Anti-
Money Laundering and Countering the Finance of Terrorism) is frequently employed in the 
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AML sector when carrying out checks on customers for the purpose of detecting and preventing 
both.411  
The approach of the international community to both issues can be observed from the 
assessments of national legal frameworks on AML/CFT conducted by supranational bodies. 
Some of these bodies include the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and the FATF. The FATF originally issued 40 Recommendations on countering 
money laundering, which has been supplemented by nine Special Recommendations which 
mainly addresses terrorist financing.412 It is pertinent to note that the two concepts are distinct 
to the extent that money laundering is concerned with the origin of the money, whilst terrorist 
financing is largely, although not exclusively about the destination of the money. As a result 
of this, there is a new determination to prevent the financial system from being misused by 
terrorist, and by extension, to other crimes. 
In recognition of this phenomenon, laws and regulatory activities have increased substantially 
and can be expected to increase further, with a vast body of national and international counter-
measures to battle against increasingly sophisticated financial criminals.413 Given these facts, 
the AML narrative evolves around the seriousness of laundering. Some reasons were given for 
the criminalisation of money laundering. The thesis briefly highlights these reasons. The first 
as stated by Alldridge is that laundering is a form of complicity in the predicate offence, 
whatever the offence is.414 The second major claim advanced for the criminalisation of money 
laundering is that it is bad for the financial system because it endangers financial institutions.415 
In other words, the soundness and stability of financial institutions could be seriously 
jeopardised, thereby eroding the confidence and trust of the public in the financial system.  
However, although this proposition may be true, several scholars disagree with this view as 
such claims are frequently found but difficult to substantiate. According to Erin, no matter how 
many times this kind of claim is repeated, its plausibility does not increase.416 Erin posits that 
even before the advent of the AML regime, no bank or other financial institution was ever 
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endangered by the fact that they laundered money for criminal clients. There is little or no 
evidence for such claim that allowing banks to launder money for clients endangers the bank 
in question or the financial institutions. Therefore, the claim that interventions are required to 
safeguard financial institutions are fanciful. Additionally, Erin states that despite the global 
financial crisis in 2007-2008, there was no evidence to suggest that financial institutions were 
endangered by the activities of money launderers. Rather, financial institutions were 
endangered by all manner of destructive conduct by bankers and politicians but not money 
laundering. Thus, Erin contends that the relationship between money laundering and financial 
institutions can, at times, be ambivalent.  
Tailoring this argument to what is obtainable in Nigeria, this thesis agrees with Erin that banks 
laundering money for corrupt PEPs do not endanger financial institutions in Nigeria where 
banks have been complicit in the unpatriotic and economically destructive involvement in 
money laundering. Nigerian banks remain the main conduits for the corrupt to transfer their 
stolen funds out of Nigeria and they continue to play this role till today.417 This argument will 
be expounded upon in the course of this thesis.  
Thirdly, there is the claim that laundering is part of capital flight from developing countries.418 
In this regard, cases involving corrupt leaders such as the embezzlement of funds by late 
Nigerian dictator, Sani Abacha, laundering billions of dollars to foreign jurisdictions triggered 
the realisation that incredible amounts of money generated from corrupt leaders were passing 
through the financial system. In response, several measures were promulgated to help curtail 
the destructive effects of capital flight from developing countries. One of such measures is the 
FATF Recommendations. The Recommendations require governments and financial 
institutions to adopt measures such as know-your-customer and other customer due diligence 
measures and to monitor and report suspicious transactions including all cash transactions 
above certain threshold amount.419  
On the whole, one of FATF’s early accomplishments was to dispel the notion that money 
laundering is only about cash transactions. Through several money laundering typologies, 
FATF has demonstrated that money laundering can be achieved through virtually every 
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medium, financial institutions or business; and that methods used to launder proceeds of 
criminal activities are in constant evolution because criminals would often find alternative 
channels to launder the proceeds of criminal activities.420 Therefore, FATF strongly advocates 
for a proper culture of compliance with standards of AML which creates an environment where 
it is more difficult for crimes such as corruption to thrive undetected and unpunished.421  
Much of this section of the chapter has focused on discussing the development of money 
laundering. The chapter now seeks to delve into the nitty-gritty of the phenomenon of money 
laundering by providing a detailed examination of the economic and social implications of 
money laundering, the stages in the money laundering cycle, methods used in laundering the 
proceeds of corruption in Nigeria, the nexus between corruption and money laundering, as well 
as the fundamental issue of utilising AML regimes to combat grand corruption in Nigeria. 
    4.4           THE EFFECTS OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACTIVITIES  
Money laundering is a result of any crime that generates profits for the criminals involved, in 
this case corruption. It knows no boundaries, and jurisdictions where there are weak, ineffective 
or inadequate AML legislations and enforcement are most vulnerable.422 As most launderers 
eventually intend to use the proceeds of their crimes, the ultimate intent is to move funds 
through the financial systems. Thus, money laundering has several deleterious economic and 
social consequence on any society or country where it thrives. The negative effects of money 
laundering as highlighted by several scholars includes the following: 
 
4.4.1   Increased Exposure to crime and corruption: 
Socially, the effects of the prevalence of engaging in money laundering practices in the minds 
of citizens is that it creates an impression that crime pays and is profitable. As PEPs continue 
to benefit from corrupt practices with minimal consequences in Nigeria, it has the effect of 
eroding the moral fabric of society.423 The most visible impact upon society in Nigeria is that 
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most public officials are not moved by the desire to serve, but the desire to have access to 
public funds. These activities facilitate the vicious cycle of corruption. Where money 
laundering activities go unchecked and criminals are able to retain and enjoy the benefits from 
the proceeds of crime, it will only perpetuate the problem of the commission of offences that 
give rise to the illicit funds to be laundered.424 Additionally, when a country is seen as a haven 
for money laundering, just as Nigeria is considered the money laundering capital of Africa, it 
will attract people who commit crime. If money laundering is prevalent, there is more likely to 
be corruption. 
      4.4.2        REPUTATION RISK FOR THE COUNTRY 
As a result of the prevalence of money laundering and corruption which are notoriously 
persistent in Nigeria due to the colossal resources laundered by corrupt PEPs, this has earned 
Nigeria the unenviable tag of being seen as the money laundering capital of Africa. A reputation 
as a money laundering haven can harm development and economic growth in a country.425 This 
is because it diminishes legitimate global opportunities from foreign institutions that find the 
extra scrutiny involved in working with institutions in money laundering havens too 
expensive.426  
Additionally, with the increasing infiltration of money laundering activities in Nigeria, along 
with lack of transparency and high level of corruption, it is often difficult to attract foreign 
investments which is a contributory factor to economic development in Nigeria. Although 
developing countries like Nigeria cannot afford to be too selective about the sources of capital 
they attract, there is a dampening effect on foreign direct investment when a country’s financial 
sectors are perceived to be compromised and under the control and influence of money 
launderers.427 Therefore, the negative damaging reputation attributed to money laundering 
activities reduces legitimate developmental opportunities. On this basis, most developing 
countries like Nigeria, characterised with high level of corruption, economic and financial 
instability have frequently failed to attract adequate foreign investment to boost her economic 
and financial growth.  
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The dominance of economic and financial crimes in Nigeria, has to a degree, been liable for 
lack of adequate foreign investment. 428 Thus, once a country’s financial sector reputation is 
damaged, reviving it is very difficult when this could have been prevented with proper AML 
controls. Therefore, fighting money laundering is an important part of creating a business-
friendly environment which is a precondition for lasting economic development.429. 
 
4.4.3 RISK OF INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS 
In order to protect the financial systems from money laundering, several institutions and 
organisations such as United Nations, the European Union, FATF and other governing bodies 
may impose and subject countries to sanctions. This is done in order to protect the international 
financial system from money laundering risks and to encourage greater compliance with AML 
standards. 430  The FATF maintains a list of jurisdictions identified as high risk and non-
cooperative whose AML regimes have strategic deficiencies and are not at international 
standards.431 Previously, Nigeria was placed on FATF non-cooperative countries and territories 
(NCCT) list due to the Nigeria’s incapability of dealing with the exploits of money 
laundering.432  
In similar vein, on the 13th of February 2019, Nigeria was added to a blacklist of nations by the 
European Commission that poses global threat to the financial system because of the 
deficiencies in its AML regimes in relation to controlling financial activities and money 
laundering.433 According to the European Commission, the criteria used to blacklist countries 
includes weak sanctions against money laundering, insufficient cooperation with the EU with 
regards AML compliance, and lack of transparency regarding the beneficial owners of 
companies and trust.434 The move was said to be part of a crackdown on money laundering 
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activities after several scandals at EU banks such as Danske Bank for its alleged involvement 
in international money laundering.435 Apart from reputational damage, inclusion on the list 
complicates financial relations with the EU. The implication being that there have been calls 
by the EU on its members to apply enhanced due diligence to business relationships and 
transactions with natural and legal persons from these jurisdictions in an attempt to persuade 
them to improve on their AML regimes. 
These instances illustrate Nigeria’s lacklustre performance and non-compliant disposition 
towards several measures in combating money laundering which frustrates her ability to remain 
a reliable international partner in the fight against money laundering. This thesis agrees with 
the EU and other regulators who continuously blame Nigeria for poor performances with 
respect to issues of AML controls. This is because there are serious issues with the Nigerian 
financial system which aids PEPs in capital flight to foreign jurisdictions.  
4.4.4 ECONOMIC DISTORTION AND INSTABILITY 
Money launderers are not mainly interested in profit generation, but rather, in protecting their 
proceeds and hiding the illegal origin of the funds. As there is no motive to generate profits, 
money launderers, most often, invest their illicit funds in economic and commercial ventures 
that do not benefit the economy of the country where such illicit funds are situated.436 When 
investing, money launderers in most cases do not necessarily pursue high profit generating 
investments. Rather, they look for investments that simply allow for the recycling of their illicit 
proceeds even if it this means taking a low rate of return. Therefore, to the extent that money 
laundering and financial crime redirects funds from sound investment to low-quality 
investments that hide their origin, economic growth can suffer.437 
Furthermore, the exploits of money laundering can also harmfully undermine currencies and 
interest rates. According to Ayodeji, large capital inflows or outflows adversely affect 
exchange rates and interest rates.438 Consequently, this can lead to volatility in exchange and 
interest rates due to unanticipated cross-border transfer of funds. The cross-border transfer of 
funds can also be problematic especially for countries like Nigeria that rely on the acquisition 
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of other currencies such as the US dollar to fulfil her international obligations in satisfying 
local needs.439 
The chapter now turns to an examination of certain typical stages in the money laundering 
process. Strictly speaking, money laundering can be construed as a dynamic three stage process 
that requires, firstly, moving the funds from direct association with the crime [placement]; 
secondly, disguising the trail to foil pursuit [layering]; and thirdly, making the money available 
to the criminal once again with its occupational and geographic origins hidden from view 
[integration].440 
4.5              STAGES OF THE MONEY LAUNDERING CYCLE 
 The ultimate goal of any money laundering activity is twofold: To conceal the predicate 
offences from which the proceeds are derived, and to ensure that criminals can enjoy their 
proceeds by investing them and giving them legitimacy.441 In order to fulfil these ultimate goals, 
a number of elements have to be attained. These elements include the conversion of illicit cash 
into asset, the concealment of the ownership or source of the illegally acquired proceeds, and 
the creation of the perception of legitimacy of source and ownership.442  
Money laundering often involves a complex series of transactions that are difficult to separate. 
It depends on the anonymity, speed and complexities to carry out the schemes. Anonymity and 
complexity are paramount for money launderers as they ensure that illicit funds obtained from 
predicate offences must have no trace to lead to its origin and to make the job of investigators 
difficult or even impossible. Thus, the nature of a money laundering cycle entails several stages, 
and it is common in the literature to see money laundering as occurring in three stages. These 
three stages can also be found in a widely accepted analysis, according to which most money 
laundering operations are carried out. These stages can be split into three, namely: 
4.5.1 PLACEMENT: 
 Placement, the first stage in the money laundering process starts with the introduction of large 
cash proceeds of crime into the banking and financial system.443 This is often accomplished by 
                                                             
439 ibid 
440 John Howell, The Prevention of money laundering and Terrorists Financing (ICC Commercial Crime Services 
2006)2 
441 Guy Stessens, Money Laundering: A new international law enforcement model (Cambridge University Press 
2000) 83 
442ibid 




placing the funds furtively into circulation through formal financial institutions, both domestic 
and international. It may be done through single or multiple transactions using one or several 
bank deposits or the purchase of instruments such as bonds or shares.444 The transnational 
nature of money laundering means that the proceeds of crime can be transferred quickly across 
borders and a common technique used at this stage is the separation of the funds into smaller 
amounts for easy lodgements into various accounts. Many placement mechanisms are directed 
at positioning the funds in a bank or other regulated sectors and it has been held that such 
placement of dirty money also relies on businesses that deal heavily in cash, as well as financial 
institutions of all types.445   
This is the common situation, although there are exceptions. For instance, a corrupt PEP 
acquiring an expensive valuable artwork at the price of $100,000 dollars using corruptly 
obtained money. Consequently, the corrupt money has now passed to the legitimate seller who 
is oblivious of the origin of the money. Equally important, it is not always necessary to proceed 
with money laundering in order to use criminally or corruptly obtained resources.446 Instead, 
such criminally obtained resources can also be used by criminals for various purposes without 
the need to launder the money. The money can be used for other illegal activities, like electoral 
fraud and vote buying practiced by most PEPs in Nigeria during election cycles. If this is the 
intention, there wouldn’t be any need to proceed with placement.  
Additionally, most modern-day crimes generate forms of benefit that do not need to be placed 
into the financial system because they are already in it the moment the crime is committed.447 
For instance, crimes such as cybercrime do not require placement because they sit directly at 
the heart of the financial system.448 Placement is only relevant when the money needs to be 
channelled into a legitimate financial system,449 considering the fact that financial institutions 
are somewhat indispensable to those seeking to launder the proceeds of crime. The idea is to 
move illicit funds from the original source into some other forms that can be further layered 
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and concealed. The placement stage constitutes part of the foundational stage of the money 
laundering cycle. Succinctly, some examples of placement techniques include: 
a) Commingling of illegitimate funds with legitimate funds such as placing the cash gotten 
from corrupt activities into legal enterprises450. 
b) Smurfing. This is a term ascribed to money launderers who seek to evade scrutiny from 
authorities by structuring currency deposits into small amounts and depositing them 
into various bank accounts in an attempt to evade reporting requirements.451 
c) Purchasing a series of monetary instruments e.g. cashier’s cheque or money orders, 
which are then collected and deposited into accounts at another location or financial 
institution.  
These examples are in no way exhaustive as the placement techniques have been increasing 
from time to time. 
The placement stage has been held as the most crucial and riskiest stage in the process of money 
laundering.452 This is so because it is at this stage that the goal of the money launderer is to 
introduce the unlawful proceeds into the financial system without attracting the attention of 
financial institutions or law enforcement through the use of several techniques in the form of 
breaking down payments, using friends and relatives to achieve their goal.453 It is also at this 
stage that detection by the authorities is most likely as it has become harder to introduce large 
amounts of cash because banks have become more vigilant regarding money laundering 
activities. 
From a regulatory perspective, the placement stage provides ample opportunities for the 
detection and interception of illicit funds; failing which it becomes extremely difficult to 
identify such funds as they fall deeper into the economy.454As provided by the rules through 
statutes and regulations, the placement stage have been especially targeted with the 
introduction of measures such as know your customer requirements for new customers and 
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enhanced due diligence for high risk customers such as PEPs, in order to ameliorate the risk of 
accepting the proceeds of crimes into the financial system.455  
Typically, in Nigeria, it should be at this stage that banks and other financial institutions 
desirous of curtailing money laundering should be paying more attention and complying with 
their statutory obligations of customer due diligence. This is because if Nigerian banks and 
other financial institutions can adhere to this statutory obligation by paying close attention 
especially to public officials and reporting where necessary to enforcement agencies and 
regulators, more PEPs will be deterred from using banks as an avenue to launder stolen 
resources to other jurisdictions.  
In terms of susceptibility to money laundering, the sector that is most exposed to money 
laundering risks are the banks456, owning to the size of their institutions, high volume of 
transactions and high exposure to cross-border transactions.457 Given that the bulk of stolen 
Nigerian resources passes through the formal financial and banking system, and the fact that 
banks remains the ideal medium in terms of remittances abroad under the cover of legitimate 
transactions, it is fundamental that banks should pay more attention to this stage.   
The failure of financial institutions to take adequate steps to identify PEPs at the placement 
stage has led to corrupt PEPs opening accounts without being detected. For instance, over a 
number of years, it was discovered that large multinational banks and other financial 
institutions were opening accounts for Nigerian PEPs without due diligence where they 
amassed and deposited, either for themselves or on behalf of others vast amounts of illicit 
funds458 Banks in Nigeria have been known to be complicit in aiding PEPs launder the proceeds 
of corruption by turning blind eyes to obvious cases of money laundering from corrupt Nigerian 
PEPs, right from the placement stage.459  
Given these facts, it is argued that to effectively combat money laundering, increased vigilance 
is fundamental to stop or detect money laundering at the placement stage. Greater vigilance at 
the placement level to help salvage and ensure financial integrity in the financial system in 
Nigeria is a necessary antidote to the problem of money laundering. This could be achieved if 
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the necessary due diligence measures are adhered to by taking seriously know your customer, 
customer due diligence as well as enhanced due diligence as vital measures that must be 
complied with.  
4.5.2   LAYERING: 
As shown above, the idea in the placement stage is to introduce the proceeds of crime into the 
financial system so that it can be further layered and concealed. Once cash has been 
successfully placed into the financial system, launderers can engage in an infinite number of 
complex transactions. Hence the reason why it was argued that the placement stage is crucial 
in an attempt to prevent money laundering. The process of layering which follows placement 
is one in which the money launderer would be able to combine the illegal proceeds with 
legitimate ones. 460  This step is referred to as layering because the layers of financial 
transactions camouflage the illegal proceeds and obscures the money trail.  
It is the stage where the true origin of money is disguised by making the activity difficult to be 
detected and uncovered. Layering is very important in money laundering because it begins the 
legalisation of illegal cash.461 Yasin posits that layering involves separating illicit proceeds 
from their source by creating complex layers of financial transaction designed to disguise the 
audit trail and provide anonymity to create confusion and complicate the paper trail.462 In other 
words, the funds are passed through so many transactions that it becomes very difficult to 
establish the original source. This process can occur as often as necessary to enable the 
launderer distance itself from the source of cash. 
 In a more complicated scheme, the money launderer will move the funds between a number 
of accounts in a number of different jurisdictions and through a series of companies to ensure 
that the trail is as complicated as possible. The paper trail created through this process muddles 
law enforcements task of determining which funds are illegal and which are not; because the 
main objective is to confuse any criminal investigation and place as much distance as possible 
between the source of the illicit resources and their present status and appearance.463 Basically, 
the idea is that the more complex the transactions, the more effective the dirty money can 
ostensibly look clean.  
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A money launderer who was successful in the placement stage is likely to move to this stage 
which appears to be more complex. This is the reason this thesis has argued that the first stage 
in the laundering cycle gives the authorities a good chance to identify the money launderer. 
This stage can be very complex because identifying the money launderer and the money 
laundering activity is much more difficult and, in some cases, impossible.   
This phase usually consists of a continuous movement of the funds globally and electronically. 
As Hatchard posits, the laundering process is assisted by the willingness of some states and 
territories to make themselves highly attractive as off-shore financial centres or secrecy 
jurisdictions and thus not necessarily over-concerned as to the origin of the incoming funds.464 
Some examples of layering include, but are not limited to 
§ Investing in real estate and other legitimate businesses.465 
§ Converting the cash placed into monetary instruments. 
§ Electronically moving funds from one country to another and dividing them into 
advanced financial options or markets. 
§ Moving funds from one financial institution to another or within accounts at the same 
institution. 
§ Placing money in stocks, and bonds. 
§ Using shell companies to obscure the ultimate beneficial owner and assets.466 
These multiple layers render the beneficial owner’s connection to money laundering less 
apparent to investigation. The layers may also allow the owner to plausibly deny ownership or 
control of such assets if they are discovered. Investigations are particularly complicated when 
such layers are placed strategically in multiple jurisdictions because no investigating authority 
will have the legal compulsory power to procure evidence from all parties involved. 
4.5.3      INTEGRATION: 
Having successfully processed the criminal profits through the first two phases, the launderer 
then moves to the third stage, integration, in which the funds reemerge in the legitimate 
economy.467 Therefore, the third and final stage in the laundering cycle is the integration stage 
whereby the illegal proceeds returns to the economy appearing as legitimate proceeds.468 It also 
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means supplying apparent legitimacy to illicit wealth through the re-emergence of funds into 
the economy in what appears to be normal business or personal transactions. At this stage, the 
illegal proceeds haven been safely placed, mingled with legitimate funds and ready to revert 
back to the launderer through legitimate means as clean and legitimate funds. This means that 
the launderer in question has a justification regarding the source of wealth in the event of 
questioning by law enforcement. Consequently, this muddles law enforcement task of 
determining which funds are illegal and which are not. The end result of integration is that the 
proceeds from the illegal means cannot be distinguished from legal ones any longer.469  
This stage entails using laundered proceeds in seemingly normal transactions to create the 
perception of legitimacy. The launderer, for instance, might choose to invest the funds in real 
estate, financial ventures or luxury assets, which are all common techniques used at this 
conclusive stage of the laundering cycle. By the integration stage, it is exceedingly difficult to 
distinguish between legal and illegal wealth. This stage provides a launderer the chance to 
increase his wealth with the proceeds of crime. Integration is generally difficult to spot unless 
there are great disparities between a persons or company’s legitimate employment, business or 
investment ventures and a person’s wealth or company’s income or assets.470 Examples of 
integration transactions include: 
1. Purchasing luxury assets like property, artwork, jewellery or expensive automobiles. 
2. Getting into financial arrangements or other ventures where investments can be made 
in business enterprise. 
Thus, the integration stage marks the shift from dealing totally in illicit funds to a state in which 
the illicit money and legitimate ones begin to mix. This blending together is often done with 
the creation of legitimate entities used by the money laundering operation on an ongoing basis. 
Therefore, once this stage is reached, the criminal has a completely legitimate reason for having 
the funds and such criminal does not need to hide it any longer. In other words, the further the 
fund or property has progressed in the cycle of placement, layering and integration, the more 
sophisticated the laundering cycle has been, the more difficult it will be to prove the case 
against the launderer. 
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Each of these stages can be repeated multiple times until the source of funds can no longer be 
associated with laundered funds. 
 4.6          THE THREE STAGE CYCLE NOT AN OPEN AND SHUT CASE 
What is interesting about money laundering is its endless variety. Money laundering cuts across 
all types of criminal activities, from white-collar crimes, to drug trafficking, to corruption in 
developing countries.471 It also occurs in several cycles as examined above, from placing cash 
in the financial system, to moving money already in that system, whether domestic or 
international and using all sorts of modern alternatives.  However, there are scholars who have 
argued that although the ways in which money is being laundered today can exhibit some 
characteristics involved in the three-stage cycle, very often they do not, and in fact, the three-
stage cycle involved in money laundering are becoming obsolete.472  
Firstly, Platt is of the view that the difficulty with using the three stage cycle is that it has the 
tendency of framing money laundering too narrowly by creating a mental picture of money 
laundering which encourages the possibility that instances of money laundering in which any 
or all of the placement, layering, or integration activity that is unidentifiable will be above 
suspicion, even though it may well in fact constitute money laundering.473 In order words, it 
does not reflect the vast varieties of ways in which money is laundered. The fact remains that 
virtually any financial transaction can be a money laundering offence if the elements of the 
crime are satisfied, and relatively few of those transactions involve the placement of large sum 
of money into the financial system, followed by a complex series of transactions designed to 
conceal its source or ownership.  
According to Platt, reliance on this model has the consequence of leading to a disjunction 
between activities that the law was designed to prevent, and the activity that financial 
institutions have been attempting to identify and report. Furthermore, Platt argues that whilst 
the three-stage cycle may suitably apply to the laundering of cash-generative crimes such as 
drug trafficking, it can be misleading in case of identifying the laundering of non-cash 
generative crimes such as fraud, bribery, tax evasion and cybercrime; crimes which have 
become more prevalent in the last two decades.474 In a fraud case, for instance, the money is 
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often already in the financial system. In such cases, the money laundering offence consist of 
steps the defendant takes to keep such schemes going. 
There are a variety of instances involving the way and manner through which money 
laundering is perpetuated that bears no resemblance to the usual cycle of money laundering 
upon which so many practical reliance has been placed by those in the financial institutions 
and law enforcement. Yet, they would involve serious money laundering activity to which 
significant liability attaches if and when discovered. Therefore, the uncomfortable reality is 
that many instances which money is being laundered in plain sight are not reported to regulators 
or enforcement agencies because of the expectation gap created by the placement, layering and 
integration model.475 
Furthermore, Stefan is of the view that one of the problems associated with using the three-
stage cycle is largely conceptual.476 He argues that by focusing on these stages used to launder 
large sums of money, we limit the scope of both the money laundering statutes and the training 
of law enforcement agents to only a small part of the money laundering problem. Therefore, a 
policymaker, legislator, or those in the enforcement agency should be less interested in the 
stages of money laundering. The concern should be to detect transactions that are suspicious 
or points towards concealing the proceeds of crime rather than focusing on the placement, 
layering and integration stage.  
In the final analysis, Stefan argues that the stages involved in money laundering does not 
correspond to what a prosecutor has to prove in a money laundering case. Placement, layering 
and integration maybe a useful approach during an investigation into a complex series of 
transactions, but does not form part of what a prosecutor needs to prove in court. Prosecutors 
will usually focus on the elements of the crime, not on the means by which the crime was 
committed. In several jurisdictions including Nigeria, the elements of a money laundering 
offence include the fact that the defendant knew that he conducted a financial transaction and 
did so with a particular intent, such as to conceal or disguise the money.477 Thus, during the 
prosecution of money laundering, prosecutors are not concerned with the three stages, although 
they can provide circumstantial evidence of knowledge and intent, elements that must be 
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established at trial, rather than focus on whether the facts fits into the placement, layering and 
integration models.478 
4.7         LAUNDERING THE PROCEEDS OF CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA 
4.7.1       METHODS USED IN LAUNDERING THE PROCEEDS OF CORRUPTION  
Laundering the proceeds of corruption can take a variety of methods. A range of money 
laundering methods used by corrupt PEPs have been identified. They include: The use of 
corporate vehicles such as shell companies, the use of domestic and international financial 
institutions and the use of financial intermediaries, particularly lawyers.479 Although these are 
not an exhaustive list of the methods used in laundering the proceeds of grand corruption as 
corrupt PEPs and other criminals find more ingenious ways of concealing their illicit funds. 
However, based on research and case studies involving PEPs laundering the proceeds of 
corruption, these methods have been the most prevalent when PEPs launder the proceeds of 
corruption in Nigeria because of the extent to which they empower PEPs achieve disconnects 
from the true ownership of such illicit funds.480 These methods are therefore examined below: 
 4.7.2           THE USE OF CORPORATE VEHICLES (COMPANIES) 
Corporate vehicles are legal entities through which a wide variety of commercial activities are 
conducted. They are an essential and indispensable part of every economy; and have been 
credited for their immense contribution to rising prosperity in economies. 481  They are 
instruments through which individuals choose to invest, hold assets or manage wealth.  In most 
cases, corporate vehicles will be used for perfectly legitimate purposes. However, despite the 
important and legitimate roles they play in global economies, they can also be misused by 
criminals such as corrupt PEPs to create disconnects between the ultimate beneficial owners,482 
and the companies that are either used in the commission of crimes, the ownership of criminal 
property or other money laundering schemes.483 Perpetrators of illicit activities such as corrupt 
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PEPs prefer to deposit their illicit funds in an account opened under the name of a corporate 
vehicle rather than their own names. 
 Various forms of corporate vehicles exist and are all excellent methods to maximise anonymity 
of ownership as well as to facilitate the movement of illicit funds. These corporate vehicles 
includes shell companies, trusts and foundations.484 For the purposes of this section, only 
companies are examined as corporate vehicles because research from case studies indicates 
that companies are the most prevalently misused corporate vehicle in grand corruption cases.485  
In the past, corrupt PEPs like Abacha and others hid their involvement with stolen funds 
through anonymous bank accounts or in fictitious names.486 This option, however, has become 
increasingly less available as a result of stringent AML laws that prohibit financial institutions 
from opening anonymous accounts in fictitious names.487 Therefore, in order to circumvent the 
requirements of additional scrutiny, corrupt PEPs have in recent times resorted to using 
companies to conceal their identities when trying to access financial institutions. This is so 
because the provision by financial institutions of services that may be used for receiving, 
holding, or conveying the illicit proceeds of corruption is a critical part of the money laundering 
process.488  
The misuse of corporate vehicles, particularly companies by corrupt PEPs and other criminals 
have placed the issue on the international agenda and contributed to the formulation of 
international standards on transparency of legal entities. According to FATF, in all three stages 
of the money laundering process, corporate vehicles can be misused.489 Thus, the FATF have 
long noted the role of corporate vehicles in money laundering schemes and as such identified 
companies as posing great risk for money laundering. This is specifically addressed in FATF 
Recommendations 10, 22, 24 and 25 which together notes the significance of ensuring 
transparency of legal entities and identifying the beneficial owner of such entities, while also 
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mandating countries to prevent the misuse of legal persons for money laundering by ensuring 
adequate, accurate, and timely information on the beneficial owner of legal persons.490  
Furthermore, the unprecedented revelations in the Panama papers involving many PEPs around 
the world, including Nigerian PEPs, have also reinforced global attention on the potential and 
real dangers of companies for the purposes of money laundering.491 In the grand corruption 
context, it is easy to comprehend why corrupt PEPs may wish to use companies for money 
laundering. These reasons include: 
a) They are a form of legal person that can contract, own assets, have bank accounts and 
credit cards in their own right. 
b) They can be owned and controlled by corrupt PEPs in their own names or through 
nominees and business associates. 
c) They bestow a degree of formality and respectability to activities which if conducted in 
the name of an individual might appear unusual and thus potentially suspicious.492 
Additionally, in jurisdictions such as Nigeria, PEPs are subject to public asset disclosure 
requirements, rules regarding engaging in outside transactions, and a host of other codes of 
conduct and ethical prohibitions.493 Coupled with the fact that unlike other criminals, PEPs 
have their reputation and career at stake if found to be in possession of unexplained wealth. 
Under the abovementioned circumstances, it is unlikely that a corrupt PEP will take the risk of 
laundering illicit funds in their own name when there exists a possibility of creating a 
disconnect using a company instead; especially when such corrupt PEP can utilise a company 
managed and controlled by a close associate to perform such transactions on his behalf which 
can seemingly create room for plausible denial.  
Under these circumstances, PEPs have a greater desire than others to ensure that illicit funds 
and criminal assets cannot be linked with or traced back to them, hence the need for utilising 
companies to conceal their identities which serves as a vehicle to separate the origin of the 
illicit funds from the fact that the PEP controls it. 
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In Nigeria, majority of the grand corruption cases have one common denominator. They rely 
on companies to conceal ownership and control of tainted assets acquired with the proceeds of 
corruption. Corrupt PEPs in Nigeria often conduct their illicit transactions through the misuse 
of companies, usually incorporated in Nigeria or other foreign jurisdictions. Companies have 
thus been an element of many high-profile grand corruption and money laundering cases in 
recent years and continue to do so. For instance, when Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, former 
Governor, Bayelsa State was arrested at Heathrow Airport by the London Metropolitan Police 
on suspicion of money laundering offences, he was accused of participating in corrupt activities 
and had enriched himself by tens of millions of pounds worth of internationally held monetary 
assets and property holdings often registered in the name of companies.494 According to court 
records, Alamieyeseigha created at least five companies that separated his name and beneficial 
interest from the legal ownership and control of various financial and real estate assets. Charged 
alongside him were the following companies: Solomon & Peters Limited, Santolina Investment 
Corporation, Pesal Nigeria Limited and Herbage Global services which all pled guilty to 
twenty-three charges of money laundering. The companies were all found guilty of money 
laundering and subsequently wound up and had their assets forfeited to the Nigerian 
government.495  
4.7.3           THE USE OF INTERMEDIARIES (LAWYERS) 
In the same fashion, the use of intermediaries such as lawyers have become one of the 
frequently used methods in perpetuating money laundering.496 In this respect, a narrative has 
emerged within official and academic discourse which is that legal and financial professionals 
are increasingly playing a critical role in concealing and facilitation of money laundering.497 
Law enforcement organisations and international organisations such as FATF have highlighted 
this as an increasing problem, suggesting that stringent AML controls placed on financial 
institutions and the increasingly complex methods of money laundering have led to criminals 
becoming reliant on the services and skills provided by professionals to help launder their illicit 
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funds.498 For this reason, this has resulted in the implementation of a variety of legislative and 
policy measures aimed at preventing professionals becoming involved in money laundering, 
including their own conscription into AML efforts through rules, responsibilities and 
obligations.499  Money laundering is a highly complex and professional industry which is 
difficult for criminals to execute on their own, hence the need to engage the services of 
professionals like lawyers. Lawyers possess particular skills and expertise that may be required 
by criminals who are desirous of concealing the origins of their criminal proceeds. For instance, 
where it involves the structuring and managing of complex financial transactions which may 
require their expertise and the knowledge of the financial system and their ability to structure 
transactions in a way that disguises the origin of criminal proceeds.500  
Furthermore, one of the key themes running through the academic literature and official 
discourse on professionals involved in the facilitation of money laundering is their 
consideration  and conceptualisation in the AML sector as ‘gatekeepers’ to the financial 
system.501 Gatekeepers are essentially professionals such as lawyers that protect the gates to 
the financial system through which potential users of the system including launderers must pass 
in order to be successful.502 The rationale for this conceptualisation is that professionals are 
seen as having the opportunity to furnish access, knowingly or unwittingly to criminals willing 
to move or conceal illicit funds.503 Also, due to the fact that they are also responsible for 
preventing money laundering by virtue of being enlisted as designated non-financial 
professionals who are mandated to comply with various AML responsibilities such as filing 
suspicious transaction reports when necessary or face the risk of being complicit in the 
facilitation of money laundering.504  
Lawyers by virtue of being classified as designated non-financial businesses and professions 
for the purposes of AML compliance are expected to combat money laundering by enhancing 
transparency, accountability, and by developing techniques for curbing illegal money transfers. 
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Lawyers enjoy a high degree of credibility and trust. With this comes vulnerability, for their 
range of services provides PEPs and other criminals with attractive money laundering 
opportunities.505 These include buying and selling real estate, incorporating corporate vehicles 
to hold assets, managing legal persons or arrangements, managing finances and securities, 
opening bank accounts to avoid AML controls and executing various financial transactions 
which can be exploited by individuals wishing to launder illicit funds.506  
Bell suggests that the use of client account for the movement of criminal proceeds is one of the 
most important services that lawyers can provide to those who seek to launder dirty money.507 
Bell details a number of cases from various jurisdictions involving lawyers who were 
prosecuted for accepting criminal money into their firm’s client account before moving it to 
offshore bank accounts, transferring it to shell corporations or returning it to the criminal in the 
form of cheques. The reason for the movement of criminal proceeds through a lawyer’s clients 
account gives them a sense of legitimacy, which can help circumvent financial institution’s 
AML controls.508 In some cases this is the result of innocent or unwitting involvement of 
lawyers.509 In other cases, it may involve wilful blindness or complicity.510 
 Apart from giving legitimate professional legal advice, lawyers have frequently acted as 
facilitators in money laundering schemes. They have assisted in establishing legal structures, 
devised ways to move assets offshore, provide legal opinions on the legality of offshore 
structures and transactions, acted as nominee directors and shareholders, as well as drafting 
legal instruments needed to implement these transactions for their clients.511 More importantly, 
they have also been implicated in facilitating the flow of public funds stolen from developing 
countries through structures in western jurisdictions.512 A quintessential example of the above 
point involves a British lawyer, Bhadresh Gohil, who was the lawyer of James Ibori, former 
Governor of Delta state and one of the most prominent Nigerian PEP to be successfully 
prosecuted for money laundering, albeit by a foreign jurisdiction.  
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Gohil was convicted on a number of counts relating to the laundering of £37million pounds 
which had been stolen from Delta state by Ibori.513 He was implicated for the role he played in 
the money laundering charges against Ibori, where he was recruited and purported to have 
designed schemes used in the facilitation of stolen public funds from Delta state. Gohil’s 
involvement in the laundering scheme included allowing the use of his firm’s client account 
for the money to pass through, opening other bank accounts to be used for laundering, creating 
a series of complex financial transactions and setting up companies used to launder stolen 
funds.514  
In addition, he assisted in the purchase of a challenger jet at a cost of $20 million and kept 
Ibori’s ownership of the jet a secret by developing a scheme to ensure that ownership of the jet 
was made as complicated and obscure as possible, using bank accounts and companies 
registered in various countries. In similar vein, some lawyers in Nigeria have also been 
implicated in various money laundering schemes that help corrupt PEPs divert and launder the 
proceeds of grand corruption using their expertise to conceal and promote money laundering 
and corrupt activities for reasons of personal financial benefit. 515  Money laundering 
investigations involving Nigerian corrupt PEPs have seen the involvement of lawyers 
facilitating the corrupt practices of public officials in siphoning and laundering illicit funds 
both in and outside Nigeria. 
 A case in point to buttress this fact involves the incumbent President of the Nigerian Bar 
Association, Paul Usoro, who at the time of writing this thesis is being charged by the 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission with a ten count charge on allegation of money 
laundering. 516  The EFCC’s allegation against Usoro relate to concealing the source of, 
disguising the origin of and retaining in his account the sum of 1.4 billion naira belonging to 
Akwa-Ibom state government which he reasonably ought to have known formed part of the 
proceeds of unlawful activity.517 The EFCC argued that the payment of over 1.4 billion to 
Usoro from the accounts of Akwa-Ibom state government for unofficial transactions is nothing 
short of criminal diversion of public funds. This he executed in connivance with the incumbent 
Governor of Akwa-Ibom State who unfortunately is not listed as a defendant alongside Usoro 
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as EFCC indicated that he is currently constitutionally immune against criminal prosecution.518 
This above case also serves as an example of the reasons why this thesis has argued in previous 
chapters on the imperativeness of the removal of the constitutional immunity granted to certain 
public officials in the Nigerian constitution. 
Furthermore, in line with the notion that members of the legal profession with their skills and 
expertise are critical to money laundering schemes and the general concerns about the misuse 
of their respected status, willingly or unwittingly in the facilitation of money laundering, the 
FATF is of the view that lawyers should be subject to comprehensive AML obligations.519 The 
obligation for legal professionals to comply with AML requirement originates from several 
case studies which provides evidence of lawyers playing a role in the facilitation of money 
laundering.520 Consequently, the FATF recommends by virtue of Recommendation 10, 11 and 
22 that lawyers and other designated financial businesses and professions should be required 
to perform customer due diligence and file suspicious transaction report similar to financial 
institutions when engaging in certain financial transactions.  
Many countries including Nigeria by virtue of s4, 6, and 25 of the Money Laundering 
(Prohibition) Act 2012 incorporated this requirement and includes lawyers as ‘‘designated non-
financial businesses and professions’’ mandated to perform similar functions as financial and 
designated non-financial institutions regarding adherence to measures like performing 
customer due diligence on their clients and reporting suspicious transactions to agencies 
mandated to implement this part of the Act, such as Special Control Unit against Money 
Laundering (SCUML).521 In other words lawyers are regulated professionals under the MLPA 
2012, which means they have certain obligations and responsibilities with regards the 
prevention of money laundering and are regulated by designated supervisory bodies to ensure 
compliance with regulations.  
However, the extension of preventive measures of the AML regime to lawyers have received 
opposition from members of the profession worldwide and has been the subject of considerable 
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debate, particularly in relation to the duty to report suspicious transactions. 522  Inter alia, 
lawyers argue that this requirement infringes and undermines the core principles of the legal 
system, including the attorney-client privilege, the duty of client confidentiality, independence 
of lawyers, the duty of client loyalty, the general delivery of legal services, and the historical 
prerogative of state regulation of lawyers.523 
 In Nigeria, there have been legal challenges in relation to measures extending reporting 
obligations to lawyers. 524 Although legal practitioners by virtue of the MLPA 2012 are 
considered designated non-financial businesses and professions, things changed drastically 
when the Central Bank of Nigeria decided to get tough with members of the legal profession 
by using banking regulations to compel compliance with extant laws by directing banks and 
other financial institutions through a circular to cease the provision of banking services to 
designated non-financial businesses and professionals that refuses to register with the 
SCUML;525 before establishing new business relationship with them.  
This attempt to enforce the said directive against members of the legal profession triggered the 
institution of an action by the Nigerian Bar association, the highest regulatory body of legal 
professionals in Nigeria against the federal government and the Central Bank of Nigeria before 
a federal high court. The NBA sought the following declaratory and injunctive reliefs: 
• A declaration that provisions of s5 of the MLPA in so far as they purport to apply to 
legal professionals are invalid, and null and void 
• A declaration that the inclusion of legal professionals on the definition of DNFBP in 
s25 is inapplicable 
• An order of perpetual injunction restraining federal government by itself or acting 
through its agencies from seeking to enforce the provision of s5.526 
These reliefs were granted and accordingly, it was decided that the provisions of s5 MLPA 
2012 in so far as they purport to apply to legal practitioners were invalid, null and void. It was 
also decided that the term legal practitioners be struck out from the list of DNFBP. The author 
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of this thesis was privileged to have been involved in this case as one of the counsels for the 
Nigerian Bar Association when the Central bank of Nigeria, dissatisfied with the decision of 
the lower court, proceeded to appeal the decision.527 The decision given by the lower court was 
upheld on appeal and the case of the CBN was dismissed accordingly.528  
Therefore, as it stands, the implication of this decision is that lawyers are not required to adhere 
to AML obligations such as reporting suspicious transactions that are put in place to govern 
banks, other financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions like 
accountants and car dealers in Nigeria. Consequently, it falls within the responsibility of the 
Nigerian Bar Association to regulate the conduct of lawyers sufficiently to prevent and curtail 
lawyer’s involvement in money laundering. 
4.7.4       OTHER JURISDICTIONS: 
As earlier mentioned, the requirement for lawyers to adhere to AML obligations when dealing 
with their clients such as reporting suspicious transactions has been controversial. Some 
jurisdictions have also had reasons to challenge similar AML laws mandating lawyers to 
comply with AML measures when dealing with their clients. For example, in Canada, on the 
authority of Canada (Attorney General) v Federation of Law societies of Canada529 both the 
Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court have ruled that AML legislation infringes upon the 
lawyer-client relationship and is inapplicable to members of the legal profession. The American 
Bar Association has also resisted the strict application of money laundering laws to its members, 
particularly the obligation to report suspicious transactions and divulging client details.530 
Given these points, although it is argued that extending AML preventive measures to lawyers 
undermines the core principles of the legal profession, such as duty of client confidentiality, it 
is my position that this argument does not outweigh the importance of legal practitioners from 
complying with AML obligations. Lawyers are pivotal as far as money laundering is concerned 
because they offer services which helps launderers conceal their illicit proceeds and add an 
additional layer of complexity and respectability to their transactions; such as purchase of real 
estate, establishing corporate structures to hold assets and opening client account to circumvent 
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AML controls. Without robust AML policies and regulations put in place, lawyers stand the 
heightened risk of being used to launder the proceeds of crime, especially in a country like 
Nigeria with the prevalence of grand corruption and money laundering. 
The implication of the judgment in Nigeria excluding lawyers from AML compliance is that it 
falls on the Nigerian Bar Association to regulate the conduct of lawyers regarding AML 
compliance issues. At present, the extant Rules of Professional Conduct in Nigeria which 
guides lawyers in their professional capacity does not provide for any rules requiring lawyers 
to disclose or report any suspicious transactions with their clients. 531  There is also no 
enforcement mechanism in relation to breach of AML compliance. Thus, it is a significant risk 
to leave lawyers unregulated for the purposes of AML compliance as this could become a 
loophole to facilitate the laundering of the proceeds of crime. 
4.7.5          THE USE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (BANKS) 
A common method used in laundering the proceeds of grand corruption is the use of the 
financial system to harbour or transfer such illicitly gained funds.532 Financial institutions are 
essential participant in either the facilitation of money laundering or the retention of the money 
accrued through corrupt practices.533 In terms of susceptibility to money laundering, sectors 
that are mostly exposed to money laundering risks are the banking sector.534 Unsurprisingly, 
banks are key players in instances of money laundering not because of the nature of their 
business, but also because some of the largest cases of corruption related money laundering 
have been characterised by the involvement of banks.  
Global Witness has through its work helped to expose exactly how banks facilitate the capital 
flight of illicit funds of PEPs. In its report titled Undue Diligence, it showcased how PEPs who 
illicitly capture state resources were helped by some of the leading global banks, including 
Barclays and HSBC to launder these funds.535 These reports point out that despite banks being 
a critical first line of defence, they often fail to uphold the highest level of ethics. For instance, 
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Barclays and NatWest banks were culpable of helping convicted Nigerian former Governor, 
James Ibori, bring proceeds of corruption into the UK.536 
History is littered with numerous examples of corrupt PEPs who have plundered their state 
treasuries and laundered same with the help of financial institutions. The most commonly cited 
examples include Philippines Ferdinand Marcos, Nigeria’s Sani Abacha and Zaire Mobatu 
Sese Seko.537 Other recent examples abound, particularly in Nigeria on the involvement and 
complicity of banks aiding the transfer of misappropriated public funds to foreign jurisdictions. 
Corrupt PEPs who are desirous of laundering illicit funds naturally prefer safer and well trusted 
channels for concealing and transferring such funds. The ideal medium would be one that not 
only conceals the funds but could also make remittances to different jurisdictions under the 
cover of a legitimate transaction. Thus, the only facility with such distinct advantages and 
possibilities is the financial and banking system.538 
It has been suggested that banks are the main conduits for corrupt PEPs laundering the proceeds 
of corruption and they continue to play a pivotal role in the propagation of corruption and 
money laundering.539 Their vulnerability to exploitation is largely as a result of the various 
services they provide, as well as the size of their institution, the high volume of transactions, 
high exposure to cash based transactions, high geographical coverage and multiple channels of 
deliveries, making them eminently suitable for the laundering of illicit funds.540 In addition, 
the globalisation of financial services in an increasingly integrated financial system permits 
exposure to cross-border transactions both conveniently and promptly.541 
 Modern financial systems, in addition to providing services to their customers and facilitating 
legitimate economic activities can also knowingly or unwittingly permit criminals like corrupt 
PEPs to transfer large amounts of money instantly using different facilities while perpetuating 
the problem by assisting the very individuals whom they should be prohibiting from using 
banking services to hide or transfer illicit funds. The difficulty that arises is that the primary 
function of banks is to make a profit and they may have much money to gain by facilitating 
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money laundering than stopping it.542 Their role is not to carry out investigatory burdens by 
policing the financial system. These activities impinge upon banks profit and that is a reality 
that has to be faced.543   
When banks establish a business relationship with a person who they know is a PEP, or 
becomes a PEP in the course of their business relationship and maintains an account in the face 
of suspicious activity, they encourage the problem of money laundering.544 This is one of the 
reasons why banks are crucial, especially in the placement stage of the money laundering 
process, in which illegal funds or assets are introduced into the financial system.  
Furthermore, with the increasing realisation of the pivotal role banks should play in combating 
corruption by virtue of utilising AML regimes to combat same; together with the role they 
actually play in reality of being complicit in most laundering instances, the expectation 
imposed on banks is that they do combat money laundering and help to reduce significantly 
the opportunities for criminals such as corrupt PEPs to engage in such activities and from using 
the financial system as conduit for their illegal funds.545  The effect of AML legislations 
worldwide requires banks and other regulated entities to police the financial system as well be 
the first line of defence against money launderers, a role for which they are not traditionally 
suited given that they are primarily profit-making enterprises.546  
Thus, it is easy to appreciate their reluctance to embrace laws and regulations which require 
them to develop a moral core at their own extra expense such as establishing compliance units, 
purchasing and launching AML software et cetera. In order to overcome this challenge, it is 
expected that they do this through various measures, including customer due diligence, 
enhanced customer due diligence in the case of high-risk customers and the filing of suspicious 
transaction reports.547 Much of the focus on PEPs to date has been to ensure that they are 
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subject to enhanced due diligence regarding the source of funds deposited into financial 
institutions.  
To combat the threat of money laundering, the Nigerian AML laws which will be analysed in 
the chapter that follows require banks and financial institutions to comply with and implement 
suitable systems of internal controls and policies to identify high risk customers and to report 
suspicious transactions. 548  However, the Nigerian banking industry have frequently been 
identified as a high risk sector for money laundering because of their complicity in the 
unpatriotic and economically destructive involvement in laundering the proceeds of 
corruption.549  Banks in Nigeria are known to commit infractions, ranging from failure to 
undertake statutory due diligence and violations of AML laws.550 The EFCC have frequently 
exposed the involvement of several Nigerian banks in aiding PEPs and other government 
officials perpetuate money laundering. The EFCC in the course of several investigations have 
noted that most of the huge funds it recovered from corrupt PEPs were uncovered not because 
banks performed their duty of filing or reporting suspicious transactions, but because they 
unearthed the various roles banks played in assisting corrupt PEPs commit money laundering 
in the course of investigating and quizzing suspected corrupt PEPs as a result of several 
petitions written by concerned citizens and civil society organisations and through whistle 
blowing.551  
The reality in Nigeria is that despite AML laws, money laundering continue to thrive and 
remain attractive to corrupt PEPs in Nigeria and the fundamental issue regarding banks in 
Nigeria is that they unfortunately serve as conduits and repositories of laundered money; and 
many if not all instances of corruption and money laundering by corrupt PEPs who have either 
retained or transferred their stolen wealth offshore for personal benefit have continued to do so 
through services provided to them by banks.552 This can be explained by the fact that corrupt 
PEPs who are high net-worth individuals signal greater profits for banks in Nigeria and thus, 
banks are beneficiaries of laundered money, making them appear profitable which is part of 
the reason they often turn a blind eye to even obvious cases of money laundering by known 
PEPs in Nigeria.553 Worryingly, the situation is such that to banks, the potential benefits of 
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aiding corruption and money laundering far outweigh the potential risks of fine or prosecution 
by law enforcement in Nigeria.554 For this reasons, it makes it less difficult to explain how vast 
sums of misappropriated public funds in Nigeria find their way into financial systems of foreign 
countries despite the AML obligation which require banks to bear an investigatory burden of 
policing the financial system through the utilisation of AML measures.  
To buttress these facts, the immediate past chairman of the EFCC in Nigeria, Ibrahim Magu, 
during a meeting with managing directors of financial institutions in Nigeria, condemned the 
increasing wave of illicit financial flows out of Nigeria by accusing 10 unnamed banks of 
money laundering. In his words, ‘‘It is worrisome to note that in 2018, statistics available to 
the EFCC shows that out of 28 commercial banks in Nigeria, 10 banks evacuated out of Nigeria 
the sums of GBP-50,832,560, USD- 8,057,756, EURO-39,986,560 and RAND- 7,500.00 
without any cogent reason for such evacuation’’555,with majority of these funds traced to 
politically exposed persons. The EFCC chairman also expressed concerns about the culture of 
allowing large transactions without commensurate reporting to the relevant authorities. 
Investigations into the activities of some corrupt Nigerian political elite by the EFCC indicted 
a number of banks in facilitating money laundering by corrupt public officials in Nigeria. For 
instance, former Governor of Abia State, Orji Kalu operated and used 59 Nigerian and foreign 
bank accounts. Seven of these banks were in the USA, one in Senegal and other 51 accounts 
were operated in five Nigerian banks to launder different sums which were the proceeds of 
corruption with the aim of concealing the nature of the illicit funds.556 In all, 106 transfers were 
allegedly made from three accounts belonging to the state government by the former Governor, 
his mother and a business associate in favour of a company traced to the Governor, Slok 
Nigerian Limited, which received the sum of 90 million Nigerian naira from the state treasury 
which were facilitated by local banks with the help of professional bankers.557 
 In the same vein, in the case of the former Governor of Edo State, Lucky Igbinedon, Nigerian 
banks, Guarantee Trust Bank and Intercontinental Bank Plc were implicated in aiding the 
former Governor launder $8.9 million at different times to different named accounts which 
were hosted in banks in the USA.558  The fact that banks are mandated to bear an investigatory 
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burden is reflective of the fact that they form a crucial component in the AML industry. In fact, 
a successful AML regime relies heavily on the cooperation of the financial sector. This is 
because combating money laundering is fundamentally a problem of information and therefore 
for a successful attack on money laundering to be sustained, most of the information required 
emanates from financial institutions such as banks.559 If they wittingly or unwittingly fail to 
play their crucial roles of reporting, the effectiveness of the overall system is severely 
compromised and money laundering will remain an attractive activity, perpetuating corruption 
and worsening the standard of living of Nigerians.  
 4.8          THE NEXUS BETWEEN CORRUPTION AND MONEY LAUNDERING 
It is pertinent to mention that corruption and money laundering are not the same, but are 
inextricably connected. They are two important phenomena which habitually occur, with the 
presence of one almost underlining the other with vicious circles.560 Money laundering is an 
essential part of corruption, just as corruption relies significantly on the laundering process, 
which is essential for the corrupt to enjoy the proceeds of crime. Together, these crimes 
unarguably cause massive harm especially for developing countries as they have a destructive 
effect on national economies and human development. Estimated at $1 trillion 
annually,561corruption produces vast amount of illicit funds to be laundered through local and 
international financial systems; the source and ownership of which need to be concealed 
through the act of money laundering.  
Indeed, many stolen public funds from Nigeria have ended up in foreign jurisdictions through 
the financial system. Therefore, money laundering offers the platform for those engaged in 
corrupt activities, such as corrupt PEPs and other criminals alike because it allows for the 
concealment of the original source of the funds and provides legitimacy for the money 
launderer and letting them enjoy the benefit from the proceeds of corruption. In order words, 
while money laundering activities are utilised to hide stolen wealth, the money is the direct 
result of a criminal activity like corruption. With Nigeria being consistently rated as one of the 
most corrupt nations in the world, and as money laundering is accurately regarded as 
corruption’s companion, the two are endemic problems in Nigeria and go hand in hand. 
Corruption is the main predicate offence in Nigeria as far as money laundering is concerned, 
                                                             
559 Musonda Simwayi,’ The role of commercial banks in combating money laundering’ (2011) 14 Journal of 
money laundering control 324 
560 Chaikin and Sharman (n9) 1 
561 United Nations,’ Global cost of corruption at least 5percent of World Gross Domestic Product’ (September 




and as such, how Nigeria deals with the scourge is directly linked to the success or otherwise 
of its anti-money laundering policies.562 
There are perspectives as to the connection between money laundering and corruption. Some 
literature argue that without money laundering, there would still be corruption; and the fact that 
not all bribes received have to be laundered as some cash can be redistributed or simply 
spent.563 Although this argument has some plausibility, however, what it fails to spot is the 
close synergy that exists between the two, as well as the more fundamental fact that anti-money 
laundering regimes can be crucial in combating corruption. In any event, as the case with 
corrupt PEPs in Nigeria, a substantial amount of cases involving corrupt PEPs have often 
involved laundering these funds locally or to foreign jurisdictions. 
   4.8.1                       MAKING THE CONNECTION 
Ill-gotten gains or corruptly obtained funds do not disappear by themselves. Corrupt PEPs and 
other criminals need ways to conceal both their identities and the illicit cash that constitutes 
the proceeds of crime. Thus, the large amount of illicit profit acquired by PEPs has to be 
masked in order to prevent the confiscation of assets. This is achieved through the process of 
money laundering. By successfully laundering the proceeds of corruption, the illicit gains may 
be enjoyed without fear of being detected and confiscated. 
Money laundering schemes are inextricably linked to corruption where the latter is utilised 
either as a means to an end or an end itself. The foregoing linkage was recognised by studies 
carried out by reputable institutions such as World Bank, United Nations and Asian 
Development Bank all of which have correlated a close connection between money laundering 
and corruption and these offences constitute elements of economic crimes.564  The United 
Nations recognised the close links between corruption and money laundering which was 
expressly indicated in the following statement: 
There are important links between corruption and money laundering. The ability to transfer 
and conceal funds is critical to the perpetrators of corruption, especially large scale or grand 
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corruption. A high degree of coordination is thus required to combat both problems and to 
implement measures that impact on both areas.565  
In the same vein, the World Bank also recognises the close link between these crimes.  
Corruption and money laundering are a related and self-reinforcing phenomenon. Corruption 
proceeds are disguised and laundered by corrupt officials to be able to spend or invest such 
proceeds. At the same time, corruption in a country’s AML institutions (including financial 
institutions and Financial Intelligence Unit’s) can render an AML regime of a country 
ineffective.566 
The occurrence and magnitude of these crimes are difficult to measure with any certainty 
because of the clandestine nature of both crimes, but this thesis recognises that they are serious 
problems for most countries, especially developing countries. This is so because both 
corruption and money laundering thrive in an environment of weaknesses in national regulatory 
and legal environment, characterised by lack of requisite laws and weak enforcement and 
regulatory institutions. 567  These crimes have attracted the attention of governments, 
international organisations and the public in general.  As a result, these closely linked problems 
are the targets of a panoply of international policy and legal initiatives.  
According to Chaikin, corruption and money laundering are symbiotic, not only do they tend 
to co-occur, but fundamentally, the presence of one tends to create and reciprocally reinforce 
the incidence of the other.568 The link between these crimes is further strengthened by the fact 
that in almost all cases involving significant corrupt practices across a very large spectrum, the 
proceeds do usually undergo the money laundering process.569 Through this process, illegally 
acquired wealth are given an appearance of legitimacy. Thus, it is during this process that 
corruption and money laundering in most cases interact and form what could be described as a 
symbiotic relationship. 
Reed and Fontana suggests that although there is undoubtedly a close relationship between 
corruption and money laundering, corruption can be viewed as a cause and effect of money 
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laundering in one or more ways.570 Firstly, they are linked as the source of proceeds, i.e. 
criminal diversion of funds that constitutes illicit funds to be laundered. As stated earlier, that 
in virtually all cases involving significant corrupt practices, the proceeds do usually undergo 
the money laundering process. To this end and as several examples have shown, such as 
Abacha, Ibori and a host of other corrupt PEPs in Nigeria and around the world in which the 
illicit proceeds of corruption are channelled to bank accounts in local and foreign jurisdictions.  
Secondly, corruption impedes the effective implementation of AML measures that have been 
adopted by interfering with the capacity of mandated institutions to perform their duties, or by 
corrupting the relevant officials.571 Where institutions such as banks with AML obligations 
collude with their clients in order not to fulfil such obligations. For instance, a bank official not 
filing a suspicious transaction report or turning a blind eye to obvious cases of corruption 
because they receive bribes from the corrupt individual or are compromised by politicians. 
Consequently, the implication being that institutions on whose cooperation prevailing AML 
regimes increasingly rely on can, if corrupted, sabotage effective implementation of AML 
measures by falsifying information or concealing information from law enforcement in order 
to conceal the true nature of questionable corruption related transactions.572 
Having said these, the crux of the close linkage between the two crimes is due to the fact that 
corruption and money laundering are embedded in each other and thus should be treated as 
crimes of similar magnitude. For this reason, and as a result of the close linkage, scholars and 
international organisations support this chapter’s argument concerning the utility of AML 
regimes to combat grand corruption in Nigeria. In this regard, scholars and several international 
organisations have long suggested that AML measures such as laws and regulations could be 
used as effective tools to detect, deter and in effect combat corruption.573 This is because there 
is a strong belief that mechanisms within the framework of combating money laundering can 
contribute significantly to the detection of corruption and related offences by providing the 
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basis for financial intelligence, enhancing international cooperation and recovering assets 
laundered and hidden in other countries.574 
4.9        THE CASE FOR UTILISING AML REGIMES TO COMBAT CORRUPTION 
Although most of the discussion and analysis of the AML legal framework in Nigeria will be 
dealt with in the chapter that follows, however, for the purposes of this chapter, it is apposite 
to examine some of the salient AML measures that can aid in combating corruption. According 
to FATF, substantial amounts of criminal proceeds are generated from corruption offences.575 
Similarly, Chaikin also posits that because many developing countries have less sophisticated 
financial crime with much smaller financial sector compared to developed countries, corruption 
is often the major source of funds to be laundered.576 These proceeds are often laundered so 
that it is concealed and yield benefit for corrupt PEPs. Accordingly, much effort is expended 
by corrupt officials in disguising their identity and the original source of the funds in order that 
the funds are placed in the financial system. 
Given these points, the significance of the nexus or relationship between corruption and money 
laundering extends to the fact that these inter-linked problems also have inter-linked solutions; 
which is that AML regimes are crucial in combating corruption. In this respect, scholars believe 
that money laundering is the flip side of corruption and other criminal activity and the close 
affinity between these crimes, as well as the utility of policy and legal responses developed to 
fight one type of crime can also be used in dealing with the other.577 This proposition finds 
justification in the following statements made by international organisations which emphasises 
on the use of AML regimes to combat corruption. 
Money laundering statutes can contribute significantly to the detection of corruption and 
related offences by providing the basis for financial investigations. Identifying and recording 
obligations as well as reporting suspicious transactions, as required by the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption, will not only facilitate detection of crime of money laundering 
                                                             
574 United Nations Office on Drugs and crime,’ The Global programme against corruption: UN Anti-corruption 
toolkit’ < https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Toolkit_ed2.pdf> 5 February 2019 
575 FATF,’ The use of the FATF recommendations to combat corruption’ (October 2013) < http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/BPP-Use-of-FATF-Recs-Corruption.pdf> accessed 20 
February 2019 
576 Chaikin and Sharman (n9) 27 




but will also help identify the criminal acts from which the illicit proceeds originated. It is 
therefore essential to establish corruption as a predicate offence for money laundering.578 
All things considered, because corruption is a crime that is clandestine in nature and one where 
its victims are usually oblivious of their loss, countering corruption may be viewed essentially 
a problem of information. Typically, as the case with grand corruption which often involves 
the transfer of money or assets, the significance of the vast amount of financial information 
generated and collated in the AML systems with regard to fighting financial crime can be an 
important measure in combating corruption. This is so because AML measures may be utilised 
to show that the resources of a corrupt PEP are not commensurate with their declared assets 
and income, especially in countries like Nigeria where public officials are mandated to declare 
their assets and liabilities before resuming office.579 As a result, it is believed that it becomes 
desirable for AML standards which involves collecting and analysing large quantities of 
financial data to be employed to combat corruption.  
At first, although the AML regime was focused on combating the illicit drug trade, its coverage 
has been progressively expanded to cover all serious crimes capable of yielding profit to be 
laundered. The basic pillars of the AML regime if adhered to, has the tendency to unravel 
corrupt practices by corrupt PEPs. Furthermore, one of the most compelling reasons given for 
using AML regime to combat corruption is in the degree of overlap whereby meeting 
international anti-corruption standards largely requires fulfilling international AML 
standards.580 This legal overlap can be seen in the 1988 Vienna convention, the 2000 Palermo 
convention and under Article 23 of the 2003 UNCAC.581  
Together, these instruments call on state parties to, inter alia, criminalise money laundering as 
a separate offence, set up systems to apply due diligence to customers of financial institutions, 
adopt a reporting regime for suspicious transactions, set up financial intelligence units to gather 
and collate financial data to pass on to law enforcement, apply extra scrutiny to the finances of 
public officials, and ensuring cooperation among financial authorities and law enforcement. 
Additionally, Article 7 of the OECD Anti Bribery convention also contain provisions relating 
to the proceeds of corruption hidden through the process of money laundering, taking 
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cognisance of the need to identify corruption proceeds for the purpose of money laundering .582 
These instruments addresses the process of laundering the illicit resources obtained from 
engaging in corrupt activities. Collectively, these international instruments are pointers to the 
fact that if countries are desirous of combating corruption, they must adopt and implement laws, 
regulations and institutions that together constitute the AML regime. 
Notably, the FATF standards by virtue of the 40+9 Recommendations provides a great deal of 
potential and valuable tools with which to tackle corruption and corruption related money 
laundering.583 Because corruption ranks high as one of the most important financial crimes in 
many countries and perhaps the greatest obstacle to economic development584, any progress 
made has the tendency to provide significant benefits to national welfare. The FATF highlights 
that leveraging AML measures to fight corruption remains a significant avenue in combating 
corruption. The reason being that they support the detection, tracing, confiscation of corruption 
proceeds, as well as promote international cooperation in the efforts to do so.585  
The recommendations also include specific measures which recognises corruption risks, i.e. 
requiring financial institutions to take stringent actions to mitigate the risk posed by PEPs. 
Enhancing this potential is the fact that many countries including Nigeria have committed to 
observing the FATF principles by promulgating AML legislations that reflect FATF principles. 
Previous cases of corruption have shown that when financial institutions are infiltrated by 
corrupt PEPs, they become an avenue for laundering the proceeds of corruption. Therefore, it 
becomes imperative that effective implementation of FATF recommendations is used to protect 
financial institutions from the risk posed by corrupt PEPs. These measures although not 
exhaustive assist in ensuring that financial institutions are not complicit and remain free from 
corrupt PEPs and other criminals in order to prevent them from being used as a vehicle that aid 
corrupt PEPs in placing the proceeds of corruption in financial institutions. Whether these has 
translated into producing results in terms of detecting and deterring corrupt PEPs in engaging 
in money laundering in Nigeria will be analysed in much detail in the next chapter.  
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In the meantime, some of the most paramount FATF AML recommendations which are useful 
tools in combating corruption are as follows: 
4.9.1      Customer Due diligence (Recommendation 10)586 
As corrupt PEPs require access to financial institution in order to utilise the proceeds derived 
from corruption, most likely this will go unpunished in situations where the proceeds of 
corruption are laundered and cannot be tracked back to the individual and underlying activity 
yielding the profit.587 The AML requirements strive to ensure that activities within the financial 
system is linked with a specific and identifiable person. This is one of the reasons why customer 
due diligence plays an important role for financial institutions and other obliged entities. 
Customer due diligence is a process of developing a clear knowledge of a customer relationship 
and checking that customers are who they say they are in order to effectively understand and 
manage the risk arising from such relationship.588  
Customer due diligence is considered part of an effective measure to mitigate the risk of money 
laundering and to support investigations and prosecutions into corruption. Financial institutions 
are required to verify the identity of customers or any person on whose behalf a customer is 
acting for and any person who ultimately owns or controls a legal entity. One of the rationales 
for this is that the use of intermediaries or middlemen to shield or insulate the PEP from 
unwanted attention can also serve as an obstacle to customer due diligence, hence, it is 
performed on every customer. Knowledge is what the entire AML compliance regime is built 
on. In accord with FATF, the cornerstone of a strong AML regime and compliance program is 
the adoption and implementation of comprehensive customer due diligence policies, 
procedures and processes for all customers, particularly those that present a high risk for money 
laundering.589 The more financial institutions know about its customers, the greater chances of 
preventing money laundering.  
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Under Recommendation 10, financial institutions and designated non-financial institutions are 
required to undertake due diligence measures in the following instances. 
I. When establishing a business relationship with a customer. 
II. When they suspect money laundering or terrorist financing. 
III. When there are doubts as to the veracity or adequacy of previously obtained customer 
identification. 
IV. When carrying out occasional transactions above applicable designated threshold. 
FATF recommends that the measures to be taken in fulfilling the abovementioned requirements 
include: 
a. Identifying customer and verifying their identity using reliable sources. 
b. Identifying the beneficial owner of a legal entity and taking reasonable measures as to 
the verification of the beneficial owner. 
c. Understanding and obtaining information on the purpose and intended nature of the 
business relationship. 
d. Conduct ongoing due diligence and scrutiny of business relationship and transactions 
conducted throughout the course of that relationship to ensure that transactions 
conducted are consistent with the institution’s knowledge of the customer.590 
Where financial institutions and designated non-financial institutions are unable to comply 
with these requirements for any reason, they are obliged not to open the account or perform the 
transactions and terminate such business relationship and also consider making a suspicious 
transaction report in relation to the customer.591  Failure or poor levels of compliance in 
conducting proper customer due diligence can lead to corrupt PEPs opening accounts without 
being detected while avoiding enhanced due diligence and on-going monitoring. These 
safeguards help in inhibiting and making it doubly difficult for corrupt PEPs to conduct 
business anonymously or conceal their business relationships and transactions. Thus, the 
significance of undertaking customer due diligence allows financial institutions and designated 
non-financial institutions identify suspicious behaviour which can trigger further investigations. 
 
 






4.9.2       Enhanced Customer Due diligence 
In regulatory terms, the most essential criteria which should establish immediately whether a 
potential customer is a corruption risk is whether he is a PEP, which automatically triggers 
enhanced due diligence procedures. Although not all PEPs engage in corruption and money 
laundering practices, the tag of being a PEP signifies a heightened risk of money laundering 
because PEPs have the potential to misuse their positions for personal gain. In its interpretive 
note to Recommendation 10, FATF acknowledges that there are circumstances where the risk 
of money laundering is higher and enhanced customer due diligence measures must be taken 
consistent with the risk identified.592 This is particularly the case when conducting business 
relationship with PEPs and other high-risk situations which involves complex or unusual 
patterns of large transactions which have no apparent economic or lawful purpose.  
Enhanced due diligence is a measure which provides a greater level of scrutiny of business 
relationships and highlights risks that cannot be detected by customer due diligence.593 The 
difference between this measure and customer due diligence measure is that CDD is a less 
meticulous verification process in which financial institutions obtain customer identity and 
evaluate the risk of the customer. On the other hand, enhanced due diligence is required for 
customers such as PEPs who are classified as high risk for business transactions.594 This is 
because they hold positions that can be potentially abused for corrupt practices. In particular, 
financial and designated non-financial institutions are mandated to increase the degree and 
nature of monitoring such business relationship in order to determine whether those 
transactions or activities appear unusual or suspicious. In relation to high risk customers such 
as PEPs, in addition to performing normal customer due diligence measures, financial 
institutions are to observe the following. 
(a) Have appropriate risk management systems to determine whether the customer or 
beneficial owner is a PEP. 
(b) Take reasonable measure to establish the source of wealth and source of funds. 
(c) Obtain senior management approval for establishing such business relationship. 
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(d) Conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of business relationship.595 These requirements 
also apply to family members and close associates of such PEP by applying extra 
scrutiny to the activities of PEPs. 
The requirement to determine whether the customer or beneficial owner is a PEP is seemingly 
a difficult task. This is because, with elections taking place at different times, in addition to 
cabinet changes and the appointment of more individuals into prominent public functions, this 
task becomes more daunting. This has necessitated financial institutions to use resources and 
databases that store information, such as websites of government, international organisations 
and the media.596 Although the information gotten through these mediums are not the only 
source for determining if a customer is a PEP, as there is a risk of wrongly assuming that if a 
name is not in such database, then the client is not a PEP. However, they usually provide 
information on public office holders and in some cases, their known associates, family 
members and legal entities. Thus, they complement the traditional due diligence measures and 
are simply another tool for developing a complete picture of the customer and the inherent risk 
associated with them. 
 In addition to this requirement, understanding a customer’s source of wealth and source of 
funds is another fundamental component of the enhanced due diligence obligations that banks 
must apply to PEP customers.597 Source of wealth refers to the activities that have generated 
the total net worth or entire body of wealth of the customer.598 This information usually gives 
an indication as to the volume of wealth the customer would be expected to have, and an overall 
picture of how the PEP acquired such wealth. Information about source of wealth and source 
of funds is useful for ongoing due diligence purposes as well as to analyse the information for 
red flags for corrupt PEP activity.599 When conducting ongoing due diligence, it is paramount 
for financial institutions to ensure that the level and type of transactions are consistent with the 
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institutions knowledge of the PEPs source of wealth and funds.600 The aim is to ensure that the 
reason for the business relationship is commensurate with what one could reasonably expect 
from the PEP, given his/her particular circumstances.  
Useful tools in verifying the accuracy of the customer’s declaration about the source of wealth 
and source of funds may include publicly available property registers, land registers, asset 
disclosure registers and other sources of information about legal and beneficial ownership.601 
Specifically, the asset and income declarations that many PEP customers in several 
jurisdictions who hold prominent public functions are required to disclose is fundamental in 
this regard. Asset declarations refer to a system where public officials must periodically declare 
information regarding to their assets, income, liabilities and business interest. In Nigeria, 
declaration of assets by public officials is not a voluntary exercise. Public officials are 
mandated by law to declare their assets before and after occupying public offices.602 This asset 
disclosures could be instrumental in assessing the PEP customer’s risk especially in situations 
where PEPs conduct business transactions involving huge sums of money that is not 
commensurate with declared assets of a PEP. Asset disclosures can thus be used for the 
prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of corruption. 
Furthermore, pursuant to Recommendation 12(b), financial institutions are required to obtain 
senior management approval for establishing (or continuing for existing customers) business 
relationship with PEPs.603 Recommendation 12 does not define or specify the precise level of 
seniority within a financial institution or designated non-financial institution that would be 
considered sufficient for being able to approve or maintain a customer relationship with a PEP 
because such a definition would not be meaningful in all relevant contexts regarding financial 
and non-financial institutions obligated to perform AML standards. Therefore, what constitutes 
senior management will usually depend on the size, structure and nature of the financial 
institution or designated non-financial institution involved.604 
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The objective is to ensure that more senior level of management is well informed of 
relationships with PEPs and that financial institutions do not undertake business relationship 
with PEPs in the absence of adequate controls. By the same token, as part of the enhanced due 
diligence requirement, once a business relationship has been established with a PEP, financial 
institutions must conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship.605  
Ongoing monitoring includes processes to monitor the PEPs transactions and evaluate whether 
the activity accords with the customer profile and also used in updating a PEP profile.606 It also 
entails an overall review of individual PEP customers by senior management. Thus, the process 
of ongoing monitoring involves combining knowledge of the customer profile, source of wealth 
and source of funds, in addition to all applicable risk factors with the capacity to evaluate 
whether the account activity is consistent with these factors. 
4.9.3         Suspicious Transactions Report (Recommendation 20)607 
At the heart of an effective AML regime is the requirement that financial and designated non-
financial institutions must report suspicious transactions with financial intelligence units. The 
purpose of suspicious transactions reporting system is ambitious and mirrors the general goals 
of the AML system, which is to facilitate the detection of underlying predicate offences like 
corruption, and to prevent criminals from utilising the financial system to launder same, 
consequently preventing and reducing crime.608 Suspicious transaction reports (STR) refers to 
a piece of information generated by financial institutions which alerts law enforcement that 
certain activity is in some way suspicious and might be an indication of potential money 
laundering.609  
These suspicious transactions include transactions surrounded by conditions of unusual or 
unjustified complexity which appears to have no economic justification or lawful objective, or 
involves a frequency which is unjustified or unreasonable. 610  FATF Recommendation 20 
underpins and governs the reporting of suspicious transactions. It provides: If a financial 
institution suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a 
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criminal activity, or are related to terrorist financing, it should be required by law, to report 
promptly its suspicions to the financial intelligence unit. The obligation to file a STR arises 
regardless of the amount involved, the nature and seriousness of the criminal offence, or 
whether the reporting entity accepts the business or transactions of the customers. This report 
plays a critical and central role in a country’s AML operational network and in the fight against 
criminals like corrupt PEPs seeking to launder stolen resources. Often, they can be the first 
sign of suspicious activity by a corrupt PEP and is an important source of information available 
to investigators.  
While there are no hard and fast rules as to what constitutes suspicious activity, financial 
institutions are obliged to watch for activities that maybe inconsistent with a customer’s source 
of income or regular business activity. Some examples of instances that constitute suspicious 
transactions includes depositing or making payments with large amount of cash, situations 
involving transactions that are unjustifiable or unreasonable, the movement of money through 
a series of accounts with no apparent business purpose, purchases which are inconsistent with 
known income.611 Due to the volumes of transactions conducted daily by financial institutions, 
proper due diligence may require financial institutions to gather further information regarding 
a customer or his transactions before deeming it suspicious and filing a suspicious transactions 
report. 612  In practice, FATF states that suspicious transactions report have uncovered 
corruption activities, triggered corruption investigations, and has been used to support ongoing 
financial investigations of corrupt activity.613  
Fundamentally, the reporting requirement removes some of the barriers which makes it difficult 
for banks and other obliged entities to divulge information to relevant law enforcement 
agencies, such as the rules on confidentiality and disclosure that previously impeded 
investigations. 614  In general, financial institutions have a duty to keep their customer 
information confidential, and may have a more general fiduciary duty to act in their customer’s 
best interest; in addition to banking secrecy laws.615 A common objection raised by some is 
that the fight against corruption and money laundering has impacted upon the rights of 
individuals and financial institutions. This may be true. The customer’s right to confidentiality, 
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not to mention the principle of banking secrecy long valued in many jurisdictions including 
Nigeria have been gradually eroded to the point where banking secrecy in the context of 
compliance with the AML regime has now been effectively outlawed.  
The obligations to report suspicious transactions supersedes the confidentiality requirement.616 
The above finds justification by virtue of FATF Recommendation 9, which states that countries 
are to ensure that financial institutions secrecy laws do not inhibit the implementation of their 
AML regimes.617  The Nigerian Money Laundering Prohibition Act clearly provides for a 
derogation of any privacy or confidentiality requirement when dealing with money laundering 
matters, making it compulsory for financial and designated non-financial institutions to comply 
with the provisions of the act in its totality. The Act states that ‘banking secrecy or preservation 
of customer confidentiality shall not be invoked as a ground for objecting to the measures set 
out in subsection (1) and (2) of this section or for refusing to be a witness to facts likely to 
constitute an offence under the Act’ 618  This provision empowers law enforcement and 
regulators against the problems associated with secrecy and confidentiality in the provision of 
banking services. This is a step in the right direction as bank’s role in propagating corruption 
and money laundering is inexcusable. 
FATF Recommendation 21 provides additional safeguards in this regard by stating that 
financial institutions, their officers and employees should be protected by law from criminal or 
civil liability for breach of any restriction on disclosure of information imposed by any 
legislative, regulatory or administrative provision if they report their suspicions in good faith 
to the financial intelligence units, even if they did not know what the underlying criminal 
activity was and regardless of whether illegal activity actually occurred.619 The purpose of 
Recommendation 21 is to ensure that financial institutions are given legal protection when they 
file STR, provided they have acted in good faith even if they are mistaken as to their suspicions.  
The difficulties of balancing the legal and regulatory obligations of filing STR’s under law 
with contractual obligations to customers has led to legal challenges in court; most notably in 
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Shah v HSBC,620 where the bank faced significant claim for damages after submitting STR to 
the National Crime Agency (NCA) while the customer faced losses due to delays in consent 
being obtained from the NCA. While these challenges have not been successful, they highlight 
potential liability to financial institutions when filing STR to regulatory and enforcement 
authorities. The courts have held that banks could be required to adduce evidence of its money 
laundering suspicions and prove these were genuine in order disprove any evidence of bad 
faith.621 Thus, it remains important for financial institutions and those in the regulated sector 
to have documented audit trail of the firms suspicions which may assist both in establishing 
the reasonableness and genuineness of the reported suspicion.  
In the UK, financial institutions and those in the regulated sector are given extra protection 
under s.338 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 where ‘authorised disclosure’ is made in good 
faith.622 Financial institutions are now mandated to make suspicious transactions report where 
necessary without fear of going against banking secrecy or confidentiality rules. In addition, 
countries that require suspicious transactions report also prohibits disclosing the filing of such 
report to the individual who is subject of the report. For instance, in Nigeria, financial 
institutions are prohibited from intimating or disclosing to the owner of the funds involved 
about reports they are required to make.623 Such unlawful disclosures in Nigeria attracts a two-
year term of imprisonment.624  
Therefore, one of the most important aspect of the role of a financial institution in the fight 
against money laundering is in reporting suspicious transactions to the authorities for 
investigation. This report can be an instrumental AML tool in fighting grand corruption by 
providing the basis for investigations into the transactions of corrupt PEPs.  However, although 
extant legislations provide for reporting of suspicious transactions, the utilisation of this 
preventive strategy to curb the menace of money laundering in Nigeria is questionable due to 
serious under reporting of suspicious transactions. Especially in light of the size of capital flight 
from Nigeria to other jurisdictions. Therefore, unless money laundering is addressed, crimes 
like corruption that generate illicit proceeds will continue to flourish because there is a 
symbiotic relationship between money laundering and corruption. Non-compliance and poor 
enforcement of AML legal framework in Nigeria can be attributed to the reason of the 
                                                             
620 Shah v HSBC [2012] EWHC 1283 
621 ibid 
622 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, s338(4A) 
623 Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2012, s16(a) 




prevalence of grand corruption in Nigeria. This forms the core of this thesis argument in the 
chapter that follows while analysing the effectiveness of Nigeria’s AML legal framework as it 
relates to politically exposed persons. 
 

























4.10                                        CONCLUSION 
To summarise, an analysis of the money laundering and anti-money laundering phenomena has 
been the primary focus of this chapter. The chapter began by discussing the general narrative 
and objectives of money laundering and anti-money laundering industry. From a small and 
relatively marginal role in the early 90’s, the chapter stated that money laundering was 
considered to be intrinsically linked with organised crime such as drug trafficking, however, it 
has been extended to encompass several predicate offences such as corruption and other 
criminal offences that generates illicit funds to be laundered. Additionally, the idea that a 
person should not profit from crime was largely instrumental in shaping the crime of money 
laundering and a bureaucracy which is the anti-money laundering industry, both of which have 
grown rapidly.  
Furthermore, the deductions from research is that money laundering do have significant 
economic and social effects. Thus, the chapter examined some of the economic and social 
effects of money laundering activities in Nigeria, ranging from economic distortions and 
instability, increased exposure to crime and corruption, as well as the risk of international 
sanctions. Likewise, this chapter analysed some certain typical stages in the money laundering 
process such as the placement, layering and integration stage. In this regard, the chapter argued 
that to effectively combat money laundering, it is fundamental to stop or at least detect it at the 
placement stage to salvage any potential havoc that it portends on the economic growth of a 
country and prevent financial institutions from being used to facilitate money laundering. This 
is because it is at this stage that criminals introduce illicit funds into the financial system, 
making it a crucial stage in intensifying efforts in detecting the illicit funds as well as the 
perpetrators before it becomes a more complex situation.   
 To combat money laundering activities, it is essential for the authorities and enforcement 
agencies to keep abreast with the latest methods adopted by corrupt PEPs in laundering the 
proceeds of corruption. At the present time, it is unlikely that a corrupt PEP will take the risk 
of laundering illicit funds in their own name when there exists a possibility of creating a 
disconnect and concealing same through various methods; especially given that assets and 
wealth of PEPs could be ascertained by virtue of PEPs being subject to public asset disclosures 
and rules regarding engaging in outside transactions. To this end, the chapter examined some 
of the common methods employed in money laundering such as the use of corporate vehicles 




financial institutions. At this instance, the chapter held that that nearly all cases of grand 
corruption in Nigeria have one thing in common. They rely on companies to conceal ownership 
and control of tainted assets and to circumvent the requirement of additional scrutiny in gaining 
access to financial institutions. In many high-profile corruption cases, corrupt PEPs often 
conduct their illicit transactions through the misuse of companies, usually incorporated in 
Nigeria or in safe havens in foreign jurisdictions. Asides from aiding the corrupt concealing 
their identities, companies are desirable for these individuals because they can own assets in 
their own name, have bank accounts and credit cards just like any person as well as bestow a 
degree of formality and respectability to activities which if conducted in the name of an 
individual might appear unusual and potentially suspicious. 
Equally important, this chapter has demonstrated that professionals such as lawyers are used 
to launder the proceeds of corruption because of the unique powers and privileges they enjoy. 
The chapter have explained that complex methods of money laundering have led criminals 
becoming reliant on the services and skills provided by professionals to help launder their illicit 
funds. The chapter also highlights instances which shows that lawyers have been implicated in 
facilitating the flow of public funds stolen from developing countries through structures in 
western countries. They assisted in establishing legal structures, provided client account, 
provided legal opinions on the legality of offshore structures, and devised ways to move assets 
and drafting legal instruments needed to implement these transactions. For instance, Bhadresh 
Gohil, who was the lawyer of convicted former Governor of Delta State, James Ibori who 
helped in facilitating the laundering of £37million stolen by Ibori from Delta State.  
Additionally, the chapter held that in light of the fact that lawyers provide services potentially 
useful to money launderers, they were subject to AML requirements through their participation 
in observing customer due diligence and transaction reporting regimes as done by financial 
institutions and designated non-financial institutions. This was the case as provided under the 
Nigerian Money Laundering Prohibition Act. However, this had received strong opposition 
from members of the profession who through the Nigerian Bar Association successfully 
challenged their inclusion to comply with AML requirements as it infringes on their sacrosanct 
privilege relationship. As it stands in Nigeria, it falls on the NBA to regulate the conduct of 
lawyers regarding issues relating to facilitating money laundering. The implication being that 
a key component of the AML regulated sector in Nigeria has been expunged from a 
fundamental requirement of adhering to AML legal requirement which can seemingly help in 




could potentially create a significant gap in the coverage of AML adherence which can lead to 
corrupt PEPs utilising the services of lawyers to provide credibility to transactions involving 
illicit funds.  
Furthermore, corrupt PEPs who are desirous of laundering illicit funds prefer safer and well 
trusted channels for concealing such funds. In this regard, the chapter explained that banks 
provide the ideal medium for not only concealing funds, but making remittances to different 
jurisdictions under the cover of a legitimate transaction. Thus, included in the discourse of 
methods used in laundering the proceeds of corruption, the chapter identified banks as the main 
conduits for corrupt PEPs laundering the proceeds of corruption in Nigeria. The chapter posited 
that Nigerian banking industry have frequently been identified as a high-risk sector for money 
laundering because of their complicity in aiding the transfer of misappropriated public funds 
to foreign jurisdictions. They are known to commit infractions and a lack of compliance with 
extant AML laws, especially when it comes to transactions with PEPs. Part of the reason why 
Nigeria was blacklisted by the FATF and the European Union for non-compliance with AML 
regimes. The chapter held that this can be explained by the fact that corrupt PEPs who are high 
net-worth individuals signal greater profits for banks in Nigeria. 
In the final analysis, the chapter has clearly delineated the close links between corruption and 
money laundering offences which are inextricably linked as the latter is an essential part of the 
former because it allows for the concealment of the original source of the funds and provides 
legitimacy for the money launderer letting them benefit from the proceeds of corruption. At 
the heart of this link is the close synergy that exist between the two and the more fundamental 
fact that constitutes the core argument of this chapter. It was argued that mechanisms within 
the framework of combating money laundering can contribute significantly to the detection of 
corruption by providing the basis for financial intelligence and investigations because AML 
measures may be utilised to show that the resources of a corrupt PEP are not commensurate 
with their known income as public officials. 
These measures which the chapter examined includes customer due diligence, enhanced 
customer due diligence, and the more salient measure which is the transaction reporting 
requirements. The chapter explained that customer due diligence which is considered part of 
an effective measure to mitigate the risk of money laundering is a robust money laundering 
counter measure which is designed to make banks and other financial and designated non-




launderers and to prevent unsuitable individuals from exploiting financial institutions for 
criminal purposes.  In particular, this measure strives to ensure that activities within the 
financial system is linked with a specific and identifiable person.  
Also examined is the enhanced customer due diligence measure which is specifically reserved 
for high risk customers where the risk of money laundering is high such as PEPs. The chapter 
explained that this measure helps financial institutions develop a complete picture of high-risk 
customers and the inherent risk associated with them. Understanding their source of wealth and 
source of funds is a fundamental component of this measure as this information gives an 
indication as to the volume of wealth the PEP would be expected to have, and an overall picture 
of how the PEP acquired such wealth. This helps to detect to financial institutions transactions 
associated with PEPs which involves complex or unusual pattern of large transactions with no 
apparent economic or lawful purpose or activities that may be inconsistent with a PEP’s source 
of income or regular business activity. 
Lastly, the chapter held that the most paramount measure of an effective AML regime is the 
requirement that financial and designated non-financial professionals and business must report 
suspicious transactions to the authorities. The chapter argued that suspicious transactions plays 
a critical and central role in a country’s AML operations and in the fight against corruption. 
The chapter explained that this report can be the first sign of suspicious activity by a corrupt 
PEP and can help uncover corrupt practices, trigger corruption investigations and can be used 
to support ongoing financial investigations of corrupt activity, which can lead to the freezing, 
confiscation and possible prosecutions for money laundering. 
The strict application of these measures is meant to reveal illegitimate sources of funds and 
trigger investigations by relevant stakeholders. With this in mind, the overarching aim of the 
chapter that follows is to provide an in-depth analysis of the Nigerian AML legal framework 
as an avenue to combating grand corruption, and their efficacy vis-à-vis the prevalent nature 
of capital flight from Nigeria and how these laws have performed in deterring corrupt PEPs 
launder the proceeds of corruption. 
 
                                               
 




                                          CHAPTER FIVE 
EXAMINING AND CRITICALLY ASSESSING THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING LEGAL AND     
                                         INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK IN NIGERIA: 
  5.1                                      INTRODUCTION 
The preceding chapter chronicled money laundering and the strength of utilising the AML 
regime to combat corruption related money laundering. Flowing from this, this chapter aims to 
critically and holistically assess the Nigerian AML legal frameworks and the utilisation of the 
AML regime in combating the prevalent offence of corruption related money laundering in 
Nigeria. As shown in chapter four, the money laundering activities of politically exposed 
persons (PEPs) in Nigeria highlights the significance of employing AML measures to curtail 
this phenomenon.  
The menace of corruption and money laundering committed by PEPs have remained an 
intractable challenge in Nigeria,625 with significant impact on development, economic and 
social well-being of Nigerians. Over the years, public funds in Nigeria have been stolen on an 
industrial scale by corrupt PEPs who often launder same through financial centres in foreign 
jurisdictions such as London, USA, Switzerland and other offshore financial centres perceived 
by corrupt PEPs to be less zealous in making their jurisdictions hostile to receiving illicit 
funds.626 In fact, between 2014-2015, the staggering sum of $37 billion was laundered into 
London alone from Nigeria.627  Money laundering among PEPs resonates deeply in Nigeria 
and the threats have become more pronounced, notwithstanding the promulgation of laws and 
regulations. 
Laws have been enacted, institutions have been established for the paramount objective of 
preventing and combating money laundering.628 The extant legal, regulatory and institutional 
responses to money laundering in Nigeria are based on and mirror internationally agreed 
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standards such as FATF Recommendations to combat money laundering. It is pertinent to 
reiterate that FATF Recommendations constitute the bedrock of the global AML standard and 
form the basis for regulating the global financial system. The combination of both international 
and domestic AML laws, whether in the form of soft laws such as FATF Recommendations or 
formally legally binding legislations in Nigeria have been geared towards affirmatively 
preventing the ability of corrupt PEPs and other criminals from utilising financial institutions 
to launder the proceeds of crime, including corruption. This is accomplished by laying 
emphasis on following the money trail with the help of those in the regulated sector such as 
banks to help detect and identify money launderers; for the easier it is to launder public funds, 
the more likely it becomes for public officials to engage in corrupt practices.629   
The legal frameworks in Nigeria constitutes laws, regulations and institutions domesticating 
the AML regime in Nigeria. Nevertheless, despite the legal regimes in existence to combat 
money laundering in Nigeria, they have not translated into practical successes in the fight 
against money laundering. The long-term results have not always been encouraging and the 
utility of AML regime have not yielded adequate results. The legal frameworks are generally 
weak as they largely exist on paper. Enforcement of AML legislations has been ineffective, 
resulting in very few prosecutions and even fewer number of convictions of PEPs engaged in 
money laundering activities.630 
The weaknesses in the enforcement of laws that constitutes the AML legal regime can also be 
attributed to a diverse number of contributing factors such as the existence of immunity clause 
in the constitution, lack of comprehensive legal framework, weak law enforcement agencies 
susceptible to executive pressure, and long delays in the dispensation of justice within the 
criminal justice system in Nigeria.631 These factors have hindered the ability of the legal and 
institutional frameworks to tackle the prevalence of money laundering by corrupt PEPs and has 
culminated in Nigeria being designated as, and blacklisted as a jurisdiction with money 
laundering concern.632 Designating a country as a jurisdiction with money laundering concern 
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because of the deficiencies in its AML regime provides an insight on the ineffectiveness of the 
country’s AML regime. 
Primarily, financial institutions (Banks) and designated non-financial businesses and 
professions (DNFBP) play a significant role in combating money laundering as it is near 
impossible for the AML regime to be successful without the banking industry’s strict 
compliance with AML laws. This is because illicit funds will normally be introduced into the 
financial system through this channel as they provide services that are somewhat indispensable 
to money launderers. These attractions provide plausible reasons why banks are subjected to 
stringent legal measures designed to prevent, suppress and curtail the passage of proceeds of 
crime through their institutions.633   
Yet, case after case reveal financial institutions complicity and failure to adhere to the AML 
regime giving corrupt PEPs continued and unabated access to the financial system to launder 
the proceeds of corruption.634 Based on the fact that a successful AML regime rely heavily on 
the cooperation of financial institutions to prevent money laundering, the difficulty as will be 
seen is that it may be more beneficial dealing with wealthy corrupt PEPs by facilitating money 
laundering than stopping it. Based on the foregoing, banks will constitute the main focus in this 
chapter when examining and assessing the effectiveness of the AML regime in Nigeria.  
According to Adeniyi, a major antidote to the menace of money laundering lies not only in the 
availability of laws, but also in mechanisms that would guarantee an effective implementation 
of such laws.635 Laws and systems of control may be put in place, but it is the human element 
that operate them. In Nigeria, the problem is not only with the existing law, but that of 
implementation of the law to achieve desired objective of combating money laundering. Based 
on these propositions, this chapter focuses on critically examining the legal and institutional 
frameworks aimed at tackling the menace of money laundering in Nigeria with a view to 
assessing the effectiveness of the various laws, enforcement mechanisms and their impact in 
the fight against money laundering particularly as it relates to PEPs. 
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There is no in doubt that Nigeria has most of the required laws on its statue books, yet it suffers 
from profound difficulties in terms of implementation and enforcement. This chapter contends 
that the challenges militating against the efforts to combat money laundering in Nigeria is not 
lack of appropriate legal framework, but in ineffective and inefficient implementation of extant 
legal frameworks to achieve desired objectives of combating money laundering. In assessing 
the AML legal frameworks, a general determination can be made on the effectiveness of these 
extant frameworks. There have been several discussion about the level of effectiveness of 
Nigeria’s AML regime. Some scholars have attributed the problem to weak compliance within 
financial institutions.636 Others blame enforcers and regulators for not doing enough to prevent 
money laundering, while some have attributed the problem to the cost of compliance imposed 
on financial institutions.637 
 This chapter will attempt to determine the effectiveness of the extant AML regime through 
indirect indicators such as assessing the impact of suspicious transaction reports in deterring 
and detecting money laundering, its impact in facilitating investigations, and whether it has 
impacted on prosecutions. In addition, this chapter will be looking at several cases of alleged 
failure of financial and DNFBP to maintain effective AML compliance. Compliance is a key 
element in any AML legal regime across the world, but Nigerian compliance regimes seems 
ineffective in stopping or detecting the free flow of corrupt funds domestically and those 
laundered to foreign jurisdictions. The AML laws places obligations on those in the regulated 
sector to establish and maintain effective compliance regimes to prevent their entities from 
being used for financial crime.  
Having said that, the overarching aim of this chapter is to critically assess the effectiveness of 
the legal and institutional frameworks for combating money and their efficacy vis-à-vis the 
prevalent nature of corruption related money laundering in Nigeria. The objective is to review 
the adequacy and effectiveness of these legislations and how they have performed in detecting 
and deterring corrupt PEPs from laundering the proceeds of corruption. In achieving this 
purpose, the chapter lays emphasis on some notable pieces of legislation which includes: 
Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2012(MLPA), Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (Establishment) Act 2004 (EFCC), Central Bank of Nigeria (Anti-money 
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laundering and combating the financing of terrorism in Banks and other financial institutions 
in Nigeria) Regulation 2018.  
The chapter finds and posits that the laws relating to AML in Nigeria are not effective in 
disrupting money laundering. In order to add substance to the chapter, the chapter offers an 
original perspective on the efficacy of the Nigerian AML regime by eliciting the views of 
stakeholders such as law enforcement and prosecutors through interviews in the course of this 
research. It must be pointed out that though interviews conducted for the purpose of this 
research has its limitations in that it only considers the views of a few law enforcement officials 
and prosecutors at the frontline of combating financial crime in Nigeria, they were sufficient 
in expressing an informed opinion of the impact of the AML laws in Nigeria; as well as 
buttressing arguments in the course of this thesis.  
Furthermore, the chapter looks at other challenges that influences or hinders the viability of 
proper implementation of AML laws in Nigeria. Fundamentally, the chapter considers the 
suitability of utilising the criminal justice system as currently practiced in Nigeria as the only 
avenue to seek redress in instances of corruption related money laundering committed by 
powerful public officials; given the delays and difficulties faced by the prosecution in 
discharging the burden of proof in criminal cases for offences like money laundering which is 
clandestine in nature. How these laws hold up within the context of combating money 
laundering is worthy of a considered examination. In the end, the aim is to ensure that analysis 
of the legal frameworks in Nigeria will throw up viable recommendations towards further 
strengthening Nigeria’s AML regime.  
 
 
             
 
 






5.2             THE NIGERIAN AML REGIME: A HISTORICAL EVOLUTION 
As several countries have implemented AML laws and collaborated on global, regional and 
multilateral action, combating money laundering has become a modern-day priority. 638 
Nigeria’s earliest significant legislative measure against money laundering commenced in 1989 
when it promulgated the National Drug Law Enforcement Decree639 to ostensibly combat drug-
trafficking related money laundering and to conform to the Vienna Convention.640 The Act 
focused predominantly on drug related crime to the exclusion of other money laundering 
predicate crimes. This was followed by the Money Laundering Decree of 1995 enacted under 
military rule.641At the time, the aim of these laws, inter alia, was to make certain that a 
documentary trail is left in all transactions conducted through banks with the goal of preventing 
and haunting down money launderers who at that time were predominantly drug traffickers.  
The ineffectiveness of these laws to effectively combat money laundering, together with the 
country’s lack of political will culminated in Nigeria being blacklisted and placed on the Non-
Cooperative Countries and Territories by FATF in 2001.642 Consequently, in response to being 
blacklisted due to its AML deficiencies; and to cooperate with FATF, Nigeria enacted the 
Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2004. The 2004 Act had a number of far-reaching 
provisions relating to money laundering in Nigeria, but it also had a number of loopholes and 
inadequacies which militated against its effectiveness. The renowned case of Federal Republic 
of Nigeria v James Ibori643 brought to the fore the weakness inherent in the 2004 Money 
Laundering Act.644  
The question for determination by the court in the course of Ibori’s trial was the interpretation 
of s14 of the MLPA 2004 using the ejusdem generis rule. The ejusdem generis rule is a rule of 
statutory interpretation which states that general words in a statute which is followed by 
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specific words must be construed as referring only to the class of things identified by the 
specific words.645  Succinctly, the relevant portion of s14 of the Act is reproduced hereunder: 
Any person who coverts or transfers resources or properties directly or indirectly from illicit 
traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances or any other crime or illegal act with the 
aim of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of resources commits an offence under this 
section and is liable on conviction to a term of not less than 2 years.646 
The court in interpreting this section held that ‘any other’ crime or illegal act contained in the 
section was only restricted to the proceeds of crime from narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances. In other words, corruption and other money laundering offences within the purview 
of s14 could not have been construed ejusdem generis with offences of drugs and psychotropic 
substances. Since the charge against the erstwhile Governor does not contain drug related 
offence, it would be improper to apply the section in this circumstance. The court held further 
that for a charge to be sustained, prosecution must link such funds to those directly or remotely 
made or obtained in the course of illicit traffic in narcotics and psychotropic substances. This 
decision which was not appealed became the locus classicus in the definition of the scope of 
money laundering in Nigeria until the advent of the MLPA 2011which was amended in 2012 
in order to rectify the deficiencies of the previous law.  
Furthermore, another major development in Nigeria’s AML history took place in 2004 with 
the establishment of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission vested with the powers 
to enforce money laundering legislations, and to investigate cases of money laundering and 
other financial crimes.647 Since its inception, the commission has recorded, albeit, minimal 
success in several areas of its mandate, such as securing convictions of corrupt PEPs and other 
criminals engaged in economic and financial crimes in Nigeria. 
Currently, the extant money laundering law in Nigeria is the Money Laundering (Prohibition) 
Act 2012 which essentially supersedes and improved upon previous versions of money 
laundering legislations in Nigeria.648 The Act makes comprehensive provisions to prohibit the 
laundering of the proceeds of crime and the financing of terrorism. It also expands the scope 
of supervisory and regulatory authorities so as to address the challenges faced in the 
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implementation of AML regime in Nigeria. However, despite the minimal success Nigeria has 
achieved in tackling money laundering, there are still fundamental problems in Nigeria’s AML 
regime which has not deterred corrupt public officials from laundering the proceeds of 
Nigeria’s stolen resources to other jurisdictions. Previous and current attempts that have been 
made to address money laundering are regularly upset by the dynamism of the crime itself and 
lack of proper implementation of AML laws. 
This is evident in the incessant upsurge in the number of corrupt PEPS being investigated for 
money laundering, and some convicted in foreign countries on charges of money laundering 
usually from committing the predicate offence of corruption. This is indicative of two things: 
That these laws are not sufficient enough to deal with the problem, or they are not adequately 
implemented. This chapter attempts to answer these questions.  
5.3        EXTANT ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN NIGERIA 
This section focuses on the AML legal frameworks in Nigeria. One of the issues that arises in 
ensuring that regulated entities such as banks appropriately detect illicit financial flows and 
take adequate steps to detect and deter money laundering while ensuring that money launderers 
are identified and sanctioned is whether the extant AML legal frameworks as presently 
constituted in Nigeria contain provisions that can properly assist financial institutions and their 
compliance officers in playing their crucial role. This section shall adumbrate the components 
of Nigeria’s AML legal regime. It is intended in this section to examine the provisions of these 
laws. Thereafter, the chapter shall proceed to its core, whether the legal regimes have been 
effective in deterring and detecting the movement of the proceeds of corruption in Nigeria. The 
specific legislations that criminalises and prohibits the laundering of the proceeds of crime in 
Nigeria are as follows: 
• Money Laundering Prohibition Act 2012  
• Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act 2004 
• Central Bank of Nigeria (Anti-money Laundering and combating the financing of 
terrorism in Banks and other financial institutions in Nigeria) Regulation 2018 
  5.3.1             MONEY LAUNDERING PROHIBITION ACT 2012 
The MLPA 2012 is the overarching AML legislation in Nigeria promulgated to promote 
effective and consistent implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for 




40+9 Recommendations and other international instruments on combating money laundering 
and the financing of terrorism. It contains provisions for the prohibition of the laundering of 
proceeds of crime. Furthermore, the MLPA 2012 expands the scope of the supervisory and 
regulatory authorities in order to address the challenges faced in implementing AML laws in 
Nigeria.649  
The Act creates a framework for a wider customer identification system and highlights 
provisions detailing the obligations of financial and designated non-financial businesses and 
professions in preventing money laundering in Nigeria. In a nutshell, the aim of the Act is 
achieved by:  
1. Enforcing disclosure by those in the regulated sector who come across suspicious 
transactions in the course of their business or professional activities. 
2. Penalising those who render assistance to money launderers such as PEPs 
3. Facilitating investigation on those who commit money laundering offences and 
avoiding the money launderers being notified of an interest in their activities.650 
The MLPA 2012 is divided into three parts namely: Prohibition of money laundering (Part I), 
Offences (Part II), Miscellaneous (Part III). This section will be focusing on the most salient 
provisions of the Act pertinent to this research.   
5.3.2    KEY AML PROVISIONS FOR FINANICIAL AND DESIGNATED NON-FINANCIAL 
BUSINESSES AND PROFESSIONS IN NIGERIA 
The Nigerian AML regime places certain statutory obligations on financial and designated non-
financial businesses and professions to implement and comply with AML laws. Top among the 
list of measures are the Customer Due Diligence requirements (CDD), Record Keeping and 
Reporting Requirements which have a high degree of usefulness for law enforcement and 
making it difficult for the proceeds of crime to enter the financial system without creating a 
paper trail. This section examines those key responsibilities. 
5.3.3   CUSTOMER DUE DILIGENCE AND ENHANCED DUE DILIGENCE FOR PEP’S 
In light of the fact that financial institutions need to ensure that they have adequate controls 
and procedures in place in order to know their customers and adequately monitor criminal 
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financial activities, the first critical step which financial institutions are mandated to perform 
is the customer due diligence measures. Customer Due Diligence (CDD) is a process of 
developing a clear knowledge of a customer relationship and checking that customers are who 
they say they are in order to effectively understand and manage the risk arising from such 
relationship.651 The CDD is one of the most fundamental AML measures.  
Not only does it serve as the first line of prevention against the commission of money 
laundering,652 it also prevents the placement of illicit funds into the financial system by helping 
ascertain the source of wealth and source of funds of customers.653 With a strong due diligence 
process that identifies customers and legal beneficiaries before a customer relationship is 
established, a bank can reduce the risk associated with money laundering to the barest 
minimum. By virtue of the MLPA 2012, financial and designated non-financial businesses and 
professions must ensure that they have appropriate customer identification and due diligence 
procedures in place.654  
These rules and procedures ensure that financial institutions maintain adequate knowledge of 
their customers and their customer’s financial activities. The CDD requirements are also known 
as ‘Know Your Customer’ rules. The MLPA 2012 enumerate situations when CDD shall be 
undertaking by financial institutions. It includes, when:  
a) Establishing business relationships 
b) There is a suspicion of money laundering 
c) Carrying out occasional transactions that are wire transfers 
d) Carrying out occasional transactions above the applicable threshold including 
transactions carried out in a single operation or several operations that appear linked.655 
This particular provision is necessary to preclude those who deposit funds by way of 
structuring in bits in order to evade the threshold provided by law. This is known as 
smurfing which is still categorised as a suspicious transaction which must be reported 
to the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU).656 
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In adhering to the above requirements, a financial institution shall 
a) Identify a customer, whether permanent or occasional, natural or legal person or any 
form of legal arrangement using identification documents, data or information bearing 
his names and photograph or any other identification documents as maybe prescribed 
by relevant regulations. 
b) Identify a customer’s address by presenting originals of receipts issued within the 
previous three months by public utilities or any documents as the regulatory authorities 
may from time to time approve.657 
c) Identify the beneficial owner and take reasonable measures to verify the identity of 
beneficial owner using relevant information or data obtained from a reliable source.658  
This provision if adhered to beams its focus on PEPs and other launderers who hide 
under corporate structures such as companies to hide and launder the proceeds of crime. 
As stated in chapter four, corporate vehicles have become a necessary tool for PEPs in 
laundering the proceeds of corruption due to their ability to hide their identities under 
corporate structures. Financial institutions are now required to go as far as identifying 
and understanding the beneficial owners of corporate structures in order to unearth 
those who control these structures to make sure they are not being used for money 
laundering purposes.  
 More significantly, the MLPA 2012 provides for enhanced due diligence (EDD) measures 
which must be taken to manage and mitigate high risks. These high risks include customers 
that are PEPs. Thus, in the case of PEPs, in addition to CDD above, financial institutions shall: 
a) Put in place appropriate risk management systems 
b) Obtain senior management approval before establishing and having any business 
relationship with the PEP.659 
In as much as the identity and business profile of all customers should be established, there are 
cases in which particularly rigorous customer identification and verification procedures are 
required. This is particularly true of relationships with individuals who hold or have held 
important public functions. Notably, some of the noticeable failures of the MLPA 2012 is the 
absence of some additional necessary requirements for enhanced due diligence for the 
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treatment of PEPs. Juxtaposing this provision on PEPs with FATF Recommendation 10, as 
well as international best practices, a noticeable exclusion under the MLPA 2012 when 
conducting EDD on PEPs is the requirement that financial institutions must ‘Take reasonable 
measures to establish the source of wealth and source of funds’ and also ‘conduct enhanced 
ongoing monitoring of the business relationship’ with PEPs.660  This is a major lacuna in 
Nigeria’s AML regime, especially when viewed against the background that the most 
damaging and prevalent money laundering activities are perpetrated by PEPs.661  
Enhanced due diligence is a measure which provides a greater level of scrutiny of business 
relationships and highlights risks that cannot be detected by customer due diligence.662 The 
practice of taking reasonable measures to understand the source of wealth and source of funds 
of PEPs is a fundamental component of EDD obligations that banks must apply to PEP 
customers.663 This is aimed at determining the origin of funds used by PEPs, evaluating the 
consistency of PEPs transactions within financial institutions and contributing to the 
customer’s profile that banks use as the baseline when conducting enhanced ongoing 
monitoring.664 At the first contact with PEPs, financial institutions should by law conduct an 
exhaustive examination of the origin of the funds used in the business relationship based on 
information provided by the customer or any other source.665  
This is to make sure that PEPs who are high risk customers are not using corruptly obtained 
funds to conduct such business relationship. There are a variety of tools to establish source of 
wealth and source of funds. In this regard, declarations of assets and income of public officials 
which includes source of wealth and business activities is important. In Nigeria, public officials 
are mandated by law to file such declarations. Such requirements should allow compliance 
officers in charge of EDD to add to the evaluation of PEPs. 
With regard to conducting ongoing monitoring of the business relationship, this has also been 
excluded in the MLPA 2012. Best practices require that once a business relationship has been 
established with PEPs, banks must conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring. Ongoing monitoring 
includes processes to monitor PEPs transactions and evaluate whether the activity accords with 
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the customer profile.666 It is necessary to ensure proper monitoring of PEPs at least annually 
and greater than that carried out for other customers. This is so because this measure provides 
relevant information relating to the status of a PEP, and whether such PEP is still entrusted 
with such position which can be gathered by reviewing documentation and information already 
held by the financial institution.  
When banks conduct ongoing monitoring of a business relationship, they may come across 
patterns that are difficult to explain, triggering further inquiry into the customer’s background. 
These measures which have been excluded in Nigeria’s AML legislation could help financial 
institutions in terms of determining and evaluating PEPs funds in order to be prevent their 
institutions from being used by corrupt PEPs to launder the proceeds of corruption. This is 
paramount given the prevalent nature of illicit financial flows from Nigeria to other 
jurisdictions by corrupt PEPs. 
5.3.4                     SOME DIFFICULTIES IN IMPLEMENTING CDD IN NIGERIA 
The CDD requirements are mandatory and crucial. Nevertheless, implementing a 
comprehensive CDD is difficult in Nigeria due to some bottlenecks. Customer identification 
and verification remain major obstacles to CDD implementation in Nigeria.667 A key challenge 
in implementing CDD relates to the lack of robust identification infrastructure in Nigeria.668 
Firstly, in relation to the challenge of identification is the issue of inappropriate or inadequate 
addressing systems. There are no postcode systems which means that customers address is 
identified through landmarks such as hospitals etc. The lack of proper addressing system makes 
the process of CDD daunting on financial institutions and increases cost on these institutions 
in the performance of their AML obligations since they would have to conduct physical 
visitations.669  
Secondly, obtaining public utilities documents in Nigeria can be challenging. Public utilities 
connote services provided for the public, example an electricity, water or gas supply. This is 
relevant because public utility document is a fundamental requirement which constitutes part 
of the prerequisite processes by financial institutions prior to the establishment of a business 
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relationship. Today in Nigeria, fixed telephone lines are almost extinct and the common mobile 
telephone services670 which are substantially pay as you go with no issuable receipt to establish 
evidence of particular residential address.671 Electricity bills are now replaced with prepaid 
metering systems where electricity consumer only buys credit and receipt are no longer 
necessary. Water bills are also not common in Nigeria with citizens substantially relying for 
water through personalised boreholes with no receipt.672 
These issues contribute to the obstacles of effective CDD regime in Nigeria. Evidence from a 
published mutual evaluation report done by the Inter-Governmental Action Group Against 
Money Laundering in West Africa, a FATF style regional body indicate that CDD frameworks 
are poor in Nigeria, hence Nigeria is non-compliant on FATF Recommendation on CDD.673 
  5.3.5                       REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 
The MLPA 2012 requires the filing of certain reports. These reports include reporting of 
International transfer of funds, Currency Transaction Report (CTR) and Suspicious 
Transaction Report (STR). Although these reports can be paramount in disrupting money 
laundering, the most significant report for the purpose of disrupting money laundering is the 
suspicious transactions reports. Suspicious transaction reports refer to a piece of information 
generated by financial institutions which alerts law enforcement that certain activity is in some 
way suspicious and might be an indication of potential money laundering.674 
5.3.5.1        Duty to Report International Transfer of Funds 
The MLPA makes it mandatory to report to the Central Bank of Nigeria and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission any transfer to or from a foreign country of funds or securities by a 
person or body corporate of a sum exceeding $10,000 or its equivalent within 7days from the 
date of the transaction.675 Furthermore, this section also provides for the declaration of cash or 
negotiable instruments in excess of $10,000 or its equivalent to the Nigerian Custom Service 
who shall report any declaration to the CBN and Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit.676 
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Failure to make this declaration or report on conviction forfeits the undeclared funds in its 
entirety or to imprisonment of not less than 2years or both.677 
The consideration of making it mandatory to report international transfer of funds is an attempt 
to detect those who try to utilise financial institutions to launder illicit funds to other 
jurisdictions. In the same vein, the consideration of making it mandatory to declare cash or 
other instruments in excess of $10,000 is to identify those who might prefer physical 
transportation of cash through airports or other borders rather than utilising financial 
institutions to launder illicit funds and risk being detected.678 
5.3.5.2       Duty to report Suspicious Transactions Reports 
One of the most salient provisions in the MLPA 2012 is outlined in s6. It provides thus: 
Where a transaction involves a frequency which is unjustifiable or unreasonable; is 
surrounded by conditions of unusual or unjustified complexity; it appears to have no 
economic justification or lawful objective; or where in the opinion of the financial or 
designated non-financial businesses and professions involves terrorist financing or is 
inconsistent with the known transaction pattern of the account or business relationship, 
that transaction shall be deemed to be suspicious and the financial institution shall seek 
information from the customer as to the origin and destination of the funds, the aim of 
the transaction and the identity of the beneficiary.679 
Therefore, in the area of surveillance of certain financial transactions and mandatory 
disclosures by financial institutions, the Act made strict provisions aimed at preventing money 
laundering in Nigeria. Nigerian AML laws requires banks to make a STR where the identity of 
the persons involved in the transaction, or the transaction itself, or any other circumstances 
concerning that transaction gives reason to suspect that the transaction involves proceeds of 
unlawful activity. The mandatory obligation to report arises where there is suspicion that funds 
involved in the business relationship are connected to a money laundering offence or the 
proceeds of crime. Chaikin is of the view that one of the reason financial institutions face in 
implementing STR is because it is often unclear what constitutes suspicion.680 According to 
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Gold and Levi, suspicion is usually aroused by the sheer size of the transactions in relation to 
the known financial circumstances of the customer.681  
The word ‘suspicion’ is not explicitly defined under the MLPA 2012. For this reason, it would 
be relevant to refer to two decisions of the UK Court of Appeal which considered the meaning 
of suspicion. In R v Da Silva,682 the appellant appealed against her conviction for facilitating 
her husband’s retention or control of proceeds of his criminal conduct, knowing or suspecting 
that her husband was or had been engaged in criminal conduct or had benefited from it. In 
dismissing the appeal, the court held that the essential element in suspicion was that the 
defendant had to think that there was a possibility which was more than fanciful that the 
relevant facts existed. Therefore, vague feeling of unease would not suffice.  
In the same vein, in K Ltd v NatWest Bank,683 K appealed against the bank’s refusal requiring 
the respondent bank to comply with payment instructions given by K Ltd. The respondent bank 
declined payment because it made a suspicious activity report to the UK financial intelligence 
Unit that the money was criminal property. In dismissing the appeal, the court applied the test 
set out in Da Silva’s case and affirmed that the person must think there is a possibility, more 
than merely fanciful, that the relevant facts exist, and this suspicion must be of a settled nature. 
Furthermore, the MLPA is equally silent as to what constitutes unusual, unreasonable or 
unjustified complexity. It appears that conditions of unusual or unjustified complexity could 
be inferred by reference to the type and nature of the intended transaction or activity and its 
apparent goal.684  
For Nigerian Banks, as a result of the fact that it is somewhat impossible to describe all forms 
of suspicious transactions conclusively in legislation, the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit 
(NFIU) as part of its mandate to provide guidelines to reporting entities on ways of detecting 
the occurrence of money laundering in financial and designated non-financial businesses and 
professions provided the following examples on some patterns of suspicious activity. 
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5.3.5.3 EXAMPLES OF SOME COMMON PATTERN OF SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION OR ACTIVITY 
• Transactions that are not commensurate with the stated business type or that are unusual 
and unexpected in comparison with the volume of similar business operating in the 
same locale. 
• Unusually large volumes of wire transfer 
• Transactions being conducted in burst of activities within a short period of time, 
especially in previously dormant account 
• A sudden increase in turnover on an account without any acceptable explanation 
• The operation of an account essentially to transfer large sums to or from foreign 
jurisdictions, when the person or company activities do not appear to justify such 
movements.685 
It appears that these examples provide some guidance for a basis of suspicion. However, since 
suspicion is a subjective fact based on decisions in Da Silva and NatWest Bank, it can be said 
that identifying suspicious transactions is not an easy task. The Act goes on to state that a 
financial institution shall immediately report any STR to the EFCC and NFIU by drawing up 
a written report containing all relevant information together with the identity of the principal 
and where applicable of the beneficiary or beneficiaries.686 
Upon receipt and acknowledgment of this, the chairman of EFCC, Governor of CBN or his 
authorised representatives shall place a stop order not exceeding 72 hours.687 If the origin of 
the funds cannot be ascertained within the stoppage period of the transaction, the EFCC or 
authorised persons may request for an order of the Federal High Court to block the funds.688 
The requirement that financial institutions should make a disclosure to the authorities of 
transactions that they consider unusual and suspicious is the most proactive approach to 
fighting money laundering and is the government’s main weapon in the battle against money 
laundering and other financial crimes.689 An in depth assessment of STR systems in Nigeria is 
provided later in this chapter. 
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5.3.5.4      MANDATORY DISCLOSURES/CURRENCY TRANSACTION REPORT 
Another duty which is equally important but probably not as fundamental as STR is the duty 
to report Currency Transaction Reports (CTR). The CTR requirement requires financial and 
designated non-financial businesses and professions to report any cash transactions that exceed 
a certain monetary threshold. This requirement applies to deposits, withdrawals and transfers. 
Under the MLPA 2012, the scope of the disclosure requirement makes it mandatory for 
Financial and designated non-financial businesses and professions to report to the NFIU in 
writing within 7 days any single transaction, lodgement or transfer of funds in excess of 
a) N5,000,000 or its equivalent, in the case of an individual or; 
b) N10, 000,000 or its equivalent, in the case of a body corporate.690 
These disclosures are generally referred to as Currency Transactions Reports. Financial 
institutions are expected to file this report even if it involves individuals conducting legitimate 
transactions that falls within the threshold. Scholars are of the view that in the context of 
preventing money laundering, especially those relating to high risk customers, STRs possesses 
more probative value than CTRs.691 This is so because, STRs are usually filed when there is 
suspicion of attempted money laundering, while CTRs are filed for every transaction that 
exceeds the statutory monetary threshold.  
Thus, there could be thousands of CTRs in any given year to make effective use of them. 
Although CTRs can be useful to law enforcement in certain broad analytic to identify financial 
crime.692 According to NFIU, the volume of CTR filed each year is significantly greater than 
all other statutory reports combined which financial institutions are expected to file. 693 
However, the NFIU is of the opinion that despite the volume of CTR filings, they are still an 
important AML measure because they make it difficult for criminals to get their illicit proceeds 
into financial institutions, and when they do, it affords law enforcement a way to follow the 
money and detect criminal activities.694 
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5.3.5.5            RECORD KEEPING/PRESERVATION OF RECORDS 
The fight against money laundering places emphasis on following the money. This is because 
audit trails permit law enforcement to trace financial transactions to criminals.695 The MLPA 
obliges financial and designated non-financial businesses and professions with record keeping 
requirements. It states that they shall provide and keep at their disposal the record of all 
transactions carried out by a customer for a period of 5years after carrying out the transaction 
or making of the report.696  
The Act also mandates these entities to keep records of customer identification for a period of 
5years after the closure of the account, or the severance of relations with the customer. The 
requirement of financial institutions keeping records of transactions is fundamental in the 
context of AML. These records could potentially serve as audit trails both for banks and law 
enforcement when the need arises in aiding criminal investigations and possible prosecution of 
money launderers. Also, they can help uncover the whereabouts of laundered funds as corrupt 
PEPs tend to launder illicit funds to foreign jurisdictions.  
5.4          THE CRIMINAL OFFENCE OF MONEY LAUNDERING UNDER MLPA 2012 
The MLPA 2012 is the premier statute that criminalises money laundering offence in Nigeria. 
Part II of the MLPA 2012 contains actual money laundering offences. It extends criminal 
culpability to anyone involved in money laundering in any of its various forms. Additionally, 
the offence applies extra-territorially if the acts constituting the offence were committed in 
different countries or places.697 Section 15 of the MLPA makes it a money laundering offence 
for any person or body corporate in or outside Nigeria, to directly or indirectly: 
(a) Conceal or disguise the origin of; 
(b) Convert or transfers; 
(c) Remove from the jurisdiction; or 
(d) Acquires, uses, retains or takes possession or control of any fund or property, 
knowingly or reasonably ought to have known that such fund or property is, or forms 
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part of the proceeds of an unlawful act; commits an offence of money laundering under 
this Act.698 
The provisions of section 15(2) (a) –(c) above are disjunctive and not conjunctive. It follows 
that an offender could be charged for merely concealing the source of funds. Likewise, it also 
appears that merely removing from the jurisdiction without more would suffice to ground a 
charge. The scope of s15 is broad. Concealing or disguising criminal property makes it broader 
as it applies to those who receive criminal property. As a result of its wide scope, s15 catches 
not only those engaging in money laundering but also financial intermediaries and institutions 
(Banks and lawyers) who aid and facilitate corrupt PEPs and other criminals launder the 
proceeds of crime. Thus, laundering one’s own proceeds is just as much money laundering, as 
similar activities performed by someone else, notably professional launders on behalf of 
another who committed the predicate or underlying offence. 
The unlawful act or predicate offence which is needed to sustain a money laundering charge 
comprises criminal acts specified in the act or any other law in Nigeria. The MLPA 2012 
defined unlawful activity using a long list of criminal activities which includes: corruption, 
fraud, participation in an organised criminal group, racketeering, illicit trafficking in narcotic 
drugs and psychotropic substances etc.699 
5.4.1                 RETENTION OF PROCEEDS OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT 
Also, the MLPA 2012 makes it a criminal offence for any person who- 
a) Conceals, removes from jurisdiction, transfers to nominees or otherwise retains the 
proceeds of a crime or an illegal act on behalf of another person knowing or suspecting 
that other persons to be engaged in a criminal conduct or has benefited from a criminal 
conduct or conspiracy, aiding, etc.; or 
b) Knowing that any property either in whole or in part directly or indirectly represents 
another person’s proceeds of a criminal conduct, acquires or uses that property or 
possession of it commits an offence under this Act.700 
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5.4.2        CONSPIRACY/AIDING AND ABETTING THE COMMISSON OF ML OFFENCE 
In accordance with the MLPA 2012, it is also an offence to conspire to commit any of the 
money laundering offences in section 15 and 17. Therefore, the act holds that it is an offence 
to conspire with, aid, abet or counsel any person to commit an offence. It is also a criminal 
offence punishable under the Act to attempt to commit a money laundering offence, or being 
an accessory to an act.701        
5.4.3        INGREDIENTS OF THE MLPA 2012 OFFENCES 
In Udeogu v FRN,702  the courts have held, inter alia, that to sustain a charge of money 
laundering, the prosecution must establish that the accused converted or transferred money or 
property; that the sum of money was derived directly or indirectly from the participation in an 
unlawful activity, and that the conversion or transfer was done with the aim of concealing or 
disguising the illicit origin of the money or aiding any person involved to evade the illegal 
consequences of his action. Proving money laundering cases is a herculean task because it 
requires a prior establishment of a predicate offence before the money laundering aspect can 
be established.  
In this respect, the court in Daudu v FRN703 held that money laundering must be accompanied 
by a predicate offence which is an illegal act that yields the funds sought to be laundered as 
clean money. It is difficult or near impossible to prove money laundering without a predicate 
offence in Nigeria. For instance, where a PEP is charged with a money laundering offence, the 
prosecution is duty bound to show that the resources laundered were derived from a particular 
illegal or unlawful activity before a prima facie case can be established. Not just Nigeria, in 
other jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA), 
for each of its principal money laundering offences, the Crown has to prove that the laundered 
proceeds constitutes criminal property.704  
Criminal property as defined under POCA refer to property that constitutes a person’s benefit 
from criminal conduct.705 A criminal conduct is all conduct which constitutes an offence in any 
part of the UK.706  Flowing from this, the court in R v Anwoir,707  held that on a money 
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laundering charge, the Crown has to prove the type of offending that gave rise to the criminal 
property. In other words, the Crown has to prove the underlying predicate offence that brought 
about the criminal property. 
Also, to prove conspiracy to commit money laundering, the prosecution must present evidence 
in respect of every essential element needed to establish the offence.708 The conspiracy is 
complete if there are acts on the part of an accused person which lead the court to the conclusion 
that he and others were engaged in accomplishing a common objective.  
5.4.4     ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF MONEY LAUNDERING OFFENCES IN NIGERIA 
To establish the above money laundering offences in Nigeria, the requisite mental element 
which the prosecution is required to prove is ‘knowledge’. The MLPA 2012 requires a person 
prosecuted for money laundering to have knowledge of the funds or property’s criminal origin 
when practising the prohibited conduct of money laundering. In other words, the alleged 
perpetrator of money laundering should be sufficiently aware that a prior crime occurred which 
resulted in the proceeds of crime that he/she is laundering. As already seen above from case 
law, it is difficult to prove money laundering without a predicate offence/unlawful activity in 
Nigeria. Specifically, the MLPA refer to the words ‘knowing or ought to have known that such 
property represents the proceeds of an unlawful conduct’. 
In Kalu v FRN,709 the courts have held that the accused must have knowledge at the time of 
conversion or transfer that funds or property are criminal proceeds. The knowledge at the time 
of conversion or transfer shall be applied with intent either of concealing or disguising the 
illegal origin of such property or helping any person who is involved in the commission of the 
offence to evade legal consequences of their actions. The offender must also be aware that the 
consequences of these conducts will be the concealment or the disguise of the true nature, 
source, location, disposition with respect to the proceeds of crime.710 
Furthermore, within the context of financial and designated non-financial businesses and 
professions, there are issues regarding instances where the knowledge of the circumstances of 
the laundering activity should take place. This occurs mainly because money laundering is 
often a continuous criminal offence and not always committed instantaneously.711 Situations 
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could arise where banks do not know the funds criminal origin at the initial stage or at the time 
of receipt of criminal funds; but subsequently have knowledge later during the time the conduct 
of laundering takes place. Roberto Durrieu pays special attention to this possibility, taking as 
an example the case of a corrupt PEP who deposits the proceeds of corruption in a bank.712  
Therefore, an employee or officer of a bank who receives the deposit of illicit funds and later 
becomes aware that the money is derived from unlawful activity such as corruption; the 
question that arises is: At what point is the officer of the bank committing the crime of money 
laundering? At the point he received the deposit of the funds or after becoming aware of its 
origin? Roberto concludes that the officer of the bank would be committing a crime of money 
laundering at the time he/she becomes aware that the received money was derived from the 
commission of a crime and still decides to undertake the transaction. However, in the context 
of financial and designated non-financial businesses and professions, there are steps to be taken 
in order to avoid criminal liability.  
To this end, an officer of the bank is expected to take appropriate action to prevent the 
laundering of the proceeds of crime in the form of submitting a suspicious transaction report to 
the appropriate authority as soon as the officer becomes aware of possible money laundering 
activity. It is left for the law enforcement to ascertain the origin of the funds. Failure to 
discharge this obligation to law enforcement, the officer could be accused of committing the 
crime of money laundering if it is proved to have been committed with the connivance of or 
attributable to any neglect on the part of the officer.713 Therefore, on this basis, filing an STR 
would be a decisive evidence when proving the innocence of the officer of the bank.  
5.5           ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIMES COMMISSION ACT 2004 
Another notable piece of legislation which is equally fundamental in the grand scheme of 
fighting money laundering and corruption in Nigeria is the EFCC Act 2004. This Act provides 
for the establishment of the EFCC, a government institution charged with the responsibility of 
co-ordinating the various institutions involved in the fight against money laundering and 
enforcement of all laws dealing with economic and financial crimes in Nigeria.714 The EFCC 
sits at the core of Nigerian AML regime and is the central co-ordinating law enforcement body 
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dealing with money laundering in Nigeria. The EFCC Act provides the legal and institutional 
framework for the enforcement of all financial crime law in Nigeria.  
The catalyst for the establishment of the legislation creating the EFCC was the need to combat 
corruption and money laundering, and to mark a paradigm shift from earlier, weaker anti-
corruption rhetoric by creating a robust and exhaustive legislative and institutional anti-
corruption approach.715 The act empowers the EFCC to the collection of all reports relating to 
suspicious financial transactions, investigate and prosecute all financial crimes in Nigeria 
which includes money laundering, and the initiation and execution of measures that would lead 
to the identification, tracing, freezing, confiscation and seizing of proceeds of crime and assets 
derived from corruption and other unlawful activities.716  
The EFCC Act has 47 sections, divided into seven parts. The seven parts cover the following 
topics: Establishment of EFCC (section 1-5); functions of the commission (section 6-7); staff 
of the commission (section 8-13); offences (section 14-27); Asset forfeiture (section 27-34); 
financial provisions (section 35-37); and miscellaneous provisions (section 38-47). This 
section is only concerned in discussing the ‘offences’ aspect of the legislation. More 
importantly, this section seeks to examine the effectiveness of the EFCC and how it has fared 
in fulfilling its criminal enforcement mandate.  
5.5.1     OFFENCES UNDER THE EFCC ACT 
The offences created under the EFCC Act is somewhat similar to those also created under the 
MLPA 2012. For instance, section 17 of the Act mirrors section 17 of the MLPA 2012 on the 
retention of proceeds of a criminal conduct. It states that: 
• A person who whether by concealment, removal from jurisdiction, transfers to 
nominees or retains control of proceeds of crime on behalf of another knowing that the 
proceeds are a result of criminal conduct OR 
• Knowing that any property represents another’s proceeds of an economic crime, 
acquires or uses that property commits an offence is liable on conviction to a term not 
less than 3years or fine equivalent to 100 percent of the crime or both.717 
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In like manner, section 18 of the EFCC Act is also similar to section 15 of the MLPA 2012. It 
provides thus: 
• A person who engages in the conversion, transfer of property knowing that such 
property is derived from any offence under this act 
• Engages in the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, 
movement, knowing that such property is derived from any offence under the act 
commits an offence is liable on conviction to a term not less than two years and not 
exceeding three years.718 
  5.5.2   EXAMINING THE POTENCY OF THE EFCC IN THE FIGHT AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING 
The activities of the EFCC in combating corruption and money laundering are within the legal 
framework that spells out its powers and functions. The extent of the performance of the 
commission in discharging her responsibilities on fighting corruption and money laundering 
goes a long way to determine the effectiveness of Nigeria’s AML legal framework in general. 
Since its establishment in 2004, Nigeria has witnessed tremendous increase in the activities of 
the EFCC wielding its enormous powers on individuals who engage in economic and financial 
crimes in Nigeria. The EFCC have been instrumental in charging and prosecuting senior 
political leaders, as well as recovering and repatriating significant resources illicitly stolen and 
laundered by corrupt PEPs belonging to the Nigerian state. This includes the arraignment of 
over 50 nationally prominent political figures such as former Governors, Ministers and 
Senators, on charges bothering on abuse of office, theft of public funds, money laundering; and 
the recovery of some $11 billion dollars stolen and laundered through financial institutions.719 
Statistically, the EFCC investigated a total of 15, 124 petitions between 2010 and 2016 which 
is the equivalent of 41.5% of all petitions received (36,442). 720  In terms of criminal 
prosecutions filed in court, the EFCC filed a total of 2,460 cases, securing only 568 convictions, 
representing 3.75% of investigated cases and a conviction rate of 23.09%. However, the vast 
majority of these convictions can be categorised as low or mid-level economic and financial 
crimes such as advance fee fraud (obtaining by false pretence), criminal conspiracy, forgery 
and currency counterfeiting, rather than the convictions arising from the embezzlement of 
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public funds and money laundering.721 Thus, cases of grand corruption involving colossal sums 
of public funds and particularly prosecutions involving PEPs are rare.  
Several money laundering cases against the political elite have made little progress in court. 
Some scholars suggest that the inefficiencies of the Nigerian legal system prevents the EFCC 
from fulfilling its mandate, with the EFCC itself associating some of its challenges to judicial 
hostility and delays in court.722 Granted that the Nigerian justice system is slow, overburdened 
and without specialist anti-corruption judges;723 together with the fact that senior lawyers also 
employ delay tactics to elongate cases that take more than a decade to conclude, thereby 
frustrating the prosecution of corrupt PEPs on money laundering charges. While these are valid 
arguments, in addition to a range of external obstacles such as lack of political will, the agency 
has also managed to damage some of its own prosecutions through error and incompetence.724 
The EFCC in Nigeria is widely known and criticised for its penchant for high profile arrest and 
public invitations of prominent suspects before a criminal investigation is complete,725given 
room for corrupt PEPs to undermine the underlying investigations by hiding or destroying 
evidence. The expectation of law is that before a person is arrested, investigations should have 
been done and completed in preparation for possible charges. The consequence of this being 
that investigations are done through media trials to impress the public but cannot stand the test 
of evidence in court. Furthermore, there is some evidence that appears to suggest that the EFCC 
is not immune from political pressures, with some scholars having linked the falling rates in 
prosecution of corrupt PEPs to such interests and selective prosecution.726 
In essence, one of the reasons for the EFCC’s failure regarding investigations and convictions 
of corrupt PEPs is that the EFCC appears to lack absolute independence. 727  In a purely 
structural sense, the EFCC is deeply vulnerable to control from the executive which reduces its 
effectiveness; and is often seen as an arm of the incumbent government without an independent 
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mandate.728 There is an overbearing influence of government presence in the activities of the 
EFCC making the commission highly influenced by politics, which can rarely discharge its 
statutory duties without interference. 729  This lack of independence can be traced to its 
institutional architecture as its principal officers are appointed by the President.730  
Due to its close relationship with the executive branch that appoints its chairman, there is a 
tendency for their powers to be used as tools of victimization, persecution and prosecution of 
perceived enemies of the government of the day. As a result, there is an increased propensity 
that the chairman will be reluctant to proceed with corruption and money laundering 
investigations against the President and his political affiliates who belong to the ruling political 
party. According to Ezeonu, it is believed that the EFCC is often used as a tool for persecuting 
political opponents, and that court trials and charges by the commission relating to the 
prosecution of PEPs are subject to who the government of the day wants to be tried and 
charged.731 
It is pertinent to also note that a provision which further constricts the independence of the 
commission is one which empowers the President to remove the chairman of the commission 
where the President is satisfied that it is not in the interest of the public that the individual 
continues in office.732 In other words, the commission’s chairman enjoys no security of tenure 
and can be removed at any time by the President without any consultation or approval from the 
National Assembly. This power to remove the chairman who heads the most powerful anti-
graft institution dealing with corruption and money laundering by the President is subjective. 
What would satisfy the President that it is not in the interest of the public for the chairman to 
continue in office is nowhere defined in the Act.  
As a result of the powers of the President to appoint and dismiss the chairman of the 
commission, this gives the President sufficient latitude to interfere in the functioning of the 
EFCC. Therefore, allegations of investigations based on the directives of the President are not 
uncommon. As put by an EFCC prosecutor, Festus Keyamo, ‘Whoever is the EFCC chairman, 
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he cannot go beyond the wish of the President. If he does, he would be removed the next day. 
At the end of the day, anyone who is the chairman will have to read the body language of the 
President to do what he wants’733  
A quintessential example of the above point involved a former chairman of the EFCC, Farida 
Waziri, who claimed in her new book that she was sacked from office because of her zero 
tolerance for corruption.734 According to the former chairman, she was removed from office 
by former President, Goodluck Jonathan, because of her refusal to back down from the probe 
of some corrupt PEPs for financial crimes and money laundering. Waziri stated that she had 
been pressurised from the Presidency not to go after certain powerful politicians but refused to 
be compromised; going against the Presidential directive which subsequently led to her 
removal. The lack of independence and political interference are core reasons why the EFCC 
have not performed credibly. This is also the reason many money laundering cases against 
corrupt PEPs have made little progress and why the AML regime in Nigeria has been largely 
ineffective to deal with illicit financial flows from public officials.  
Asides political interference and lack of independence, another factor that contributes to the 
ineffectiveness of the EFCC’s mandate in combating money laundering is operational 
incapacity caused by insufficient funding.735 The effectiveness of the EFCC is also determined 
by its internal organisation and continued training of professionally qualified personnel. 
Without funding, the EFCC cannot function effectively to deliver on its mandate to fight graft. 
Funding is essential in investigating and successfully prosecuting money launderers. 
Investigating corruption and money laundering involving PEPs is capital intensive and needs 
funding to achieve diligent prosecution of cases. Corrupt PEPs have the wherewithal and 
resources to get the best legal services and turn the tide against the EFCC in the court of law.  
EFCC’s annual report for 2015 identified as one of its operational challenges the dearth of 
consistent training of officers to meet the exigencies that are peculiar to the ever-changing 
nature of economic and financial crime.736 In similar vein, EFCC’s 2016 report also states that 
‘training is essential because it equips officers with the requisite skills and information on best 
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practices in law enforcement. If we are to succeed in the fight against corruption, training must 
be adequately funded’.737 The commission has stated that it has been largely dependent on the 
assistance of donor partners to train its staff. This weaknesses in training further manifests in 
the failure of the EFCC to conduct thorough investigation, resulting in the dismissal or acquittal 
of corrupt PEPs in criminal prosecutions.  
It is somewhat evident that over the years, the commission has fallen short of its potential with 
limited successful record of accomplishment. This thesis is of the view that the commission 
cannot objectively fight money laundering by corrupt PEPs if their operations are guided by 
political motivation and interference. In order for the commission to achieve and surpass its 
achievement of prosecuting those engaged in laundering the proceeds of corruption, absolute 
independence is required. This can be achieved by amending the EFCC Act to remove the 
power of appointment and removal of the chairman of the commission from the hands of the 
President who is a PEP and leader of the ruling party with so much interest to protect. Such 
appointment powers can be given to the Chief Justice of Nigeria on the recommendation of the 
National Judicial Council preferably. 
5.6 Central Bank of Nigeria (Anti-money Laundering and combating the financing of terrorism in Banks 
and other financial institutions in Nigeria) Regulation 2018 
Banking regulations refers to the processes and procedures adopted by banking regulators to 
oversee, regulate, monitor or control the activities of banking institutions.738 These processes 
define the parameters within which banks should operate and are subjected to certain 
requirements, guidelines and restrictions aimed at promoting transparency and compliance 
with extant AML laws in Nigeria. Nigeria’s AML regulatory framework consists of regulatory 
and supervisory bodies empowered by their establishment acts and other AML laws to 
supervise financial institutions in their operational activities. Primarily, the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) is the apex regulatory and supervisory body of the banking sector in Nigeria.739 
In exercise of the powers conferred on the CBN by virtue of Banks and Other Financial 
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Institutions Act 2004 (BOFIA),740 the CBN introduced regulations for financial and designated 
non-financial businesses and professions to prevent money laundering in the country. 
CBN (AML) Regulation 2018 is the extant AML regulation in Nigeria which amends CBN 
(AML) Regulation 2013. The regulation essentially sets out systems and models to shield banks 
from being utilised as a channel to launder illicit funds, perpetrate fraud and different types of 
monetary crimes; as well as conduct their respective business in accordance with extant AML 
laws in Nigeria. Basically, the CBN regulation imposes certain requirements relating to 
Customer Due Diligence, policies and procedures, controls and record keeping amongst other 
things. Furthermore, the regulation allows the CBN to enforce AML measures, provide 
guidance, support implementation and enforce compliance by financial institutions. Also, the 
CBN regulation rectifies some of the deficiencies not taking into consideration in the MLPA 
or EFCC Act by promulgating extensive provisions to curtail illicit financial flows and to 
penalise those in the regulated sector who aid money launderers.  
In this respect, the regulation stipulates fines on banks, their directors and other key officials 
for money laundering infractions. This is so because, to deter the use of financial institutions 
for money laundering, sanctions should be applicable not only to financial institutions and 
designated non-financial businesses and professions, but also their directors and senior 
management who are complicit in aiding money launderers.   
The core objectives of this regulation is: 
• To provide AML compliance guidelines for financial institutions under the regulatory 
purview of the CBN as required by relevant provisions of the MLPA.741 
• To enable the CBN to diligently enforce AML measures and ensure effective 
compliance by financial institutions.  
In terms of structure and content, the CBN Regulation contains 133 Regulations which are 
divided into thirteen parts and three schedules. Likewise, in terms of scope, the regulations 
cover the relevant provisions of the MLPA in key areas of the AML regime such as monitoring 
and filing of suspicious transaction reports, various reporting requirements and record keeping 
requirements et cetera.  
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5.6.1        CARDINAL PROVISIONS UNDER CBN REGULATION 2018 
Due to the extensive coverage of this regulation pertaining all aspects of AML in financial and 
DNFBP, it is infeasible because of space to examine all of its provisions. Instead, this section 
highlights the most salient regulations regarding obligatory steps and sanctions which must be 
taken by financial institutions to prevent money laundering especially from high risk customers 
such as PEPs. 
5.6.1.1   Suspicious Transaction Report: 
In Regulation 9 and 31 respectively, a financial institution shall identify and file suspicious 
transaction reports to the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit where funds or assets are 
suspected to have been derived from a list of predicate offences which includes corruption, 
participation in organised criminal group, illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances and other predicate offences under the MLPA 2012.742 The regulation states that 
financial institutions be alert to the various patterns of conduct that are known to be suggestive 
of money laundering, such as transactions involving a frequency which is unjustifiable, 
unreasonable or is inconsistent with the known pattern of the account or business 
relationship.743 
5.6.1.2         Verification of Beneficial ownership 
 The term beneficial owner is conventionally used in AML context to refer to the person who 
has an interest in or ultimate control over assets,744 and who tries to conceal this fact through 
the misuse of corporate vehicles. This definition was developed in the context of banks and 
other financial institutions dealing with prospective high-risk customers while having an 
obligation to establish the identity of their potential customer’s beneficial owner before 
carrying out any transaction on its behalf. As part of this thesis’s analysis of grand corruption 
cases involving PEPs in chapter four,745 the main type of legal structure used by corrupt PEPs 
to conceal their identities and beneficial ownership is the company, due to its ability of masking 
their identities. 
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 The MLPA in its section 3 vaguely requires financial institutions as part of their identification 
of customers to identify a customer whether natural or legal person.746 However, the regulation 
expands this measure in Regulation 15 by requiring financial institutions to understand the 
nature of customers business and its ownership structure.747 This is done by identifying and 
verifying the natural persons who have ultimate controlling interest in a legal person or identify 
and verify natural persons that exert control through ownership interest. Unlike the MLPA, 
such an improved focus on companies and beneficial ownership in the fight against money 
laundering is justifiable when one looks at the patterns of misuse. 
5.6.1.3       Enhanced due diligence 
In regulation 16, a financial institution shall perform EDD for higher risk customers, business 
relationship for PEPs, legal persons or arrangements that are personal assets-holding 
vehicles.748 Where PEPs have been identified, the regulation mandates them to obtain senior 
management approval before establishing business relationship and shall render monthly 
returns on all their transactions to the CBN and NFIU.749 They are also required to perform 
enhanced on going monitoring of the relationship with PEPs and in the event of any transaction 
which  is abnormal, shall flag the account and immediately make a STR to the NFIU. 
An important aspect of the EDD which was not taken into consideration in the MLPA but 
which the regulation rectifies is that financial institutions must take reasonable steps to 
establish source of wealth and source of funds of customers identified as PEPs.750 This is a 
crucial aspect in determining and making sure that funds which a PEP transacts with are not 
the proceeds of corruption. Banks are expected to utilise available means of verification such 
as asset declarations which is a legal requirement for public officials before assumption of 
office. This is to make sure that banks have reasonable knowledge of the assets and wealth of 
a PEP in order that they can make an informed decision regarding transactions in the course of 
their business relationship. 
5.6.1.4        Penalties for violating the Regulation 
The CBN exercises a supervisory role over banks and other financial institutions in order to 
determine whether there has been an infraction of any of the AML laws in Nigeria to determine 
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the seriousness and nature of the infractions, and to consider applicable sanctions. In this regard, 
to preclude any aberrations in banking activities and comply with extant AML laws, penalties 
have been imposed for violating the provisions of this regulation. Failure to comply attracts 
appropriate sanctions in accordance with the provisions of the MLPA.751 The MLPA in s15 
and 16 provides for fines or terms of imprisonment or both upon committing money laundering 
or aiding and abetting money laundering activities which ranging from not less than seven years 
but not more than fourteen years prison sentences. Additionally, financial institutions that 
contravenes the regulation shall be subjected to non-monetary and financial penalties and also 
sanctions by the CBN which comprises of revocation or suspension of its operating licence.752 
5.7 A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AML LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN 
DETECTING AND DISRUPTING THE PROCEEDS OF CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA 
In the light of this section’s intention to assess the impact of the legal frameworks on money 
laundering in order to test its effectiveness, it is desirable to understand the meaning of 
effectiveness of legislation. Effectiveness of legislation expresses the extent to which a law can 
achieve its purpose, and is considered the primary expression of legislative quality.753 The 
effectiveness test examines whether/how legislation has been applied and what its results have 
been. According to FATF, in the context of AML, effectiveness is the extent to which financial 
systems and economies mitigate the risk and threat of money laundering.754 This could be in 
relation to the intended result of a given law or implementation of specific set of AML measures 
to mitigate the risk of money laundering.755 
Furthermore, effectiveness can also be determined by examining the extent to which the law in 
practical terms successfully performs the functions it is designed for. This could be determined 
by: 
• The purpose of the legislation which sets the benchmark for what the legislation aims 
to achieve. 
• How the law will achieve its desired results 
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• The practical/real life results of legislation.756 
Therefore, if the law fails practically to achieve the purpose for which it was promulgated, the 
law becomes ineffective. The purpose of the promulgation of AML regimes in Nigeria is to 
help curtail the prevalence of money laundering by identifying and tracking the movement of 
funds deposited in or transmitted into or out of Nigeria, primarily, through financial institutions. 
In achieving this laudable objective, banks and other designated non-financial businesses and 
professions are mandated by law to properly identify persons conducting transactions with 
them, maintain records of transactions which serves as a paper trail for when the need arises, 
and more importantly, file reports such as suspicious transaction reports when they have 
knowledge or suspect money laundering.  
The pressing question is how banks have performed in the light of these obligations in Nigeria? 
For the purpose of assessing the effectiveness of Nigeria’s AML regime, this section focuses 
significantly on financial institutions (Banks), and their compliance with such laws in detecting, 
disrupting and deterring the prevalent use of their institutions by PEPs to launder the proceeds 
of their unlawful activity which is usually in the form of corruption. Evaluating the extent to 
which banks comply with the AML regime in Nigeria will potentially indicate the effectiveness 
or otherwise of the AML law in disrupting money laundering. To provide a preliminary insight 
into the effectiveness of Nigeria’s AML regime, Nigeria has frequently been designated a 
jurisdiction with strategic deficiencies in her AML regime partly because of large volumes of 
transactions involving proceeds of crime passing through its financial sector.757 The European 
Commission’s recent inclusion of Nigeria in its blacklisted countries is capable of supporting 
a conclusion about the ineffectiveness of Nigeria’s AML regime in disrupting the flow of the 
proceeds of crime.758 
From this thesis’s arguments in the preceding chapter, the AML regime when it works well is 
one of the greatest tools to combat grand corruption. The problem is the acts or omissions by 
others, usually banks which by negligence or recklessness impede the smooth running of an 
intrinsically good regime. This scenario is unfortunately the case with Nigerian banks. The 
prevalence of money laundering by corrupt PEPs can be attributed to the failure or inability of 
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banks to comply with AML measures,759 despite a raft of AML laws and regulations which 
require financial institutions to perform certain mandatory requirements.  
As we shall see, several banks in Nigeria have been implicated for aiding PEPs launder the 
proceeds of misappropriated public funds or omitted to implement AML measures to detect, 
uncover and thwart money laundering through their systems. Such failure or omission to 
implement these measures are offences that are punishable under MLPA 2012 and CBN 
Regulation 2018. According to the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money 
Laundering in West Africa, Nigerian banks involvement in money laundering has to be seen in 
the context of Nigeria’s description as one of the most corrupt countries in the world where 
pervasive corruption provides a free territory for money laundering.760 
5.8 THE IMPACT OF THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING REGIME IN NIGERIA AND THE 
EFFECTIVENESS QUESTION 
The need to disrupt the flow of the proceeds of crime generally gave rise to the promulgation 
of laws and regulatory activities relating to money laundering. 761  By disrupting money 
laundering, corrupt PEPs and criminals are prevented from enjoying their illicit wealth and 
cutting the source of financing further criminal activities. Understanding the impact and ability 
to measure the impact of the AML legal and regulatory regime against the prevalent scale of 
money laundering in Nigeria, especially by PEPs will enable the determination of the 
effectiveness of the law relating to money laundering. 
To effectively detect and disrupt money laundering, the overall efficiency of the practices 
through which the law is implemented is crucial. At this stage of the chapter, it will be apposite 
to effectively assess the effectiveness of the Nigerian AML legal framework through the lens 
of Professor Reuter and Truman’s two-pillar structure (prevention and enforcement) which 
essentially depicts the measures for detecting and disrupting illicit financial flows. 762 
According to Professor Reuter, the prevention pillar is designed to deter criminals from using 
financial institutions or gatekeepers (lawyers) to launder the proceeds of crime. In like manner, 
the enforcement pillar is designed to punish criminals including those who aid or facilitate 
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money laundering when they have facilitated the successful laundering of those proceeds 
despite the prevention efforts.763  
The prevention pillar consists of measures such as performing strict customer due diligence 
and reporting requirements such as filing suspicious transaction reports. On the other hand, 
the enforcement pillar consists of: investigations, punishment, sanctions and prosecution.764 
The significance of the components of these pillars is that CDD is intended to limit criminal 
access to financial institutions, reporting requirements alert authorities to activities that may 
involve attempts to launder proceeds of crime, while prosecutions and sanctions punish money 
launderers, gatekeepers and institutions that fail to implement the AML laws. 
Therefore, while the preventive pillar largely represents legal requirements and practices that 
are required to be established at first instance to disrupt corrupt PEPs or their associates from 
using financial institutions or professional intermediaries to launder proceeds of corruption, the 
enforcement pillar represents legal measures and practices that can be used to assist regulators 
or law enforcement to trace or track the launderers and those who might have facilitated the 
laundering for the purposes of prosecution, the confiscation and recovery of such illicit 
proceeds.765 
The prevention pillar in particular plays a significant role in disrupting money laundering 
because the pillar should serve as the obstacle to criminals intending to launder the proceeds 
of crime. Concerns as to the workability of the AML regime can be based on the effectiveness 
of the preventive measures in the AML legal framework. It is only when laundering has 
occurred or has been attempted that the enforcement pillar kicks in. The success of the 
enforcement pillar of the AML regime partly depends on the efficiency of the preventive pillar.  
As shown above, Nigeria has satisfactory laws and regulations that encompasses Professor 
Reuter’s two-pillar structure. However, the critical problem might be attributable to an 
ineffective implementation, enforcement and punishment regime; challenges that must be 
addressed in order to achieve desired objective of combating money laundering. While these 
challenges remain, the general view on Nigerian AML law is that the regime is ineffective.766 
One of the most compelling evidence to buttress this point comes from the EFCC chairman 
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who acknowledged that the AML regimes are not working as expected when he accused 10 
banks of aiding money laundering by PEPs.767 The next section makes use of some of the 
components of the two-pillar structure to access the effectiveness of Nigerian AML regime.   
5.8.1 HOW EFFECTIVE ARE SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORTING SYSTEMS IN NIGERIA? 
An indispensable element of the AML regime in Nigeria and around the world is the 
requirement that financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions 
file suspicious transaction reports with their respective financial intelligence units. Arguably, 
this is the most fundamental practical aspect of the role of financial institutions in the fight 
against money laundering.768 The law as already examined is explicit under the suspicious 
transaction system over the power it gives financial institutions. In addition to carrying out 
proper checks on the identity of their customers, banks are required to be watchful of suspicious 
activity, and to report suspicious activities that might involve money laundering to the 
authorities. 
According to scholars, there is little evidence that preventive measures have reduced money 
laundering. This is particularly true with respect to suspicious transactions reports where they 
have raised serious doubts as to whether they are actually effective in catching money 
launderers.769 Statistics collected in the course of investigations from NFIU suggest that few 
successful investigations are developed from suspicious transaction report. A plethora of 
investigations and prosecutions into the activities of PEPs strongly uncover the active 
involvement of banks in facilitating money laundering by corrupt PEPs.770 Given the vast sums 
of illicit financial flows from Nigeria, in order to follow the trail of corrupt PEPs, law 
enforcement require access to key financial information in the form of STRs, which is often 
not readily available from commercial banks in Nigeria.771 The pertinent question to ask is: If 
banks are compliant with the AML laws and regulations, why are vast sums of stolen public 
funds moving through the Nigerian banking system undetected and unreported?  
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With almost every case in the aftermath of investigations conducted by the EFCC, there has 
been a finding that if banks were proactive and vigilant in their compliance obligations of filing 
STR, some of the illicit financial flows from corrupt PEPs could have been averted.772 Instead, 
as will be seen from examples below, investigations reveal how corrupt PEPs use banking 
facilities to hold and/or transfer stolen public funds without banks filing STR which is 
mandatory by virtue of extant AML laws.  
These investigations continue to expose how Nigerian banks routinely failed or neglected to 
report transactions with PEPs which they should have deemed irregular or unusual and thus, 
should have been reported in disregard of their statutory obligations. At the heart of the problem 
is a tension between banks basic business model of taking deposits, processing transactions 
and making profit, and their legal and moral obligation to turn down and report funds they 
suspect to involve money laundering.773 This creates a major problem for banks. On the one 
hand, failure to report STR is an offence under AML laws in Nigeria.774 On the other hand, if 
they report suspicious transactions, they might lose wealthy clients who are usually PEPs in 
Nigeria.775 For law enforcement authorities, banks are considered to be a fundamental source 
of valuable information for detecting money laundering.  
Nonetheless, from the bank’s perspective, the main reason for their existence is to make as 
much profit as possible. Hence, their commercial interests are totally distinct from that of law 
enforcement authorities. This is very difficult for banks given their main purpose is profitability. 
Therefore, it is easy to an extent to appreciate their reluctance to embrace laws and regulations 
which require them to be vigilant and report suspicious transactions at their own extra expense. 
Regardless of profit making and having regard to the enormous financial crime in Nigeria 
especially with PEPs, the consequences of giving corrupt PEPs unfettered access into the 
financial system to launder the proceeds of corruption without filing STRs is huge. Money 
laundering by PEPs on the Nigerian state has resulted in dire consequences on majority of her 
citizens living in abject poverty. On this note, banks can be said to be part of the problem. 
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More frequently, several high-profile cases in Nigeria have put a spotlight on the banking 
sectors vulnerability to money laundering.  There is considerable support for the view that there 
is serious under reporting of suspicious transactions by banks in Nigeria. According to Jerry 
Ushaka, an interviewee attached to the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit, a government 
agency whose mandate includes the receipt and analysis of STRs from banks, the effectiveness 
of the Nigerian STR systems is questionable because of serious lack of compliance with the 
reporting of STR by financial institutions in Nigeria.776 During the interview, Jerry raised 
concerns that the potential benefit the STR system provides in fighting illicit financial flows in 
Nigeria go largely unrealised because of infractions and poor compliance with this preventive 
measure. He posited further that compliance responsibility placed on banks rarely yield any 
value in disrupting money laundering or in assisting law enforcement start investigations into 
potential cases of money laundering.  
Furthermore, the above has been giving credence by a former chairman of the EFCC who in a 
keynote address confirmed that several money laundering cases happen in Nigeria with the 
active connivance of banks and their employees.777 He stated further that Nigerian banking 
system is prone to abuse by corrupt elements as investigation reveal that several incidences of 
money laundering by PEPs occur with the active involvement of banks. It is rare to come across 
an investigation that was instigated by the reporting of STR. Most of the huge funds recovered 
by the EFCC from corrupt PEPs were transferred out of the country through officials of the 
banks and these activities were not brought to the attention of the EFCC or NFIU.778  
Rather, the EFCC unearthed various roles played by banks in the course of investigations 
originating from petitions by various groups which brought about the discovery of the active 
participation of banks in facilitating money laundering through outright disregard of reporting 
suspicious funds and transactions. 779  In other words, the ability and inability of banks to 
successfully fulfil their role in curbing money laundering has been a major discovery in a 
number of money laundering investigations. For instance, one of the most compelling evidence 
that confirms how banks abdicate or fail to discharge their mandatory obligation to report 
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suspect funds brings into focus the corruption and money laundering activities of Nigeria’s 
immediate past First Lady, Mrs Patience Jonathan.  
According to a charge filed by the EFCC against Mrs Jonathan, a PEP, based on its findings, 
the EFCC was able to establish a prima facie case against Mrs Jonathan for retaining the 
proceeds of corruption contrary to s15 and 17 of the MLPA 2012.780 The charge sheet claimed 
that the funds traced to Mrs Jonathan’s Skye Bank accounts totalling $22,353,076.71 were the 
proceeds of corruption.781 She is alleged to have opened various bank accounts in Nigeria using 
her name, fictitious names, and four shell corporations which were fraudulently incorporated 
and used to launder the proceeds of corruption.  It was revealed in this case that huge sums of 
money from suspicious sources hit the account of the Mrs Jonathan without the bank filing a 
STR to the authorities for investigation.  
In particular, revelations from investigations confirmed that Skye Bank employees whose 
names featured in this case were complicit by allowing these accounts to be used to launder 
huge sums without filing STR. At the point when these transactions were made, can it be said 
that Skye Bank reported the illicit transactions in a timely fashion to the appropriate authorities 
as required by s6 of the MLPA 2012 and the CBN Regulations 2018? If Skye Bank complied 
with the CDD and EDD requirements as examined, those accounts would not have been opened 
to begin with. Additionally, even where the accounts were opened, STR should have been filed 
and reported when huge funds which should have triggered suspicion began to be deposited 
into the accounts, especially from a high-risk customer. 
During my interview with Super-intendent Leonard Uzoma, an officer of the NFIU, he 
confirmed that one of the paramount reasons financial institutions fail to adhere to AML 
measure of filing STR when they suspect money laundering is because they are beneficiaries 
of laundered funds which helps keep them afloat.782 These laundered funds in essence make 
them appear profitable. Leonard confirmed that the difference between legal proceeds and 
proceeds of corruption is not based on their physical attributes but legal interpretation. 
Consequently, the proceeds of corruption are a good source of investment for banks.783  
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Next, in another trial involving a former Governor of Ekiti State who is standing trial alongside 
his company, Spotless Investment Limited on an 11-count charge bordering on money 
laundering to the tune of N2.2 billion naira. In the course of the trial, one of the prosecution 
witnesses, an official of Zenith Bank Nigeria, a bank used for money laundering; while being 
led in evidence narrated to the court how the bank received N1.2 billion naira from an aide of 
the Governor, Abiodun Agbele.784 On taking receipt of the money, the former Governor’s aide 
supplied bank accounts into which the money was to be lodged. The imperative question to ask 
from the court proceedings is that, after receiving such vast sums exceeding their statutory 
reporting threshold, why did Zenith Bank not report such huge figures to the authorities in the 
form of filing STR? 
According to Leonard, banks in Nigeria are not desirous of filing STRs and complying with 
other AML measures especially when it involves PEPs, for fear of driving a high net-worth 
customer to their competitors.785 They are more interested in protecting the secrecy of their 
high net worth customers who are usually PEPs than reporting to law enforcement agencies. 
Leonard alluded to the fact that of the existence some unethical practices carried out by banks, 
such as to scout for bank deposits from PEPs, and to provide advice to PEPs regarding 
smurfing/structuring of funds to evade reporting requirement created under AML laws. This 
practice gives room for the attraction of proceeds of corruption. Banks have built businesses 
around laundering money for government officials and high net-worth PEPs. It is instructive 
to note, that Lawrence Akande, a banker who also testified during the trial admitted that his 
bank solicited patronage from the former Governor. He told the court that ‘as a person of high 
network’ his bank sought patronage from him.786 
A number of other investigations that led to the prosecution of PEPs also indicated a number 
of banks in facilitating money laundering through non-compliance with reporting STR. For 
instance, Former Governor Joshua Dariye laundered illicit funds with the help of several 
Nigerian Banks who facilitated the movement of various sums which represented the proceeds 
of corruption without filing an STR.787 The role of Guarantee Trust Bank was also highlighted 
during the UK trial and conviction of James Ibori through which he laundered millions of 
pounds. In all these cases, the STR was not instrumental in stopping the movement of proceeds 
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of corruption, or in helping law enforcement initiate criminal proceedings against corrupt PEPs. 
Rather, majority of EFCC discoveries into the illicit financial flows of corrupt PEPs were done 
after receiving petitions from citizens.788 Despite banking laws designed to flag the movement 
of large sums of money by both private individuals and public officials, their families and close 
associates, Nigerian banks rarely help in disrupting money laundering but assist criminals to 
circumvent AML controls.789 
5.8.2         EVALUATION REPORTS ON STR SYSTEMS IN NIGERIA 
As shown above, the effectiveness of Nigerian STR system is questionable due to financial 
institutions non-compliance with AML laws. A further compelling evidence on the 
ineffectiveness of Nigeria’s banking institutions poor compliance regime is based on an 
assessment of Nigerian STR regime by FATF Mutual Evaluation Report.790 An important 
mandate of the FATF is the mutual evaluation report of its member jurisdiction. Generally, the 
analysis of evaluation report plays a significant role in triggering reforms necessary to bring a 
legal system in line with FATF standards and increase number of STRs filed. A mutual 
evaluation involves an examination of a jurisdiction’s institutional framework, AML laws and 
regulations.791 They also review the capacity, implementation and effectiveness of the AML 
systems to deter money laundering.   
A jurisdiction’s compliance is given a rating according to four levels namely: Compliant, 
Largely Compliant, Partially Complaint and Non-compliant. Unsurprisingly, the latest mutual 
evaluation report rated Nigerian compliance with CDD and STR as non-compliant. This rating 
was given to Nigeria by FATF due to serious questions as to the effectiveness of Nigerian STR 
systems because of lack of reports from financial institutions even in the face of illicit financial 
flows. 792  
According to a 2017 and 2019 CBN Economic Report, major infractions were observed in 
majority of commercial banks AML systems which fail to meet a number of compliance 
requirement specified by law. For instance, it was observed that in 2017, banks failed to 
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conduct STR even in situations which clearly qualified for such reports to be filed.793 The 2019 
Economic Report which conducted examinations of twenty seven commercial banks in Nigeria 
guided by the statutory provisions of the MLPA 2012 also found serious AML deficiencies 
during the examination, such as outright failure by banks to comply with the STR systems and 
lack of proper due diligence during PEPs on boarding process.794 This means that banks fail to 
take into consideration the fact that PEPs are high risk customers and ignore the law as 
examined above which requires, inter alia, senior management approval and having a degree 
of knowledge as to their source of wealth and source of funds.  
According to the NFIU, in as much as most commercial banks in Nigeria are not always 
compliant with filing these reports, the STR systems among banks in Nigeria are still riddled 
with weaknesses that contribute to its ineffectiveness. From its annual reports made available 
on the NFIU portal, non-reporting of reportable transactions, late submission of reports, under-
reporting of STRs, non-compliance with PEP reporting format all constitute notable 
weaknesses with the STR regime among commercial banks in Nigeria that gives rise to illicit 
financial flows passing through their systems. 795  From research and interviews, the 
effectiveness of the Nigerian STR regime is weak and ineffective given the low number of STR, 
especially in light of the size of illicit financial flows from Nigeria through financial institutions.  
To demonstrate, in 2015, the NFIU received from banks a total of 1,932 STRs. According to 
the NFIU, apart from the fact that most of the STRs filed by banks were substandard, none of 
these STR’s were PEP related.796 This is despite the fact that through subsequent investigations, 
vast sums of public funds were laundered out of Nigeria to foreign jurisdictions by PEPs 
through commercial banks in Nigeria in 2015. Similarly, in 2014, 2,180 STR’s were filed by 
commercial banks, none of this was PEP related.797 Likewise, in 2013, 1,064 STR’s filed with 
none relating to PEPs.798 In 2019, a total of 12,457 STR’s were filed by commercial banks in 
Nigeria, a significant increase from previous years, although majority were in relation to other 
                                                             
793 Central Bank of Nigeria,’ Economic Report for the First Half of 2019’ < 
https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2019/RSD/HALF%20YEAR%202019%20-%2017072019.pdf> accessed 3 February 
2020 
794 ibid 
795 Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit,’ Activity Report 2014’ < 
https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/images/Downloads/downloads/activity.pdf> accessed 4 March 2020 
796 Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit,’ Activity Report 2015’ < 
https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/images/Downloads/downloads/activityreport2015.pdf> accessed 4 March 2020 
797 Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit,’ Activity Report 2014’ < 
https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/images/Downloads/downloads/activity.pdf> accessed 4 March 2020 
798 Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit,’ 2013 Progress Report’ 




economic and financial crimes.799  This leads to the possible conclusion that the number of 
STRs, particularly those relating to PEPs does not seem to be consistently proportional to the 
amount of illicit financial flows taking place in Nigeria.  
The lack of action in terms of reporting PEP related STRs by banks leaves one to believe that 
there is great flexibility in terms of the way banks can choose to enforce AML measures. But 
this is not the case. The law is explicit that all suspicious transactions, particularly those relating 
to PEPs must be reported because of the damage these high-risk persons could cause.  
Therefore, the problem is not in the law per se, but in its implementation which has been poor. 
These failings are all intrinsically linked to the reason of ineffectiveness of AML laws in 
Nigeria. Few would disagree with the basic tenet that the STR system can be said to be effective 
if a sufficient proportion of the reports made as a result of extant legislation can be shown to 
contribute to positive law enforcement outcomes.800 The law in Nigeria requires banks to 
mandatorily file these reports, however, from the foregoing, banks do not comply with the laws, 
and STRs rarely leads to positive law enforcement outcomes. Therefore, no matter how cogent 
the AML laws are, the absence of a strong desire to adhere to the law especially by financial 
institutions is bound to have a nullifying effect on such laws. It is the absence of compliance 
that accounts for why funds are stolen and successfully laundered in the first place. 
5.9 ENFORCEMENT AND SANCTIONS RELATING TO MONEY LAUNDERING OFFENCES IN NIGERIA 
In line with Professor Reuter’s two pillar structure, enforcement, sanctions and prosecution are 
among the components of the enforcement pillar used to deter the facilitation of money 
laundering. In the context of this research, it also helps the thesis use these components as a 
yardstick to assess the effectiveness of the Nigerian AML legislation to ascertain if 
enforcement and sanctions regime serves as a deterrent for those who launder and facilitate 
money laundering. An assessment of prosecution, as part of the enforcement component in 
assessing Nigerian money laundering regime for PEPs comes later in this chapter.  
 By virtue of the MLPA 2012, several government institutions share the role of enforcing 
money laundering laws and regulations in Nigeria.801 These institutions/agencies also derive 
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their enforcement powers from their various enabling Acts creating them. They include the 
EFCC,802 NFIU,803 and the CBN.804 But the main institution mandated with enforcement of 
money laundering laws in Nigeria is the EFCC since they also possess prosecutorial powers 
for money laundering related offences unlike the NFIU and the CBN.  
Together, these institutions enforce the money laundering laws. Firstly, by having the mandate 
to receive and analyse critical financial information from banks in relation to STR’s and other 
AML measures. Secondly, they can demand, obtain and inspect the books and records of 
financial and designated non-financial businesses and professions to confirm compliance with 
the provisions of the Act. Lastly, they have the powers to sanction and prosecute anyone 
culpable of committing the offence of money laundering in Nigeria.805 Nevertheless, it is one 
thing for a law to be on the statute books, and it is another to enforce it.  Scholars are of the 
view that the failure of the AML legal framework in combating money laundering starts with 
the failure of the agencies responsible for enforcing the laws.806  Nasir also posit that the 
difficulty in entrenching an effective check on money laundering through banks hinges more 
on ineffective enforcement.807 
In view of the prevalence of illicit financial flows from Nigeria, one could be tempted to 
conclude that Nigeria has been incredibly apathetic regarding the enforcement of money 
laundering laws particularly against PEPs. From interviews conducted with officials of the 
EFCC and NFIU with the aim of eliciting and confirming certain facts, such as the prevalence 
of money laundering by public officials, the enforcement of money laundering laws has been 
poor. In the course of interviewing Chile Okoroma, a Director of Public Prosecutions attached 
to the EFCC, 808  he confirmed that there was an incessant upsurge in the rate of money 
laundering involving PEPs in Nigeria.  
According to Chile, although the precise scale is unknown given that money laundering is 
complex, clandestine and could involve several methods, investigations done by the 
commission over the years has helped shed light on the enormity of the problem. The reason 
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given was that most of the individuals who vie for elective offices are not moved by the desire 
to serve, but to have access to public funds and so you have a political atmosphere where more 
public officials engage in embezzling public funds and laundering same to foreign 
jurisdictions.809  
Furthermore, on the issue of enforcement of AML laws, the interviewee responded by stating 
that AML laws are being enforced but public officials still find ways to commit the offence. 
This is so because, due to the complex nature of money laundering, PEPs device several means 
of aiding them launder the proceeds of corruption, such as hiding their identities under 
corporate structures, as well as utilising the services of close associates and intermediaries such 
as senior lawyers to hide the proceeds of corruption. These enforcement challenges have been 
made worse by the fact that legal practitioners in Nigeria who often help PEPs launder proceeds 
of crime by virtue of their legal services are exempted from complying with the MPLA as a 
regulated sector who should also be filing certain reports when they suspect money laundering. 
These new techniques make it challenging for the commission to effectively enforce the law as 
it is extremely difficult to trail the ultimate beneficial owners of companies who possesses the 
same power of a natural person to transact with financial institutions.810 More importantly, 
confirming what this thesis discovered from research, Chile stated that one of their greatest 
obstacles or challenges faced in successfully enforcing the AML laws is banks complicity in 
assisting PEPs launder the proceeds of corruption and their lack of compliance with their 
statutory responsibilities. Most banks do not keep record of their transactions with PEPs or 
even refuse to share vital information in a timely manner to assist the commission prevent the 
illegal transfer of state resources. Without this information, law enforcement would not be in a 
position to act swiftly regarding transactions that are suspicious or that conceal money 
laundering activities. These culminates in the poor number of prosecutions and convictions for 
money laundering which does not seem to be proportional to the amount of illegal financial 
activity taking place among PEPs. In order to be successful in money laundering cases in court, 
evidence-based prosecution is needed and this vital evidence comes in the form of financial 
information from bank through the filing of STR’s.811 
 Disclosures by the interviewee revealed that other challenges which hampers enforcement has 
been the issue of insufficient funding, training and capacity of the commission to effectively 







discharge its mandate.812 This is the era of electronic information and technological innovation 
which provides PEPs and other criminals with new opportunities for money laundering. It also 
provides a novel means of combating the problem of financial crime. Evidence gathering 
through the use of social media affords law enforcement with a potential effective supplement 
to more labour intensive and time-consuming operations. It follows that Nigeria must develop 
capacity building, enhancing the skills of investigators through staff training and ensure that 
the commission has the technological ability to pursue cases of money laundering 
conclusively.813 Proper funding is needed for the investigation and prosecution of financial 
crime which is capital intensive and requires a considerable amount of resources. This is 
because the dynamics of money laundering requires law enforcement to be adequately 
equipped to be able to handle the complexities of money laundering activities.814 This affects 
enforcement as there is little incentive and operational funds available to fight money 
laundering. 
Asides these contributory factors that pose some challenges to the commission which hinders 
proper enforcement of the AML laws in Nigeria, other factors that also have significant effect 
on the enforcement of AML laws on PEPs in Nigeria includes: Lack of independence of the 
commission which arises from political interference from external forces, as well as the issue 
of selective prosecution. To find out, this thesis tried to elicit certain information from Precious 
Onyeneho, an investigating officer with the commission on the impact of political 
interreference on the enforcement of AML laws against PEPs. 815 
Precious stated that after conducting investigations linking certain PEPs to money laundering, 
charges are brought, however, in most cases, involving PEPs, the government through the 
Attorney General and Commissioner for Justice who is a political appointee discontinues cases 
of PEPs accused of money laundering and other crimes by issuing a nolle prosequi.816 
By the provision of s174 of the Nigerian Constitution, the Attorney General of the Federation 
(AGF) has the power to 
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a. Institute and undertake criminal proceedings against any person before any court in 
Nigeria 
b. To take over and discontinue any such proceeding that may have been instituted by any 
authority 
c. To discontinue at any stage before judgment is delivered any such proceedings which 
may have been instituted by any person or authority.817 
In exercising this power, the AGF is required to have regard to the public interest, the interest 
of justice and the prevention of the abuse of the legal process.818 The courts have held that the 
powers of the AGF as entrenched in the Constitution is absolute and not subject to review by 
a court of law.819 This wide discretion has often been abused on several occasions. Although 
the interviewee did not give out names, a recent example brings to fore how these wide powers 
has been utilised to discontinue money laundering cases against PEPs. For instance, in the trial 
of a former Governor of Gombe Sate who the commission in exercising its prosecutorial 
powers preferred a 21-count charge of misappropriation and laundering of N25billion (naira) 
while in office as Governor.820 
After years of prosecution, the commission suddenly withdrew from the trial in June 2019 to 
allow the AGF take over and discontinue the case without explanation. It is believed that the 
discontinuation of the trial was politically motivated. In exercising such powers, the AGF is 
required to have due regard to the public interest, the interest of justice and to prevent abuse of 
legal process.821 Discontinuing the trial of a PEP accused of stealing such vast sums of public 
funds does seem to be done in the public interest, nor in the interest of justice. Rather, it 
frustrates the enforcement of AML law against PEPs.  
Additionally, there are also circumstances where existing law inhibit proper enforcement of 
AML laws against PEPs in Nigeria. This has been touched upon in a general context in chapter 
two and three,822 involving the immunity granted to most public officials from prosecution 
during their tenure in office. On this, the thesis through interviews sought the views of Precious 
who confirmed that immunity granted to most public officials frustrates the commission’s 
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efforts to combat money laundering, the same individuals who indulge in corruption related 
money laundering in Nigeria. On various occasions, the commission could have credible 
intelligence on incumbent Governors who launder the proceeds of corruption. However, 
although investigations could be carried out, charges could not be brought because of the 
immunity granted to the holders of such office. At the point of exiting power and losing 
immunity, it becomes much difficult to enforce such laws on them as evidence could be lost 
and witnesses become unavailable.  
This thesis agrees with dissenting voices who stand opposed to immunity clause under the 
Nigerian Constitution, because it has often been manipulated to promote injustice, impunity 
and corruption. Immunity helps corrupt PEPs by over protecting them from prosecution even 
in the face of committing corruption and money laundering offences with public funds while 
in office. This is contrary to the legal framework of AML legislations. This thesis submits that 
until these challenges are addressed, the enforcement of the laws on AML especially against 
PEPs is not likely to thrive; and in the grand scheme of things, the fight against money 
laundering is unlikely to succeed. Based on the foregoing, the AML enforcement in Nigeria 
has proven to be weak and ineffective. 
5.9.1   Sanctions: 
As money laundering becomes more complex and sophisticated, financial institutions are 
increasingly faced, first, with the risk associated with money laundering, second, the need to 
comply with AML laws and ultimately, with the risk of becoming sanctioned as a result of 
participating, or unintentional facilitation of money laundering.823 While some banks will be 
willing to comply with the AML laws, others will not for various reasons, leaving a window 
for money launderers to operate. In view of this, there is the need for regulators and law 
enforcement to act against erring banks. In the past few years, fines and settlements have been 
paid out by a number of global banks for breaching AML rules and allowing their institutions 
to be used for money laundering. For instance, FinCEN imposed a fine of twenty-five million 
dollars, the largest penalty ever brought against a US financial institution for wilful violations 
of the AML programme and suspicious activity reporting requirement. Riggs allowed several 
transactions involving several corrupt governments to go through in total disregard for its AML 
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obligation.824 Likewise, the Financial Conduct Authority, fined Guarantee Trust Bank (UK), a 
subsidiary of a Nigerian bank five hundred and twenty-five thousand pounds for failings in its 
AML controls and its handling of the proceeds of crime.825 
The FATF recommends under Recommendation 35 that countries should ensure that there is a 
range of effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, whether criminal, civil or 
administrative, available to deal with natural or legal persons that fail to comply with AML 
requirements. Sanctions should be applicable not only to financial institutions, but also to their 
directors and senior management.826 By virtue of s6(9) MLPA 2012, financial institutions who 
fail to file STRs when they suspect money laundering are liable on conviction to a fine of one 
million naira for each day during which the offence continues.827 As seen from examples 
provided, the banking industry in Nigeria has somewhat proved to be inherently complicit in 
facilitating money laundering among PEPs in Nigeria, thus, necessitating deterrent action.  
With the prevalent nature of vast illicit financial flows aided by financial institutions in Nigeria, 
there is the contention that the sanctions and punishment regime as created by law has not been 
stringent enough to serve as a deterrent against financial institutions who fail to comply with 
AML rules by allowing their institutions to be used to launder the proceeds of corruption. There 
is literature to the effect that sanctions will succeed as deterrence if the outcome of such 
sanctions outweigh the benefits derivable from non-compliance.828  In Nigeria, the benefits of 
violation seemingly outweighs the cost or fine for non-compliance. Most banks do not see any 
commercially justifiable reasons to comply with the AML laws in Nigeria. The penalties and 
sanctions regimes even seem to be incentives for violation of anti-money laundering laws in 
Nigeria. 
In accordance with the MLPA, banks are simply asked to pay a fine one million naira (roughly 
two thousand three hundred pounds) for each day during which the offence continues compared 
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to what they stand to gain from facilitating or aiding corrupt PEPs launder millions of dollars. 
The case of Mrs Jonathan illustrates this point as it is unlikely that the sanctions regime as 
provided by the MLPA will serve as a deterrent from helping her launder over twenty-two 
million dollars.  In any event, the usual occurrence is that, rather than prosecuting and 
sanctioning the enablers of money laundering, very often law enforcement and the prosecution 
prefer having them as witnesses in various money laundering cases before the courts as seen in 
the cases assessed above.  
It must be remembered that based on FATF recommendations, countries are to ensure that they 
have effective and dissuasive sanctions for natural and legal persons who fail to comply with 
AML laws. Flowing from this, and having regard to the Nigerian sanction’s regime and 
international best practices, it is this thesis submission that the Nigerian sanctions regime for 
non-compliance is tenuous. The sanctions provided by law do not fit the level of damage which 
could be caused by aiding PEPs launder public funds. 
Juxtaposing the sanctions provision of the MLPA with that of other jurisdictions which could 
serve as models for the enforcement and punishment of money laundering, it shows that the 
MLPA’s sanction is too lenient and does not serve as a deterrent to banks and their officers 
who help corrupt PEPs launder the proceeds of corruption. For instance, in the United Kingdom, 
under the Proceeds of Crime Act, those in the regulated sector such as banks who are guilty of 
not filing STR or who do not make the required authorised disclosure to enforcement and 
regulatory authorities as soon as practicable when they suspect money laundering are liable on 
summary conviction for a term not exceeding 6 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory 
maximum or to both,829 and on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding five years or to a fine or both.830 This seems a more dissuasive sanction in terms of 
deterrence for officers of banks engaging in money laundering than that provided by the MLPA. 
The unsatisfactory money laundering controls are still rife among Nigerian banks, which 
suggest that sanctions are not having the desired effect.  
It is this thesis position, that while prosecuting those suspected of stealing public funds is 
necessary, law enforcement should also focus more attention on the enablers of money 
laundering. PEPs cannot do it alone, they are often assisted by institutions or intermediaries to 
circumvent AML control mechanisms. It is the officers of the banks that enable those in power 
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to continue to steal and divert public funds to the detriment of Nigerians who cannot afford 
such diversion of public funds to private pockets. Therefore, due to the frequent involvement 
of officers of financial institutions in Nigeria in facilitating money laundering of PEPs, it is 
apposite that the MLPA be amended to include more stringent punishments that fits the crime, 
such as up to a year in prison on summary conviction; and on conviction on indictment, such 
officer be imprisoned for a term of not less than seven years but not more than fourteen years 
imprisonment. This would send a strong message that officers of such banks would face the 
same culpability as a corrupt PEPs seeking to launder public funds. Therefore, adequate and 
stringent sanctions for non-compliance with money laundering standards is essential in the 
establishment of efficient reporting of money laundering activities in Nigeria. 
5.9.2 PROSECUTION OF PEPS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS UNDER THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM IN NIGERIA 
Another critical component of the AML regime which could be used in assessing the overall 
effectiveness in terms of success or failure of the law in Nigeria is in the area of prosecutions 
and convictions of PEPs charged with corruption related money laundering offences in Nigeria. 
Not only has the enforcement and sanctions regime been poor, the prosecution and conviction 
of PEPs charged with money laundering and other related offenses has been significantly low 
compared to the high number of illicit financial flows by PEPs in Nigeria. 
There appears to be a consensus on the fact that the pursuit of effective enforcement of laws 
on money laundering and the punishment of offenders who commit the offence of money 
laundering remains one of the best weapons for deterrence.831  At the same time, several 
international legal instruments on money laundering supports facilitating the investigation, 
criminalisation and prosecution of money laundering offences. 832  This emphasis perhaps 
reflects the popular view that the most effective way of combating money laundering is the use 
of the criminal law.833 In the context of AML, the main role of the criminal law in combating 
money laundering is to prosecute offenders, as well as the confiscation and forfeiture of 
criminal assets if found guilty. 
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Yet, in practice, the number of successful prosecutions and convictions of corrupt PEPs 
charged with money laundering offences using the criminal law in Nigeria is reportedly low, 
and does not seem to be proportional to the huge number of PEPs alleged by law enforcement 
institutions to have stolen public funds and laundered same through complicit financial 
institutions. To successfully prosecute those who indulge in criminal diversion of public funds 
and money laundering, it is essential to have an efficient and robust criminal justice system for 
the administration of justice. This is regarded by many as fundamental because the 
investigation of crime, arrest of alleged offenders, their trial and punishment occur within the 
sphere of the criminal justice system.834 
One of the themes that emerged from interviews with law enforcement personnel involved in 
the investigation and prosecution of money laundering, was the view that there are significant 
challenges associated with prosecuting PEPs for money laundering under the Nigerian criminal 
justice system. These challenges include delays in the dispensation of justice, manipulation of 
the judicial process by defence lawyers and lack of trained judicial officers in handling money 
laundering and financial crime related matters.835 These challenges hamper and frustrate the 
prosecution of PEPs for money laundering offences in Nigeria. 
Furthermore, delays have reportedly become an attribute of the Nigerian criminal justice 
system that has perverted the course of justice in prosecution of PEPs for money laundering 
offences.836  Money laundering cases involving PEPs linger for such a long time that the 
purpose of achieving deterrence and recovering laundered public funds is lost as cases drag on 
indefinitely, while PEPs facing serious charges are left to use the proceeds of such crime to 
frustrate the judicial process.837 
It is usually an onerous task to successfully prosecute PEPs because of the deliberate 
obstruction of the court process by defence lawyers representing PEPs who rely on delay tactics 
to either truncate the trial process or completely undermine it. Legal strategies such as the filing 
of frivolous applications, applying for questionable injunctions are all sought by defence 
lawyers who do not plan to provide defence on the merit of the case, but on technicalities and 
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other techniques to delay trial.838 It is not unusual in Nigeria for corrupt PEPs to suddenly 
develop significant physical or mental health problems that frustrates the trial of their case. 
Preliminary objections are usually employed to delay trials. 839  This is so because with 
preliminary objections, once raised, should be determined first before the courts can take 
further steps in the proceedings. Very often, the ruling on that issue takes anywhere from six 
months to a year after the commencement of the main action. If overruled, the appeal process 
may take years before the issue is resolved.  
The practice of manipulating the legal system to truncate the trial of PEPs was condemned by 
the Supreme Court in Joshua Dariye v FRN.840 In this case, the appellant who was charged 
with laundering N1.2 billion naira while he was Governor of Plateau State filed a preliminary 
objection against the jurisdiction of the trial court. Although the application was dismissed by 
both the trial court and Court of Appeal, the trial was stalled for 8years because of further 
appeals to the Supreme Court. In dismissing the appeal at the Supreme Court, the court 
condemned the delay tactics as an unfortunate practice in the fight against financial crime in 
Nigeria. 
 These loopholes in the law and procedure has enabled defence lawyers to become masters in 
dilatory tactics making it difficult to reach closure of any kind in many money laundering cases. 
Judicial officers have on various occasions, allowed lawyers use these obstacles which weigh 
favourably for PEPs in money laundering prosecutions.841 Judges have granted applications 
restraining law enforcement from investigating and prosecuting PEPs for money laundering.842 
There have been scores of former Governors, Ministers and other PEPs whose money 
laundering trials have stalled in different courts across Nigeria and dragged on for years with 
little or no progress made. 
For instance, Former Governor Saminu Turaki of Jigawa State has been standing trial for more 
than 10 years. He is being charged on a 32-count charge bordering on corruption related money 
laundering of N36 billion public funds.843 Former Governor Gbenga Daniels of Ogun State,844 
and Chimaroke Nnamani of Enugu State have been standing trial for misappropriation of public 
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funds and money laundering offences for more than 10 years.845 Governor Danjuma Goje was 
being prosecuted for corrupt practices and money laundering offences before his case was 
discontinued abruptly by the incumbent Attorney General Abubakar Malami. 846  Former 
Governor Alao-Akala of Oyo has been standing trial for more than 10 years on charges which 
border on corrupt enrichment and money laundering of N11.5 billion while in office.847  
Former Governor Rasheed Ladoja of Oyo State is facing trial for alleged misappropriation of 
funds and laundering the sum of N4.7 billion while in office.848 Late Former Governor of 
Nasarawa State, Aliyu Akwe Dome was standing trial on a 10-count charge preferred against 
him for laundering N8 billion state funds before he became deceased.849 It is instructive to note 
that these cases which commenced more than a decade ago have not been concluded due to 
interlocutory appeals filed to Supreme Court arising from the trials. A host of others PEPs 
which could not be included for space have been standing trial for money laundering and other 
related matters without any progress.850 
In reality, it was anticipated that the introduction of the MLPA 2012 as examined earlier would 
lead to a greater number of successful prosecutions of PEPs involved in money laundering 
offences because of its improved provisions for prosecuting money laundering offences. This 
is also complemented by the EFCC Act which empowers judges to give money laundering 
cases accelerated hearing and to adopt measures to avoid unnecessary delays.851 In addition, 
the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 which is intended to fast track criminal trials 
by prohibiting delay tactics are all statutory legislations that should enable speedy trials and 
dispensation of justice in corruption related money laundering cases.852 
Despite these provisions, it takes years for cases to be successfully prosecuted and this has led 
to significantly low conviction rates in cases involving PEPs. That said, there has been some 
high-profile PEPs convicted for money laundering. In terms of numbers, the sum total of 
convicted PEPs on corruption and money laundering charges is underwhelming. Since the 
promulgation of the MLPA 2012, only 5 high profile cases have been successfully concluded 
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out of over 100 PEPs arraigned for money laundering and related offences;853  with just 3 
convictions secured in 13 years despite widespread cases of PEPs engaging in money 
laundering.  
They include the convictions of former Governor of Abia State, Orji Uzor Kalu and his 
companies who were convicted in December 2019 and sentenced to 12years imprisonment  
after 12 years of trial for criminal diversion of public funds and money laundering.854 However, 
the Supreme Court of Nigeria in a unanimous judgment on May 8, 2020, overturned the 
judgment of a Federal High Court which had earlier convicted the former Governor on the 
ground that, Justice Mohammed Idris, who delivered the judgment was already sworn in as a 
Justice of the Court of Appeal at the time of the judgment and could not act in the capacity as 
a High Court judge.855 The Supreme Court directed the case to be reassigned for trial de-novo. 
Also, former Governor of Plateau State, Joshua Dariye, was convicted and sentenced to 10years 
in prison for misappropriation of nine million dollars of public funds and money laundering.856 
In the same vein, former Governor of Taraba State, Jolly Nyame was convicted after being 
found guilty of criminal diversion of public funds and money laundering.857 The other two 
cases involving ex-Governors were ended after the EFCC entered a plea bargain with the 
defendants.858  
The other high-profile conviction of a Nigerian PEP occurred in a foreign jurisdiction. This 
was the case of former Governor of Delta state, James Ibori, who was convicted and sentenced 
to 13 years in prison after pleading guilty to ten counts of money laundering to the tune of two 
hundred and fifty million pounds at London’s Southwark Crown Court.859 In light of the 
assessment of prosecutions of PEPs brought under the MLPA 2012 and other relevant 
legislations prohibiting corrupt practices, this thesis takes the view that the legal frameworks 
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have proved to be inadequate and ineffective in deterring PEPs from committing corruption 
related money laundering offences in Nigeria.  
5.10 IS THE CRIMINAL LAW SUFFICIENT IN THE PROSEUCTION OF CORRUPT PEPS IN NIGERIA? 
Crucially, this thesis takes the stand that the challenges in the prosecution of PEPs in Nigeria 
calls into question the propriety of utilising the conventional criminal law as the main tool to 
combat money laundering as currently practiced in Nigeria. Firstly, money laundering by its 
very nature is difficult to prove beyond reasonable doubt due to its complexities.  As 
demonstrated in previous chapters, the complex nature of money laundering and the 
sophisticated techniques and strategies employed by PEPs to obscure the proceeds of 
corruption results in cases that are extremely complex and difficult to investigate and prosecute.  
As seen in Udeogu v FRN earlier discussed, proving money laundering is a herculean task as 
the prosecution is required to prove a predicate offence before the money laundering aspect 
can be established. In other words, its criminality derives from a predicate crime which has 
already taken place prior to the incidence of the money laundering crime being detected.  In 
proving the money laundering offence in Nigeria, the prosecution must prove that the accused 
converted or transferred money or property; that the conversion was done with the aim of 
concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the funds, and that the funds or property which was 
the subject of the transaction was as a matter of fact the proceeds of crime or unlawful 
activity.860  
Prosecutors would have to consider the challenges in establishing specific elements of both a 
predicate offence (such as criminal diversion of public funds) and the money laundering 
offence to the required standard of proof. It must be remembered that money laundering cases 
require thorough investigation in order to obtain credible evidence. This is usually obtained 
from financial institutions as proof of evidence in a money laundering trial. Apart from the fact 
that banks in Nigeria seldom comply with the law by providing timely information to law 
enforcement, the investigative machinery and capacity of law enforcement agencies in Nigeria 
is not robust enough to conduct proper investigations to detect highly sophisticated methods 
employed by PEPs in concealing and laundering the proceeds of corruption. Also, as elicited 
from interviews, the investigation of money laundering cases raises funding issues for law 
enforcement in Nigeria. 
                                                             




Secondly, the likelihood of conviction has to be considered. By virtue of the conviction-based 
forfeiture practiced in Nigeria, a conviction must be secured prior to triggering confiscation or 
forfeiture orders.861  This means that if a PEP gets convicted, the criminal assets are forfeited 
to the Federal Government of Nigeria. On the other hand, if not convicted, the assets revert 
back to the PEP.862 However, the fact that a PEP escapes conviction does not necessarily mean 
that there was no prima facie evidence to secure a conviction. But the nature and challenges 
inherent in the Nigeria’s criminal justice system makes it extremely difficult to obtain 
convictions in majority of cases involving high net-worth PEPs charged with money laundering 
offences.  
Convictions are often difficult to secure as money laundering cases involving high net-worth 
PEPs tend to take so much time, and have often carried a very low prospect of conviction. In 
this respect, a corrupt PEP may benefit from the lengthy delays in the dispensation of justice, 
which could lead to possible dissipation of assets. Therefore, an accused PEP found guilty of 
stealing and laundering public funds may escape conviction; and much of the deterrent effect 
that the perceived likelihood of prosecution might provide could be lost and the proceeds of 
corruption retained to the detriment of Nigerians. 
Although technicalities should not be an obstacle in achieving justice in corruption related 
money laundering cases or any other case, clinging onto the conventional criminal prosecutions 
is no longer feasible in combating corruption related money laundering in Nigeria. There is the 
problem of evidence gathering. Without evidence, law enforcement would find it challenging 
to prosecute PEPs even in the obvious cases of corrupt enrichment and laundering of proceeds 
of corruption. Presumption of innocence and standard of proof are all principles that confer 
undue protection to corrupt PEPs and expose the administration of criminal justice to 
manipulation in Nigeria.   
For the reasons advanced, and to address these weaknesses which would help enhance and 
reinforce the current legal framework in the disruption of money laundering especially among 
PEPs in Nigeria, this thesis advocates for the introduction of the Unexplained Wealth Order 
(UWO) in Nigeria. The UWO is considered a more focused and robust legal framework 
underpinned by civil law administration which is in line with civil based forfeiture regimes. 
Under this regime, concentration of effort is expended on confiscating the proceeds of 
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corruption or confiscating and forfeiting assets acquired with the proceeds of corruption; as 
opposed to arraigning offenders and waiting for years to secure a conviction which is often 
elusive. This can be a more persuasive and pragmatic approach in solving the ubiquitous nature 
of money laundering by PEPs in Nigeria.   
Confiscation and forfeiture orders are the primary means through which criminals maybe 
deprived of the proceeds of crime. The eventual goal being to deprive them of the use of such 
assets and to disrupt and deter further criminal activity.863 The ultimate aim of corrupt PEPs 
and money launderers is the enjoyment of ill-gotten funds or assets. It is not uncommon in 
Nigeria to see PEPs and other public officials owning assets that are way beyond their known 
legitimate earnings. The surfacing of unexplained wealth raises the suspicion as to the 
legitimacy of the sources of such wealth.864 
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5.11                                  CONCLUSION 
To sum up, the crux of this chapter, ab initio, has been to examine and assess the effectiveness 
of the Nigerian AML legal and institutional framework in detecting and deterring money 
laundering by PEPs in Nigeria. In seeking to combat money laundering, Nigeria enacted AML 
laws modelled on a series of international standards. The chapter examined Nigeria’s AML 
legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks and finds that they are satisfactory when tested 
with international standards from FATF and other international legal instruments. This is 
because they have satisfactory provisions for the prohibition of the laundering of the proceeds 
of crime, as well as highlighting the obligations of financial institutions and designated non-
financial institutions in preventing money laundering.   
However, the chapter also finds that Nigeria suffers from profound difficulties in 
implementation and enforcement of its AML regime. Generally speaking, a successful AML 
regime should result in the relentless disruption of money laundering activities, reveal 
illegitimate sources of funds, trigger investigations and possible prosecution and recovery of 
assets from those responsible for the misappropriation and conversion of public funds. It would 
equally dissuade those seeking to undertake money laundering activities from doing so. But 
the continued prevalence of money laundering, especially by PEPs exemplifies the weakness 
and lack of enforcement of AML laws in Nigeria. 
Although a considerable number of AML scholars contest the effectiveness of the Nigerian 
AML regime, the strength of this research was in its utilisation of interviews with stakeholders 
of the AML industry in Nigeria, notably, the EFCC and NFIU. The research was key in 
confirming some gaps in the enforcement and implementation of AML laws in Nigeria with 
respect to PEPs. After a careful examination of these laws, the chapter progressed by 
attempting to determine the effectiveness of the extant AML regime in detecting and deterring 
the laundering of the proceeds of corruption.  
The chapter focused on financial institutions (banks) because they are used frequently by 
corrupt PEPs when introducing the proceeds of corruption to be laundered. Financial 
institutions act as the first line of contact or defence in facilitating or disrupting money 
laundering through several measures as promulgated under extant AML laws in Nigeria. But 
the findings of this thesis are that the involvement of banks in money laundering activities of 
PEPs in Nigeria and their non-compliance with AML laws are largely part of the reasons for 




financial institutions failure to maintain effective compliance in the form of filing timely STR’s 
which notifies law enforcement of potential money laundering activities.  
The ability to detect and report suspicious transaction reports which is arguably the most 
fundamental requirements in the AML regime has been poor in Nigeria. Usually, the moment 
huge and suspicious large cash transactions are positively detected, especially when they 
involve high risk customers like PEPs, it should be reported mandatorily. The chapter was able 
to show that banks do not report huge transactions conducted by PEPs through their institutions 
to law enforcement for expedient resolution. This failure in credible reporting by the banks 
have been a major pitfall for AML regime in Nigeria. Yet, the sanctions and punishment regime 
as created by law for failing to comply has not been stringent or dissuasive enough to serve as 
a deterrent against banks who facilitate the commission of money laundering offences. The 
benefit of violation seemingly outweighs the benefit derivable from non-compliance. 
Furthermore, the analysis of expert interviews together with research from the literature 
conducted for this research work revealed some weaknesses and challenges militating against 
proper enforcement and implementation of AML laws in Nigeria. This was conformed and 
attributed to a diverse number of contributing factors such as weak law enforcement institutions, 
an ineffective criminal justice system, and lack of a comprehensive legal framework. 
Additionally, the chapter revealed that there are circumstances where existing law inhibit the 
effectiveness of prosecutions by law enforcement, such as the power of the AGF, a government 
appointee to discontinue money laundering cases, as well as the immunity from prosecution 
granted to most public officials in Nigeria. 
Successful prosecution of PEPs and their subsequent inability to return to public office, 
followed by confiscation and forfeiture of assets acquired with the proceeds of crime is a 
plausible option. However, in practice there are challenges associated with prosecuting PEPs 
under the criminal justice system in Nigeria. These challenges were discussed and includes 
delays in the dispensation of justice, especially in high profile cases and the manipulation of 
the judicial process by defence lawyers. These challenges hamper and frustrate the successful 
prosecution of PEPs for money laundering offences and the recovery of the proceeds of 
corruption. PEPs are individuals who have the resources to drag cases indefinitely and 
perpetually. 
All things considered, the chapter finds that the legal frameworks and indeed the criminal law 




Nigeria. An assessment of the effectiveness of these frameworks targeting PEPs in Nigeria 
causes this thesis to conclude that the AML legal frameworks in Nigeria are ineffective and 
does not in any significant way deter potentially corrupt PEPs from engaging in corrupt 
practices. The thesis in the next chapter proposes a different approach to asset recovery built 
around civil law which complements and increase the effectiveness of existing AML regime 
built around the criminal law in Nigeria. 
 Preventing money laundering by engaging in serious and effective asset recovery regime 
which does not require a criminal conviction before assets are recovered from PEPs would be 
an effective response to the prevalence of corruption related money laundering by PEPs. In 
civil regimes, a PEP suspected of acquiring assets or retaining the proceeds of corruption must 
prove, on the civil standard of proof that such property was not obtained with the proceeds of 
corruption.   
Grand corruption may constitute a significant proportion of the resources of states. The 
resources stolen by public funds are ultimately used to acquire assets such as real estate and 
other valuable assets. Recovering such criminal assets which is above the known legitimate 
income of a PEP suspected to have stolen public funds would be an effective approach in 
combating corruption related money laundering in Nigeria; because it makes it difficult for 
PEPs to profit from the proceeds of corruption. The adoption of this approach in Nigeria will 
invariably improve the recovery of the proceeds of corruption which can help spur development 













                                         CHAPTER SIX 
TOWARDS A NEW LEGAL MODEL IN THE FIGHT AGAINST GRAND 
CORRUPTION AND MONEY LAUNDERING IN NIGERIA 
  6.1                                INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter has extensively evaluated and assessed the effectiveness of various AML 
legislations targeting corrupt PEPs in Nigeria. The chapter concluded by affirming that AML 
legal frameworks in Nigeria are ineffective and does not in any significant way deter corrupt 
PEPs from engaging in corrupt practices and money laundering activities. This conclusion, 
however, does not mean that every aspect of the AML laws as they are today in Nigeria are not 
working and therefore the AML regime should be abandoned altogether. Rather, this chapter 
argues for a paradigm shift in approach to corruption related money laundering offences, 
transitioning from a reactive conviction-based asset confiscation to a proactive non-conviction 
based civil forfeiture regimes. It is pertinent to state that the arguments in the course of this 
chapter does not intend to decriminalise money laundering, or delegitimise any of the extant 
conviction based legislative provisions. In practice, a combination of criminal sanctions and 
civil remedies is often the most effective strategy for seeking to recover the proceeds of 
crime.865 
This chapter presents legal frameworks that could help reinforce the law and practice relating 
to financial crime in Nigeria. The colossal scale of grand corruption and money laundering 
perpetuated in Nigeria by PEPs has continuously created a huge governance deficit that has in 
turn, created negative consequences which have worsened the socio-economic and political 
situation in Nigeria.866 These thefts divert valuable public resources from addressing abject 
poverty and fragile infrastructure present in Nigeria. Consequently, Nigeria is plagued with the 
risk, threats and damage resulting from the misappropriation and laundering of public funds by 
corrupt PEPs. These risks have long been an inherent challenge in Nigeria’s political system, 
thereby affecting the nation in an adverse manner.867  
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To put that into context, it is not unusual to see individuals who enter public service from 
humble beginnings emerge tremendously wealthy within a short period of time as a result of 
misappropriation of public funds. The prevalence of these acts perpetuated by public officials 
in Nigeria has attracted significant local and international attention due to the fact that these 
acts have led to a developmental problem of the greatest magnitude in Nigeria. Nigeria 
currently experiences difficulties in implementing effective AML regimes. From research 
conducted in this thesis, Nigeria is presently shackled by inadequate and outdated legislations. 
In this regard, a significant factor undermining the effectiveness of AML regimes in Nigeria is 
the difficulty in prosecuting corruption and money laundering offences.  
The approaches reflected in the extant statutory provisions have enabled corrupt PEPs to retain 
illicitly acquired wealth and have left law enforcement in Nigeria with restricted capacity to 
locate or confiscate the proceeds of corruption. Public funds continue to get stolen at a much 
faster pace than it is being recovered. At present, little can be done to act swiftly on highly 
suspicious wealth of PEPs and other criminals in Nigeria unless there is a legal conviction for 
a predicate offence. This system has produced a mere trickle of results against a torrent of 
corrupt funds being stolen and laundered by Nigerian PEPs. The extant legislation in place 
require a person to be prosecuted and convicted to justify the confiscation or forfeiture of the 
proceeds of corruption.868 
However, the conventional criminal law approach of prosecutions and conviction-based asset 
recovery have proved to be inadequate in tackling corruption and money laundering in Nigeria. 
This is so because of the challenges posed by evidential burden of proof, delay tactics by 
defence lawyers and other legal technicalities that have hindered proper prosecution and 
conviction of PEPs engaged in unlawful acts. Criminal cases involving corrupt public officials 
dwell more in the realms of technicality than that which seeks to achieve substantial justice.  
Fundamentally, the true limits of the traditional conviction-based confiscation arise from 
various factors, among which are the difficulty to first secure the criminal conviction of an 
identified person, then the necessity to prove the nexus between the property subject to 
confiscation and the offence the defendant was convicted for.869 In other words, successful 
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prosecutions of money laundering offences require proof that the laundered funds were the 
proceeds of crime.  
But, as Murray posits, money laundering is clandestine in nature as it is usually organised in a 
manner which ensures no direct links between the predicate offence and the laundered money, 
thus, making it extremely challenging to meet the high standard of proof required in criminal 
proceedings. 870  Moreover, the challenges faced by law enforcement in Nigeria when 
investigating these offences such as lack of human, technical, and material resources have 
considerably affected proper investigations needed to prove money laundering offences in 
Nigeria. It is therefore perturbing that PEPs continue to acquire assets far above their legitimate 
income emboldened by the deficiencies in the Nigerian criminal justice system. 871 
All things considered, the ease and speed with which public funds are misappropriated and 
laundered from Nigeria to other foreign jurisdictions necessitates a paradigm shift from the 
criminal law which has become inadequate to win the war against corruption and money 
laundering. The measures with which to fight money laundering and recover the proceeds of 
corruption needs to constantly evolve. As a result of the problems of the conventional criminal 
justice system and the difficulty in proving cases beyond reasonable doubt, it has become 
imperative to shift from an exclusive criminal prosecution of financial crime to a non-
conviction-based recovery regime which is not focused on in personam (against the person) 
but an action in rem (against assets and illicit funds).872 
In other words, a complementary framework built around civil recoveries in Nigeria is 
fundamentally necessary to increase the effectiveness of existing money laundering legal 
frameworks. At the present time, it has now been realised that one of the crucial ways in 
reducing crime is the delivery of civil justice where it was previously thought it was the use of 
criminal sanctions and punishments. 873  The reality and extent of corruption and money 
laundering, and the involvement of powerful public officials calls for a more creative use of 
the civil law, especially in consideration of the difficulties encountered with criminal 
jurisdiction. Utilising civil jurisdiction in the pursuit of justice against corrupt PEPs is 
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potentially an effective weapon whose value is yet to be explored within Nigeria’s legal 
framework.  
The focus of financial crime control is now tilting towards civil forfeiture of criminal assets. 
They do not replace criminal prosecutions and confiscations, but they complement them by 
attacking the economic base of criminals.874 Thus, effective asset recovery regimes based on 
non-conviction-based asset confiscation and forfeiture play a crucial role as one of a wide and 
coordinated range of measures to tackle both financial crimes like money laundering and 
corruption.875 The non-conviction based asset forfeiture is a legal mechanism that provides for 
the restraint, seizure and forfeiture of stolen assets without the need for a criminal conviction.876 
It is pertinent to state that forfeiture and confiscation are often used interchangeably. They have 
become strategic weapons that are being deployed to disrupt and dismantle the economic 
infrastructure of criminals or corrupt PEPs. Confiscation is said to be justified by a principle 
deeply ingrained into law, that no individual should be permitted to become unjustly enriched 
from unlawful activity in general and from crime in particular.877 If those who take part in 
crime know that they are likely to be stripped of every profit they make, then the desire to enter 
into crime will be diminished.878 These principles form the foundation for laws around the 
world aimed at confiscating the proceeds of crime.879  
In recent years, an emerging global trend of introducing legislation to use civil procedures 
against criminal assets have surfaced and have been constantly evolving.880 Frustrated with the 
alarming problem of corruption and money laundering perpetuated by PEPs, governments and 
international organisations have been devising creative and aggressive legal measures to 
combat corruption. The trend has been to progressively focus on the illicit assets rather than 
                                                             
874 Emile Van Der Does De Willebois,’ Using Civil remedies in Corruption& Asset Recovery cases’ (2013) 45 Case 
Western Reserve Journal of International Law 615 
875 Theodore Greenberg and Others, Stolen Asset Recovery: A Good Practice Guide for Non-Conviction Based 
Asset Forfeiture (The World Bank 2009) 13 
876 Ibid 1 
877 Peter Alldridge, Money Laundering Law: Forfeiture, Confiscation, Civil Recovery, Criminal laundering and 
Taxation of the Proceeds of Crime (Hart Publishing 2003) 45 
878 Ibid  
879 David Lusty,’ Civil Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime in Australia’ (2002) 5 Journal of Money Laundering 
Control 345 
880 Anthony Kennedy,’ Designing a civil forfeiture system: An issue list for policymakers and legislators’ (2006) 




the person as a way to combat the inefficiency of traditional responses of the criminal justice 
system to financial crime.881  
The introduction of the unexplained wealth order (UWO), a relatively recent development in 
confiscation and forfeiture jurisprudence is one of such measures which is designed to 
confiscate, seize and recover the unexplained increase in the wealth of a public official. The 
UWO targets the significant increase in the assets of a PEP that he/she cannot reasonably 
explain in relation to their lawful income; essentially deeming a PEPs unexplained 
accumulation of asset to be a form of corruption.882 A growing number of jurisdictions around 
the world have progressively turned towards non-conviction based civil forfeiture regimes by 
introducing the UWO. Such laws have operated with significant success in Ireland, Australia, 
and recently, the United Kingdom because the state does not have to first prove a criminal 
offence, as is generally the case in conviction-based forfeitures.883  The state, in effect, is 
pursuing criminal law objectives in the civil forum, absent the procedural safeguards inherent 
in criminal proceedings. This became critically fundamental as it has become difficult for law 
enforcement agencies to obtain criminal convictions even in obvious cases of criminal 
enrichment.  
This chapter intends to make salient, significant and cogent arguments that the future of money 
laundering control in Nigeria lies in the use of non-conviction based civil forfeiture regimes, 
which are more potent in disrupting and disgorging illicit criminal proceeds than the 
conviction-based forfeiture regimes provided under the criminal law. The aim is to outline the 
debate surrounding the non-conviction-based approach, to consider how this approach is 
utilised. Fundamentally, the chapter employs a comparative international approach by 
analysing the practical application of the Unexplained Wealth Order in two selected 
jurisdictions, namely, Ireland and the United Kingdom in order to assess their application and 
evaluate their effectiveness.  
Furthermore, under the parameters of this study, the choice of these jurisdictions is because 
they are both common law legal systems like Nigeria and are well established democracies 
with effective law enforcement and judiciary, which are key ingredients for application and 
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effective use of UWO. In addition, the chapter identifies a range of obstacles and challenges 
which must be taken into consideration when contemplating introducing UWO in Nigeria so 
as to learn lessons. 
Nigeria is yet to enact legislation that sets out a system for confiscating the proceeds of crime 
in the absence of a criminal conviction through civil courts. There is also no legal framework 
that sets out power to seize and forfeit cash through a civil process, even where there are 
reasonable grounds to suspect that such funds is the proceeds of crime.884  
Acknowledging the serious problems of grand corruption and money laundering and the need 
for improved mechanisms to combat their devastating impact, this thesis would be 
recommending that Nigeria considers the promulgation of civil forfeiture laws modelled on the 
Unexplained Wealth Orders as a stand-alone legal framework to combat corruption and money 
laundering perpetuated by PEPs. The UWO provides a more direct route to enforceability.885 
The chapter contends that PEPs involved in grand corruption in Nigeria have greater fear for 
the loss of the assets acquired than fears concerning the loss of their liberty. Therefore, this 
thesis is of the view that a legal framework which hinges on taking the profit out of crime by 
recovering the proceeds has the indispensable ingredient for an effective sanction regime.  
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6.2       MAIN APPROACHES TO ASSET RECOVERY/FORFEITURE REGIMES 
Every year, enormous sums of public funds are misappropriated and laundered illegally from 
Nigeria. The unfortunate result is that these funds are exploited for the benefit of a few corrupt 
officials and are generally used to purchase expensive items such as luxury vehicles, real estate, 
art and other assets of value.886 While financial crimes like money laundering and corruption 
are damaging to all countries, their effects are particularly felt in developing countries such as 
Nigeria because they negatively affect the quality and accessibility of public services, provision 
of infrastructure and erodes public confidence in government. However, one way to counter 
these acts is to recover and return stolen assets to their rightful owners or jurisdiction of 
origin.887 
The rhetoric of modern confiscation/asset recovery laws rests on few premises. They are that 
criminals are motivated by profits and they should be hit where it hurts. Also, that significant 
proceeds may derive from crime and are therefore available for recovery. In addition, that the 
traditional forms of law enforcement are not effective within the scope of acquisitive crimes.888 
Asset recovery refers to the process by which proceeds of crime are identified, traced, seized, 
confiscated and returned to their rightful owners such as a State. Asset recovery is a 
fundamental principle in the Anti-money laundering jurisprudence. The asset recovery regime 
and the AML framework both contribute towards creating a hostile environment for criminals, 
and limit the assets available to them.  
Generally speaking, there are several statutory mechanisms used internationally that allow for 
asset recovery. These mechanisms are generally achieved using two distinct methods, namely, 
conviction-based asset forfeiture and non-conviction-based asset forfeiture. They share the 
same objective which is forfeiture of stolen public funds or assets, but differ significantly in 
the procedure used to forfeit assets. Thus, the modest aim of this section is to examine these 
main approaches to asset recovery for better understanding of the unexplained wealth order. It 
is also pertinent to mention that the second mechanism is of particular interest in this chapter.  
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6.2.1       CONVICTION-BASED ASSET FORFEITURE 
According to various international legal instruments and conventions, countries are required to 
develop the necessary domestic legal measures for asset recovery by taking the greatest extent 
possible within their legal systems that enable them recover the proceeds of crime.889 The 
conviction-based asset forfeiture is one of such measures to recover stolen assets. Here, the 
issue of asset forfeiture is treated as part of the criminal prosecution process by generally 
requiring an actual criminal charge as a prerequisite to the restraint of suspected proceeds of 
crime, and a criminal conviction as a prerequisite for the confiscation of proceeds of crime.890 
The requirement of a criminal conviction means that all of the enhanced procedural protections 
of the criminal process apply, including, inter alia, the presumption of innocence and the 
heightened criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt must first be established. 
Thereafter, confiscation of proceeds of crime can occur as part of the sentencing process.891  
For example, following his conviction in the United Kingdom for money laundering in 2012, 
James Ibori, former Governor of Delta State, Nigeria, was sentenced to 13 years imprisonment. 
In addition to the conviction, the UK authorities brought confiscation proceedings for the 
recovery of the proceeds of corruption amounting to $50 million.892 The rationale here is 
obvious, criminalising the conduct from which illicit proceeds are made does not adequately 
punish or deter an offender. Even if convicted, criminals will still be able to enjoy the proceeds 
of crime, either personally, or through family members and associates.893 Therefore, without 
post-conviction confiscation and forfeitures, the perception would still remain that there is an 
incentive to crime and that crime pays.  
 Importantly, the conviction-based forfeiture is an in personam order, an action against the 
person rather than in rem, against property.894  In Nigeria and most other countries, asset 
recovery or forfeiture can only occur after a criminal conviction.895 No confiscation can be 
ordered without declaration of guilt by a competent court of law. This thesis is of the view that 
it has become challenging to view the recovery of the proceeds of unlawful activity as part of 
the criminal justice process, as such, justifiable only on the basis of a prior finding of guilt 
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according to the criminal standard of proof. It is unconscionable for a corrupt PEP to unjustly 
enrich himself at the expense of the society, while the only recourse the state has is to prove 
the commission of a crime against such PEP. In Nigeria, in so many grand corruption cases 
involving public officials such as Governors, proving cases beyond reasonable doubt has been 
extremely difficult even in obvious cases where there has been a significant increase in the 
asset and wealth of a public official he/she cannot reasonably explain. 
As it stands, conviction-based forfeiture laws as provided in the extant legal frameworks in 
Nigeria have been inadequate, having a negligible effect that has resulted in the recovery of 
only a limited proportion of the vast public funds misappropriated and laundered by PEPs each 
year. Fundamentally, the true limits of the traditional conviction-based forfeitures come from 
various factors, among which are the difficulty to first secure the criminal conviction of the 
accused, then the necessity to prove the nexus between the property subject to confiscation and 
the offence he was convicted for. 
According to Adetunji, this procedure has failed to adequately combat corrupt practices and 
money laundering in Nigeria because the criminal process is slow, tortuous, expensive and 
inadequate to secure the conviction of corrupt public officials who are often more highly 
sophisticated than law enforcement agencies in Nigeria.896 When considering facts such as the 
constitutional protection of the accused in a criminal process, the vast resources at the disposal 
of an accused which is used in assembling the best legal experts often used to exploit the 
weaknesses of the criminal justice system in Nigeria; thereby keeping the case in abeyance. 
Also, the logistics involved in prosecuting high net-worth PEPs by law enforcement agencies 
with limited resources, and the pervasive corruption of the institutions of government.  
Furthermore, with the advancement in technology and globalisation, criminals are increasingly 
able to distance themselves from the underlying predicate offence so that there is no sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate actual criminal participation on their part, thereby placing the proceeds 
of crime beyond the reach of conviction-based laws, which enables public officials retain the 
proceeds of corruption.897 Financial crime prosecution often involves lengthy and complex 
proceedings which may eventually result in a failed prosecution in Nigeria. 
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This is so because of the technical hurdles that arises from the intricacies of different money 
laundering strategies and methods. To demonstrate, the vast majority of grand corruption cases 
in Nigeria have involved the use of corporate structures to disguise assets, and such corporate 
structures continue to substantially hinder the tracing of stolen assets; as well as frustrate law 
enforcements ability to link such proceeds beyond reasonable doubt to an accused. Money 
continues to get stolen, and it gets stolen at a much faster pace than it is being recovered in 
Nigeria.  
The difficulty in obtaining evidence in corruption and money laundering cases, the need to 
secure a criminal conviction to enable the removal of assets has led to a vicious cycle and has 
failed to impact upon those at the pinnacle of stealing public funds. This has meant that PEPs 
who have assets and funds beyond their legitimate earnings through corrupt practices remain 
unpunished. Against this background, conviction-based forfeiture is not suitable in respect of 
public officials as it entails a level of technical complexity and procedural hurdles that often 
frustrates the whole process especially in corruption related money laundering offences. As a 
result, this route has proved not to be a viable option in Nigeria. It is this thesis’s argument that 
it is time for change in approach to addressing the prevalence of the offences of corruption and 
money laundering in Nigeria. 
6.2.2    NON-CONVICTION BASED ASSET FORFEITURE (NCBAF)/CIVIL FORFEITURES 
The power of PEPs to undermine the criminal justice process in Nigeria, coupled with other 
practical challenges in conviction-based asset forfeiture creates the need to adopt alternative 
approaches.898 Introducing a system of non-conviction-based asset forfeiture is therefore of 
paramount importance. Non-conviction-based asset forfeiture sometimes called civil 
forfeitures is a more suitable measure allowing for the restraint, seizure and forfeiture of stolen 
assets without the need for a criminal conviction.899  The NCBAF regime treats the question of 
asset forfeiture as a completely separate issue from the imposition of a criminal punishment, 
with proceedings conducted in civil courts, according to civil standards of proof (balance of 
probabilities) and civil rules of procedure.900 It uses the civil standard of proof as the prevailing 
benchmark. Fundamentally, it also shifts the onus of proof onto the defendant who must prove 
the lawful origins of his/her assets. This is so because, proceedings are directed against assets 
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that are believed to have been acquired with the proceeds of crime. In other words, it is an 
action that targets assets itself (in rem), and not against the individual (in personam), as in 
criminal cases.901  
The NCBAF procedure is considered more intrusive and better suited to counter increasingly 
well organised and sophisticated criminal activity, particularly financial crime.902  A short 
survey reveals that this approach has proven effective in numerous jurisdictions. In the United 
States, the Department of Justice in 2008 confiscated $1.2 billion, 67% came from non-
conviction-based confiscation ($804million) and only 33% from confiscation following a 
criminal conviction ($400 million).903 The purpose of the NCBAF is to hit the criminal where 
it hurts most. Assets which could be confiscated and forfeited from corrupt PEPs in a NCBAF 
includes, monetary and non-monetary assets such as real estate, private jets, oil vessels, schools, 
hotels, exotic cars, jewellery and other income generating instruments.904 
 One of the main attractions of the NCBAF from a law enforcement and prosecution stand-
point is the absence of requirement of any prior conviction before initiating confiscation 
proceedings. 905  Confiscation can be ordered within the course of less vigorous judicial 
procedures than criminal proceedings since the only burden for the prosecuting authority is to 
demonstrate on the balance of probabilities that the assets were acquired with the proceeds of 
unlawful activity.906 Importantly, the NCBAF is paramount in a variety of contexts, as in the 
following instances. 
6.2.2.1     EXTOLING THE VIRTUES OF NCBAF/CIVIL FORFEITURE REGIMES 
§ The accused is so powerful that a criminal investigation or prosecution is unrealistic or 
impossible. 
§ There is insufficient evidence to proceed with criminal prosecution 
§ The accused has been acquitted of the underlying criminal offence as a result of lack of 
admissible evidence or a failure to meet the burden of proof. However, while there may 
be insufficient evidence for a criminal conviction beyond reasonable doubt, there still 
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could be sufficient evidence to show that assets were derived from unlawful activity 
(corruption) on a balance of probabilities. 907 
Not only is the NCBAF important in the above-mentioned contexts, it is also advantageous 
for the following reasons: 
i. They represent a better deployment of resources to target criminals with significant 
property which cannot be explained by legitimate income. 
ii. The NCBAF/civil forfeitures do not fall foul of the principle of double jeopardy rule or 
res judicata and therefore an action for a NCBAF order is available where an earlier 
criminal prosecution has been unsuccessful.908 
iii. The criminal law principle of autrefois acquit has no application in NCBAF procedure 
since they are civil proceedings.  
iv. The burden of proof is reversed, thus, there is a presumption of criminality simply on 
the basis that there is unexplained wealth. 
v. Civil forfeiture laws require law enforcement/prosecutors exercising the power to bring 
a case to establish that, on the balance of probabilities, the asset is derived from 
unlawful activity. 
vi. Evidence of a specific offence is unnecessary 
vii. The NCBAF is more flexible in that the innocence of the defendant is immaterial, 
therefore law enforcement or prosecuting agencies can circumvent a failed prosecution 
to forfeit asset belonging to an accused whose guilt could not be established. 
viii. In a NCBAF, so far as the asset of a criminal can be identified, the death, flight, or 
whereabout of the accused will not impede civil forfeiture.909 
ix. Given the ever-increasing access to banking and the speed within which money is 
moved across jurisdictions, the quick removal of assets and disposal of property 
wherever they may be located is becoming easier to facilitate through this procedure.910 
6.2.2.2           INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR NCBAF 
In recent years, a number of multilateral and international organisations have recommended 
NCBAF. The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) is the ground-breaking 
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convention on asset recovery and it explicitly identifies asset recovery as its fundamental 
principle. The UNCAC sets the path for a new generation of legal instruments prescribing 
confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds of crime for countries to develop the necessary 
domestic legal measures for asset recovery.911 The UNCAC requires state parties to consider 
taking such measures as maybe necessary to allow confiscation of property without a criminal 
conviction in cases in which the offender cannot be prosecuted by reasons of death, flight, 
absence or in other appropriate cases.912 UNCAC speaks specifically of the embezzlement of 
public funds and the laundering of embezzled public funds and obligates a requested state party 
to return confiscated property to the requesting state party without the need for a conviction.913 
The UNCAC addresses the problem encountered in the past, whereby states could provide legal 
assistance and cooperation in criminal matters, but not in civil cases.914 
The UNCAC proposes the NCBAF as a tool for all jurisdictions to consider in the fight against 
corruption. In similar vein, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommends countries to 
enable their competent authorities to consider adopting measures that allow laundered property, 
proceeds of instrumentalities to be confiscated without requiring a criminal conviction to the 
extent that such a requirement is consistent with the principles of their domestic law.915 To 
ensure that foreign confiscation orders are recognised and enforced in the widest range of 
circumstances, Recommendation 38 requires countries to have the authority to be able to 
respond to requests made on the basis of non-conviction based proceedings and related 
provisional measures, unless this is inconsistent with fundamental principles of their domestic 
law.916 According to FATF, so many jurisdictions are overly reliant on a conviction in the 
origin country. This becomes problematic because, in nearly all recent cases of grand 
corruption, the detection and investigation of criminal activity of heads of government occurred 
only after there was a change of government, specific corrupt individuals fell out of favour, or 
there was widespread public outcry after wrongdoing was publicly exposed. There is no 
realistic opportunity to investigate and prosecute them for financial crimes, hence the need for 
non-conviction-based asset forfeitures.917 
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FATF states that non-conviction-based confiscation may be implemented in the context of 
criminal laws and proceedings, or through a separate system or law outside criminal 
proceedings. The NCBAF legislations have received judicial approval in many foreign 
jurisdiction. For instance, in Gogitidze & Ors v Georgie918, the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) held that proceedings for confiscation such as the NCBAF which do not stem 
from criminal conviction or sentencing proceedings do not qualify as a penalty, but rather 
represent a measure of the control of the use of property and cannot amount to the determination 
of a criminal charge within the meaning of Article 6 of the ECHR. 
In similar vein, in Butler v United Kingdom,919 the court noted that NCBAF was a measure not 
to be compared to a criminal sanction since it was designed to take away the profit of unlawful 
activity. Also, in Simon Prophet v the National Director of Public Prosecution,920 the South 
African constitutional court decided that there was no need to prove any crime in NCBAF 
suspected to be the proceeds of crime. It further stated that NCBAF provides a unique remedy 
used as a measure to combat organised crime. 
This support underscores the importance of the NCBAF. While being encouraged by the 
UNCAC and FATF, adapting national law to create a legal basis for NCBAF is not mandatory 
on state parties. Some jurisdictions such as United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia and Canada 
have all promulgated laws in support of NCBAF. 
 6.2.2.3               MAIN CRITICISMS AGAINST NCBAF 
Despite its positives, the NCBAF is viewed by some as an assault on due process, with most 
criticism revolving around its constitutional dangers since it involves lifting of constitutional 
protection for the accused, lowering of procedural safeguards, and the potential to encroach on 
human rights with respect to right to own properties.921 Although the issue of human rights is 
discussed in more detail below, it should be said that this has been considered by courts in 
different jurisdictions which has upheld the constitutionality of the NCBAF regime.922  
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The overarching consensus is that the NCBAF is compatible with the rights to own property 
and other human rights on the basis that the rights are qualified and not absolute, thus, they are 
capable of being subject to interference, provided such interference is proportionate. 923 
Opponents of this regime argue that by operating under the guise of a civil process, the state is 
able to impose criminal punishment without the requirement of establishing guilt on the part 
of the individual.924 In the same fashion, other criticisms of the NCBAF includes the fact that 
procedural safeguards, such as the criminal standard of proof and the presumption of innocence 
are sidestepped. Granted that some of the criticism of the NCBAF are valid, they do not 
outweigh the importance and the benefits of stripping criminals off stolen assets. 
In view of the above analysis, it is apt to mention that extant Nigerian legislations on 
confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds of crime are disjointed and only relate to conviction-
based forfeitures which encourages delays in criminal prosecutions and has continued to be a 
major obstacle to proper enforcement of the Nigerian AML regime. The NCBAF laws is today 
one of the key missing links to Nigeria’s fight against corruption and money laundering.  
The promulgation of the NCBAF will broaden the measures available to combat corruption 
and money laundering and to exact some measure of justice. If Nigeria had NCBAF laws, it 
would have aided the recovery of a significant number of illicit assets acquired by PEPs with 
the proceeds of corruption. It is for the reasons advanced that this thesis proposes a more 
pragmatic option of utilising civil forfeiture regimes to ensure a successful interdiction of 
proceeds of corruption by promulgating a stand-alone legal framework which is in line with 
non-conviction-based forfeiture procedures.  
The Unexplained Wealth Order (UWO), which is a relatively new development in NCBAF 
legal regime would strive to curb financial crimes by depriving corrupt public officials and 
other criminals of any significant increase in their assets that is not reasonably corroborated by 
their lawful income. The UWO is a more fruitful endeavour than looking at corruption related 
money laundering offences as isolated incidents that can be dealt with by the application of 
criminal sanctions. 
6.3   THE UWO AS A VIABLE OPTION IN PURSUIT OF CRIMINAL ASSETS  
A good number of academic scholars have done research in relation to addressing the problem 
of corruption and money laundering activities in Nigeria by proposing means to combat it. 
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Although the literature covers a wide range of such research, the course of action most often 
discussed is criminal sanction, possibly because of the corrosive effect of these acts to society. 
The criminal law expresses the society’s disapproval of corrupt practices and aims at 
punishment.925 In as much as these arguments are valid and understandable, none has given 
focus to the imperative of using the Unexplained Wealth Order to combat such crimes in 
Nigeria. The UWO has been heavily promoted as a potential weapon in the state’s arsenal 
against the destructive crimes of corruption and money laundering.  
  6.3.1              WHAT ARE UNEXPLAINED WEALTH ORDERS? 
Firstly, UWO follow a non-conviction-based model. They are seen as a drastic measure which 
is a relatively recent development in confiscation and forfeiture jurisprudence. Their primary 
objective is to deprive criminals from acquiring or benefiting from unlawful activities.926 In 
short, they place significant explanatory demands on any high net worth individual, company 
or trust to provide a detailed account of how they obtained assets which law enforcement has 
reasonable cause to suspect may have been acquired from the proceeds of criminal conduct.927 
Theoretically, the UWO can be described as the legal mechanism through which unexplained 
wealth which has been adjudged to represent the proceeds of criminal activity by the court are 
confiscated and forfeited to the State.928 The term unexplained wealth is the significant increase 
in the assets of a public official that he/she cannot reasonably explain in relation to his/her 
lawful income; effectively deeming a public officials unexplained accumulation of significant 
assets to be form of corruption.929  Implicit in this operation lies the assumption that the 
apparent increase in wealth enjoyed by a PEP may be the only signal that corrupt acts have 
transpired. 
Importantly, the UWO legal framework is free-standing and does not require there to be any 
precursor or parallel civil or criminal proceedings before an application can be made to the 
court. In terms of their scope, the UWO is predicated on the assumption that where there is a 
disparity between a person’s assets and income, he is presumed to have obtained those assets 
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unlawfully.930 It is important to realise that a primary target for attack if corruption and money 
laundering are to be combated is the money and assets of corrupt PEPs.931  
Fundamentally, the UWO compels a person to explain the provenance of specific assets to an 
enforcement agency within a time frame. It places a rebuttable presumption on the asset holder 
that the assets in question were funded by criminality to which the individual can obviate by 
providing an explanation as to the legitimate source of asset.932 The burden of proving that the 
wealth is lawfully obtained is on the respondent. The veracity of the respondent’s explanation 
and any document provided will be carefully and invariably scrutinised by law enforcement. 
This would be aided by the fact that considerable amount of information will be available to 
verify against the persons explanation such as through asset declarations that are made 
mandatory for public officials in Nigeria before the assumption of public office. 
Evidentially, the civil test in an UWO proceeding is that on the balance of probabilities, the 
court has to be satisfied that allegations by law enforcement regarding unexplained wealth 
acquired through unlawful conduct are correct unless the respondent proves otherwise.933 The 
penalty would be civil, not criminal, and as such would be brought against assets, rather than 
pursuing criminal charges against an individual. One of the rationales for the UWO is that PEPs 
are usually adept at concealing the proceeds of corruption. Unless they are called upon to 
explain the source of their asset, it will be extremely difficult and often impossible to identify 
the proceeds of corruption.934  
According to Lusty, in many cases of corruption related money laundering, it is often 
practically impossible for law enforcement or prosecution to trace the proceeds of corruption 
to the predicate offence and establish the precise level of a PEPs lifestyle being financed by 
corrupt practices. 935  Hence the importance of an UWO proceeding which require the 
respondent to explain how funds or assets in excess of income was acquired. The respondent 
remains silent as his own peril.  
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Under this regime, the inability of the defendant to explain and prove the legitimate source of 
his wealth triggers a presumption that such assets might have been acquired with the proceeds 
of crime.936 This will result in the property being presumed to be recoverable property. This is 
a significant weapon for law enforcement authorities in the sense that the financial information 
provided in an answer to a UWO might otherwise have taken longer to gather or may not have 
been obtained at all.937 
In particular, the fundamental elements that make the UWO powerful and compelling are 
numerous. Firstly, they require a lower standard of proof. Secondly, the reversal of the burden 
of proof. Thirdly, there are less onerous rules relating to the admissibility of evidence. Fourthly, 
that a range of persons and corporate entities can be targeted as respondents.938 Fifthly, the 
ability to forfeit property without the need to identify an underlying criminal offence. Lastly, 
the fact that the court may order the confiscation of illegally obtained assets following 
proceedings which are not subject to either a finding of a criminal offence or the conviction of 
the person accused.939  
There are some practical factors that justify placing the burden of proof on a respondent 
regarding the lawful origin of property in an UWO proceeding. The general non-existence of 
direct evidence relating to the derivation of proceeds of crime has been problematic for law 
enforcement and prosecutors.940 Some argue on policy grounds for the legitimacy of the reverse 
burden of proof provisions by maintaining that respondents should bear the burden to address 
the origins of the disproportionate assets given that the details about the actual acquisition of 
property, including sources of funds used to acquire such property are likely to be within the 
knowledge of the respondent.941 The reverse burden of proof is a paramount feature of the 
UWO regime as it helps to circumvent the evidentiary problem of proving the participation of 
powerful public officials in the underlying unlawful activities which gave rise to such wealth.  
Placing the burden of proof on the respondent to provide an explanation for suspected assets 
acquired with the proceeds of crime is a departure from the principle that lays the burden of 
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proof on the state to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt942, as enshrined in 
the extant laws of most countries. However, in exceptional circumstances such as the 
prevalence or threat of a particular crime, such as financial crime, it is justifiable to permit a 
degree of departure from the normal principle of prosecution proving guilt beyond reasonable 
doubt,943 for the sake of ease of proof, and in circumstances where the relevant information 
may be only within the asset holder’s knowledge that assets held were not acquired with the 
proceeds of crime. In many cases, the only way of determining legitimate sources of funds for 
a property is by having its owner provide evidence.944 In this respect, the state has to adopt the 
most effective and human right compliant means of recovering the proceeds of crime.945 
Furthermore, the UWO is far reaching as it can be executed against the estate of the respondent 
in cases where the order is made after the death of the respondent.946 This prevents the family 
and associates of the corrupt PEP from benefiting from the proceeds of crime. Also, the fact 
that corporate entities can be targeted as respondents is also a crucial factor because many 
criminals and corrupt PEPs in Nigeria hold their illicit assets in the names of companies to 
conceal the true ownership of such assets. These features give law enforcement greater latitude 
and a greater chance of forfeiting the proceeds of corruption. They have been crucial in making 
the UWO easier to implement and thus, a crucial weapon in the States arsenal against grand 
corruption and money laundering.  
Based on the above analysis, the UWO is seemingly a proportionate and measured response to 
the destructive problem of corruption and other financial crimes without the need to invoke the 
powers of the criminal law which may; as we have seen in the course of this thesis, created a 
wave of uncertainty as a result of delay tactics, wave of appeals, and other technicalities used 
to forestall cases in Nigeria. Furthermore, there is still a gap where law enforcement and 
prosecutors cannot satisfy the necessary evidential burden to successfully convict powerful 
PEPs in Nigeria. The UWO has the potential to produce evidence to enable law enforcement 
agencies take recovery actions against the assets of corrupt PEPs acquired with stolen public 
funds.  
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 Building on the concepts behind confiscation and forfeiture, some jurisdictions have enacted 
the UWO to circumvent some of the challenges encountered in prosecuting financial crimes 
and to heighten the fight against financial crime by making it much easier for law enforcement 
to identify, seize and confiscate assets of criminals. These legislations have been influenced by 
a number of factors including political, social, legislative and economic context.947 Though it 
might be tough to evaluate the effectiveness of the UWO regime, conclusions can be drawn on 
the basis of indicators that show the impact of this regime.948 In Ireland, both anecdotal and 
statistical evidence point to the fact that the Proceeds of Crime Act and the Criminal Asset 
Bureau949 have had a positive impact in attacking proceeds of crime successfully which has 
drastically reduced criminal activities in Ireland.950 
The pertinent question is, how does the concept of UWO look like in practice? To understand 
this, a practical illustration of its operation would be gleaned from the United Kingdom and 
Irish models of the UWO regime which make provisions for legal procedures for the treatment 
and confiscation of proceeds of crime.  
6.3.2 COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE UNEXPLAINED WEALTH ORDER IN IRELAND AND UK 
The gradual emergence of legal framework providing for UWO against criminal assets can be 
detected. Countries such as Ireland951, Australia,952 Colombia953, and the United Kingdom954 
are few legal systems that have ventured in the direction of introducing such legislation. Other 
countries such as Italy who enacted the UWO legislation have faced constitutional and legal 
challenges by virtue of their courts declaring that shifting the burden of proof to the accused 
violates the Italian constitution.955  
The promulgation of the UWO in these jurisdictions is a result of the rise in corruption and 
money laundering activities perpetuated by criminals able to hide the proceeds of crime from 
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law enforcement authorities, thereby making criminal prosecution more difficult. This 
necessitated the creation of aggressive new legal powers and new capabilities for law 
enforcement to enable the relentless disruption of money laundering and financial crime in 
these jurisdictions. 
6.4     UNEXPLAINED WEALTH ORDERS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Over the past few years, concerns over the UK’s vulnerability to money laundering and terrorist 
financing had become part of mainstream public discourse. London had been recognised as a 
prime destination for money launderers due to its status as a preeminent financial centre, a 
fantastic property market and the ease of purchasing and holding London properties using shell 
corporations. 956  The use of high-end London real estate market as a vehicle for money 
laundering by foreigners became a major concern. According to a 2016 report conducted by 
Transparency International, it was said that there were gaps in the UK’s legal framework being 
exploited by corrupt individuals and companies.957  
The report details how prominent PEPs, oligarchs and wealthy foreigners have acquired 
valuable assets in the UK with the proceeds of crime.958An example given by Transparency 
International was that of a corrupt official who had stolen their country’s health care budget 
and can easily buy a house in London with the proceeds of corruption. Case studies provide an 
indication of the scale of illicit funds and assets flowing through the United Kingdom, 
particularly involving Nigerian politically exposed persons. 
• In the case of General Sani Abacha and his associates, an estimated $780m of public 
funds in Nigeria was laundered through UK banks.959 
• Former Governor of Delta State, James Ibori, is estimated by UK law enforcement 
agencies to have embezzled $150m of public funds in Nigeria. It is reported that Ibori 
bought a house in Hampstead, North London, for $2.2m and another property in Dorset 
for $311,00.  
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• Former Governor of Bayelsa State, Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, was found to own 
properties in London worth $10million.960  
Although the clandestine nature of money laundering makes it difficult to quantify, the Home 
Office estimated in 2017 that the scale of money laundering in the UK exceeds $90 billion a 
year.961 This staggering figure has meant that the UK government have been quick to support 
aggressive actions in the form of changes to the money laundering and counter-terrorist 
financing framework in order to make the UK a hostile territory for money launderers as a 
result of the social and economic costs of money laundering in the United Kingdom.  
In view of these facts, the anti-money laundering landscape in the UK received a significant 
boost following the promulgation of the Criminal Finances Act 2017 which amended the 
Proceeds of Crime Act substantially.962 Notably, one of the fundamental changes in the Act 
was the introduction of the Unexplained Wealth Order into the UK legal system. Their arrival 
makes the UK one of the few common law jurisdictions to have a UWO framework, alongside 
Ireland and Australia.963  
The introduction of the UWO expresses a clear intent by the UK government to put the civil 
powers to freeze and forfeit cash and assets derived from unlawful conduct to greater use. This 
is in light of the concern about those involved in grand corruption, with corrupt public officials 
billed as primary targets of the UWO framework.964 The order provides prescribed enforcement 
authorities as we shall see with the power to require an individual to explain the origin of his 
assets that appear to be disproportionate to his income, where the person is inter alia, a 
politically exposed person, or suspected of being involved in serious crime in the UK or in 
foreign jurisdictions. Scholars are of the view that the emphasis of the UWO regime would 
seemingly suggests that the application of the criminal law will no longer be the first port of 
call for law enforcement authorities responding to financial crimes in the UK965 
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  6.4.1    PROCEDURE FOR APPLYING FOR UWO IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
In detail, the procedure for applying for UWO in the UK is commenced by an application made 
by an enforcement authority to the High Court.966  The application may be made without 
notice; 967  to prevent the property from being dissipated. The application must specify or 
describe the property in respect of which the UWO is sought and identify the respondent whom 
the authorities believe holds the property.968 Fundamentally, the application would urge the 
court for an order compelling the respondent to explain the following: 
a) The nature and extent of their interest in the property, 
b) Explaining how they obtained property (Including how any costs incurred in obtaining 
it were met), 
c) Where the property is held by trustees of a settlement, provide details of the settlement 
as maybe specified in the order.969 
In order to obtain a UWO in respect of property, the enforcement authority must satisfy the 
court that several requirements enumerated below have been met. Thereafter, the court may 
make such an order if it is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe the following: 
     
 6.4.2           REQUIREMENTS FOR GRANTING OF UWO 
I. The respondent holds the property970; the value of which is greater than $50,000971 
II. That there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the known sources of the 
respondents lawfully obtained income would have been insufficient for the purposes of 
enabling the respondent to obtain the property. 
III. That the respondent is a politically exposed person 
IV. There are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the respondent is, or has been, 
involved in serious crime whether in the UK or elsewhere.972 
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Flowing from the above-mentioned requirements, the high court may grant an order, provided 
it is satisfied that each of the requirements for making the order are fulfilled. Once the order is 
made, the burden shifts onto the respondent to demonstrate that their property is legitimate and 
produce information in support.973 The language used in the legislation indicates that the court 
retains discretion over granting the order, having determined whether there were reasonable 
grounds to believe that property was acquired with the proceeds of crime.974 The court has held 
that where the Crown seeks to prove that property derives from criminal conduct, it must be 
such as to give rise to the irresistible inference that it can only be derived from crime.975 This 
is to emphasise to enforcement authorities the need to present a compelling evidential basis in 
making applications for orders capable of impacting upon individual rights.976 Section 362 
POCA 2002 refers to ‘may’ as opposed to ‘must’ or ‘shall’: 
The High Court may, on application made by an enforcement authority, make an UWO 
in respect of any property if the court is satisfied that each of the requirements for the 
making for the order is fulfilled’’.977 Such discretion must be exercised having regard 
to the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the person against whom the order is 
sought. 978 
6.4.3               APPLICANTS WHO CAN APPLY FOR AN UWO 
Pursuant to the provisions of POCA, the enforcement authorities who have the power to make 
an application to the High Court for the purposes of UWO include: 
• National Crime Agency; 
• Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs; 
• The Financial Conduct Authority; 
• Director of Serious Fraud Office 
• Director of Public Prosecutions.979 
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6.4.4         THE RAMIFICATIONS OF AN UWO 
COMPLIANCE AND NON-COMPLIANCE TO AN UWO: 
Where the UWO is issued, the respondent must truthfully explain the provenance of the 
property that is the subject of the order within the specified time in the order.980 In cases where 
the respondent fails without reasonable excuse to comply with or respond to all the requests 
for information set out in the order, severe consequences attach. Being a court order, breach 
could expose the respondent to proceedings for contempt of court. More importantly, the 
legislation expressly triggers a draconian presumption that the property is recoverable property 
for the purposes of any proceedings taken in respect of the property, unless the contrary is 
shown. 981  Recoverable property in this regard means property obtained through unlawful 
conduct. This would allow law enforcement to commence civil recovery action against the 
property. Conversely, should the respondent comply or purport to comply with the 
requirements imposed by an UWO, then the enforcement authority must determine if any 
enforcement or investigatory proceedings ought to be taken.982 The veracity of the explanation 
and any document provided is assessed by the enforcement authority with a view to forfeiture 
proceedings. 
Furthermore, if the enforcement authority decides that no further proceedings ought to be taken 
in relation to property, then it is incumbent on the authorities to notify the high court of that 
fact as soon as reasonably practicable. A determination must be done within 60 days starting 
with the day of compliance.983 Equally important, whereas UWO is not a criminal indictment, 
it is an offence for a person, in purported compliance with a requirement imposed by the UWO; 
to knowingly or recklessly make a statement that is false or misleading.984 Such an offence is 
punishable by a maximum of two years imprisonment on indictment, and a maximum of six 
months imprisonment on summary conviction.985 It is instructive to note that the UWO is not 
intended to deprive persons of their lawful property. Accordingly, there are measures for the 
UWO to be revoked in cases where the evidence exonerates the respondent. 
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6.4.5           EXTRA-TERRITORIAL EFFECT OF UWO 
Firstly, extraterritorial jurisdiction is the ability of a court to exercise jurisdiction over 
individuals or property located outside the geographical confines of the jurisdiction in which 
the court is located.986 For an asset recovery regime to be effective, it is fundamental that courts 
in victim countries987 have the authority to enter orders affecting proceeds of crime located 
beyond their borders. This is so because of the speed with which assets can move from one 
country to another; which requires forfeiture laws to be as active as the criminals who generate 
such proceeds in order to preserve assets before they are dissipated or hidden. 
 Increasingly, jurisdictions are enacting laws to enable them enforce forfeiture orders in foreign 
jurisdictions. Such laws typically permit the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction if certain 
conditions are met, such as that the acts giving rise to forfeiture occurred within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the court and an established connection between the jurisdiction and the assets. 
In the UK, as an additional measure to enhance the effectiveness of the law, the new UWO 
legislation carry significant extraterritorial reach. This is underscored by the ability to use this 
tool against a person and property located abroad.988  
By virtue of s362A POCA, the UWO may be ordered against property located outside the UK. 
In similar vein, the person who is to respond to a UWO can also be located anywhere.989 When 
read together, there are clear and compelling policy reasons for such an approach. The proceeds 
of crime are seldom held in one country and are often placed in countries where recovery is 
difficult.990 Criminals or corrupt PEPs may also decide to invest their wealth in the UK even if 
such illicit funds is derived wholly from unlawful conduct which occurred in a foreign country 
while not being resident in the UK. For instance, a number of Nigerian PEPs have been known 
to invest the proceeds of crime wholly generated from corrupt practices in Nigeria by 
purchasing properties and other expensive assets in the UK.991  
With this in mind, the legislation expressly recognises that in instances where a respondent to 
a UWO is suspected of serious criminal activity, the conduct need not have taken place in the 
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UK.992 Additionally, s362S provides that if the high court makes an UWO in respect of any 
property, and the enforcement authority believes that property is in a country outside the UK, 
the enforcement authority would have the power to send a request via the Secretary of State to 
the government of the receiving country to secure that any person is prohibited from dealing 
with the property; and for assistance in connection with the management of the property, 
including with securing its detention, custody or preservation.993  The requested state will 
however determine whether the order is valid for execution under its domestic law.  
   6.4.6               RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF UWO 
Another key point to mention about the beauty of the UWO is in its retroactive effect. A 
retroactive statute is one that operates backwards, by attaching legal consequences to acts that 
took place before the statute was enacted.994 The retroactive applications of forfeiture laws 
against the proceeds of crime acquired before the promulgation of such laws is paramount. The 
rationale behind this is that if the laws are not retroactively enforceable, then criminals would 
be given the opportunity to profit from acts that were illegal at the time they were committed. 
Some have argued that the retroactive application of forfeiture laws may appear to be in conflict 
with the prohibition on passing ex post facto laws, a general rule under the constitutional laws 
of most countries which prohibits the application of a criminal punishment to an act that did 
not constitute a criminal offence at the time it was committed.995  
On the other hand, proponents of retroactive laws generally do so on the premise that they are 
necessary evils in specific or limited circumstances, especially in terms of dealing with serious 
crimes, such as corruption.996 In the context of non-conviction-based asset forfeiture laws that 
have been applied to forfeit the proceeds of crime generated and acquired before enactment of 
the law, the issue has been contested and has withstood judicial scrutiny. The courts have held 
that the retroactive application of forfeiture laws is constitutional as forfeiture laws are not 
criminal or penal in nature, but instead a civil law consequence of the fact that a perpetrator or 
other beneficiaries had obtained assets from unlawful act.997 
Moreover, NCBAF is not dependent on a criminal conviction, and because criminals never had 
a vested right to properties they acquire with the proceeds of crime, NCB legislations can be 
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retroactively applied without offending the basic law.998  As a consequence of the retroactivity 
of the UWO laws in the UK, not only are money launderers becoming nervous about acquiring 
UK assets, they are also concerned about assets that they may have acquired long ago with the 
proceeds of crime. In practice, nothing stops the enforcement authorities from seeking UWO 
in relation to any qualifying assets regardless of when they were acquired.999 
 6.4.7        THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF UWO IN THE UK  
In practical terms, UWO impose a burden on respondents where there is an apparent disconnect 
between their lifestyles and their sources of wealth to establish that their assets were 
legitimately acquired, often in circumstances where the relevant information may be only 
within the knowledge of the asset holder. In order to demystify the procedure of the UWO, it 
is pertinent to understand how it works in practice; for any law is only as good as its 
implementation. In practice, these simple steps apply. 
o A PEP, such as a President or Governor, has been alleged to have misappropriated vast 
amount of public funds having committed an unlawful conduct such as corruption into 
private accounts. To hide the proceeds of such crime, he launders it and decides to buy 
multi-million-dollar properties in the UK and possibly other foreign jurisdictions. 
o These assets are seemingly far beyond the annual salary of a PEP based on their salaries. 
These allegations are brought to the knowledge of the relevant enforcement authority. 
After conducting investigations, law enforcement brings an application before a high 
court judge who gives notice of a UWO if satisfied that the respondent is likely to be 
the owner of suspicious wealth beyond his means if all the following requirements are 
met; 
a. The respondent is a PEP and there are reasonable grounds to suspect their 
involvement in serious crime 
b. The respondent’s known source of income is insufficient to obtain the asset 
c. The value of the asset is greater than $50,000 
Having faced serious concerns about those involved in grand corruption laundering the 
proceeds of crime in the UK, and the significant difficulties which prevented enforcement 
authorities from confiscating and forfeiting properties from overseas criminal suspects unless 
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they have been convicted of a crime in their home country; the breadth of tools now available 
to the UK enforcement authorities has significantly improved their ability to tackle corruption 
and money laundering in the UK. In this respect, it is suggested that corrupt PEPs, oligarchs 
and wealthy foreigners who have acquired valuable assets with the proceeds of crime are billed 
as primary targets of the UWO framework.1000   
6.4.8 UWO’S THAT HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THE UK: THE CASE OF ZAMIRA HAJIYEVA 
The National Crime Agency (NCA) and other enforcement authorities have now had two years 
to avail themselves of this tool and it is now reaping substantial rewards. Within the first 
months of its promulgation in the UK, the NCA applied for and was granted an UWO in respect 
of multi-million-pound properties totalling $22 million, the first to be made under the 
POCA.1001 The High Court in granting the order was satisfied that the requirements of the Act 
had been met, including that the respondent’s husband was a PEP. The respondent in this case, 
a PEP, Mrs Zamira Hajiyeva and the wife of a former chairman of International Bank of 
Azerbaijan whom the NCA alleged had obtained their wealth through grand corruption.1002 
Mr Hajiyeva was charged and convicted of various offences including misappropriation, abuse 
of office, large-scale fraud and embezzlement and was sentenced to 15years imprisonment in 
Azerbaijan.1003 In the UK, the case against the respondent brought by the NCA was founded 
on her being the beneficial owner of identified properties in Knightsbridge London and a golf 
course in Berkshire totalling $22 million. Coupled with this fact, the NCA revealed through its 
investigations that Mrs Hajiyeva had spent a reported $16 million in Harrods despite having 
no identifiable source of income to obtain such properties.1004  
The respondent in this case appealed to the Court of Appeal in order to discharge the UWO.1005  
Her appeal focused on two primary arguments. Firstly, that her husband was not a politically 
exposed person for the purpose of s362B (4c) of the Proceeds of Crime Act. Secondly, that 
reliance upon her husband’s conviction in Azerbaijan to establish the source of her wealth was 
misplaced because her husband’s conviction was as a result of an unfair trial. In dismissing the 
appeal, the court upheld the definition of a PEP as adopted by Mr Justice Supperstone that she 
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was a PEP because she was a family member of Mr Hajiyeva. On the second ground, the court 
of appeal held that Mr Hajiyeva’s conviction supports grounds for reasonable suspicion that 
the known source of income was insufficient for the purpose of obtaining property; as a state 
employee between 1993 and 2015, it is very unlikely that such a position would have generated 
sufficient income to fund acquisition of property.1006 For this reasons, the appeal was dismissed.    
Following this Court of Appeals decision which interpreted the statutory regime of the UWO, 
including firmly placing the burden of proof on the respondent,1007 and not restricting the 
definitions of a PEP, judicial guidance have been given and this would likely open the 
floodgates for more UWOs. With these developments in statute and case law, the consequences 
for those targeted can be severe. The Hajiyeva case brings into focus the effectiveness of the 
UWO in compelling high net worth individuals suspected of committing crimes like corruption 
to provide information on their income that law enforcement might otherwise not obtain. The 
NCA has categorically stated that the UWO presents more opportunities to recover assets and 
it has concluded investigations on a number of individuals who own assets in the United 
Kingdom believed to have been acquired with the proceeds of crime in which it might be 
appropriate to engage the use of an UWO.1008 
 6.4.9             CHALLENGING THE UWO 
The fact that UWO is a useful tool does not mean that every application is factually, 
evidentially and legally sound. The intention of parliament in promulgating the Act was not to 
deprive persons of their legitimate property. This is where the opportunity for challenges arises, 
and there are measures for the UWO to be revoked in cases where evidence exonerates the 
respondent.1009 On a discharge application, the application may, for instance, choose to explain 
to the court how they lawfully obtained the property and adduce evidence of sufficient means 
drawn from income sources. Satisfactory explanations may turn on evidence that the property 
was a gift or inheritance.  
Challenges to an UWO can be brought on certain grounds, one of which is that the requirements 
for making an UWO have not been made out.1010 This was the case in National Crime Agency 
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v Baker, which involved a successful challenge to three UWOs on this basis, resulting in their 
discharge. In this case, the NCA sought UWO in respect of London properties worth $80 
million owned by the grandchildren of a former President of Kazakhstan, which was held by 
offshore companies. On the facts, the court held that the properties were not a product of 
unlawful conduct as argued by the NCA and found that it had been rebutted by cogent evidence 
that the properties had been acquired with legitimate funds;1011 once the wealth or income is 
explained, the basis for a UWO falls away.  
Furthermore, the court held that the use of complex offshore corporate structures or trusts was 
not, in itself, a ground for believing that they have been setup for money laundering purposes; 
holding that there had to be some additional evidential basis for such belief. Based on these 
facts, the high court discharged the UWO. The Court of Appeal has recently refused the NCA’s 
application for permission to appeal the discharge of the UWOs in this case as the case did not 
offer any real prospect of success. Despite this drawback and considering that the courts role 
is to oversee whether or not the application for the making of the UWO is lawful and justified; 
they remain an aggressive new legislation that gives enforcement authorities new capabilities 
to enable the relentless disruption of criminal assets in the UK.  
All things considered, this thesis takes the position that the UWO would have a considerable 
deterrent effect on those who launder public funds or the proceeds of crime to the UK. They 
are intrusive and require a respondent to answer questions, disclose confidential information in 
respect of sensitive financial matters while being supported by the power of forfeiture for non-
compliance.  
6.5             THE UNEXPLAINED WEALTH ORDER IN IRELAND 
Not just the UK, but also Ireland has since promulgated the Unexplained Wealth Order. In 
Ireland, unexplained wealth laws reversing the burden of proof onto the respondent to justify 
the lawful origin of property was introduced in two laws, namely: Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 
(POCA) as amended in 2005 and Criminal Asset Bureau Act 1996 (CAB). The POCA and CAB 
form the basis for the Irish two-pronged approach to tackling illicit wealth. With the 
introduction of these laws, Ireland became one of the first countries in Europe to enact the 
UWO. The POCA sets out the legislative framework that enables the state to attack proceeds 
of crime while CAB establishes the institutional framework to support its implementation.1012 
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The introduction of these legislations was felt necessary in Ireland on the grounds that it was 
an imperative response to the threat of serious and organised crime. 1013  
Fundamentally, one of the key factors most paramount to Ireland’s UWO is the Criminal Asset 
Bureau.1014 The CAB is a well-resourced multi-disciplinary agency whose members are from 
different agencies with staff from the police, prosecutors, revenue commission and social 
welfare with access to a large database through which the CAB can compare citizens assets to 
income. 1015   Their primary function is to use all legal remedies available to the state in 
pursuance of targeted criminal assets.1016 This gives the CAB the ability to proactively identify 
individuals with unexplained wealth. In addition, the Irish High Court appoints a judge, assisted 
by a special registrar, to work solely on forfeiture cases for a period of at least two years. This 
provides CAB with direct and speedy access to the courts and a judge knowledgeable in 
forfeiture laws.1017  
Furthermore, several elements make the Irish POCA unique. Firstly, it can be applied to any 
property acquired before or after the Act came into effect. Secondly, the state is not required 
to establish a nexus between a specific offence and the property subject to forfeiture. Thirdly, 
the burden of proof shifts to the respondent to show legitimacy of the property sought to be 
frozen.1018  
6.5.1          PROCEDURE FOR APPLYING FOR UWO IN IRELAND 
The first stage in the UWO regime in Ireland involves an application for interim freezing order. 
It is governed by s2 of POCA.1019 This is made on an ex-parte basis, the rationale being to 
ensure that assets cannot be removed from jurisdiction pending a full hearing involving all 
parties.1020 The High Court may grant an ex-parte interim freezing order against property once 
it is satisfied that all the requirements as stated in the Act are met by the authorised officer of 
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CAB. The applicant (CAB) bears the initial evidentiary burden of proof and must show by the 
civil standard of proof, the following.1021 
 6.5.2              REQUIREMENTS FOR GRANTING UWO IN IRELAND 
a. That a person is in possession or control of specified property 
b. That the property constitutes, directly or indirectly, proceeds of crime. 
c. That the value of the property is not less than $10,000.1022 
If the court is satisfied that these requirements have been met, the court grants an interim 
freezing order which would be in force for a period of 21 days to prevent the property from 
being dissipated.1023 The interim order will notify parties, or any other person who may be 
affected by it, of the freezing of property, as well as any other conditions or restrictions 
considered necessary. Next, the second stage involved when granting UWO in Ireland is the 
interlocutory order for which the same conditions in (a-b) applies.1024 Whilst this is described 
as interlocutory order, the section 3 hearing is to be regarded as the trial of the action. 
Interlocutory orders are orders that are issued by a court during the pendency of a case.1025 
Here, the applicants present a comprehensive overview of the respondent’s lifestyle and 
engagement in criminal conduct. 1026  This order is granted if the court is satisfied that 
reasonable grounds exist to suspect that property is the proceeds of crime,1027 unless any person 
can make an application to have this order discharged or varied.1028  
The court will issue a discharging order if the respondent is successful in proving that the 
property subject to the order is not the proceeds of crime or that that its value is less than 
$10,000. The legislation explicitly provides a safeguard that the court shall not make the orders 
if it is satisfied that there would be risk of serious injustice.1029 Section 3(3) POCA is primarily 
designed to allow a respondent argue that CAB’s case is inaccurate and that property targeted 
was legitimately sourced.1030 In the same vein, by virtue of s9 POCA, the court is empowered 
to issue on order compelling the respondent to file an affidavit disclosing all properties and 
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income he/she owns or possesses and their sources during such period not exceeding 10 years 
from the day the proceedings were initiated.1031 
The interim and interlocutory phase in Ireland present a transition to the final phase which is 
actualised with the disposal order.1032 For the court to issue a disposal order, the interlocutory 
order must be in place for no less than seven years.1033 In the course of this time, any person 
who can satisfy the court that property is not the proceeds of crime can have it lifted. If no such 
order has been granted during the seven years, the CAB can seek a disposal order effectively 
extinguishing anybody’s right to the property.1034  The court may grant the disposal order 
directing that property be transferred to the Minister for Finance or such other person as the 
court may determine.1035 It is pertinent to mention that the statute does not foresee any sanction 
if the respondent does not comply. However, the inherent powers of the court apply, whereby 
a person can be held in contempt of court, or, if he/she provides false information, can be 
charged with an offense.1036  
Importantly, the Irish regime applies retroactively making property acquired before or after the 
introduction of the Act vulnerable to confiscation.1037 In like manner, POCA also ensures that 
the proceeds of foreign criminality would be covered by the scope of the legislation where such 
proceeds have been used to acquire assets in Ireland. This was not the case when POCA was 
initially enacted as the courts had on several occasions held that the Act did not include 
proceeds derived from offenses in foreign jurisdictions.1038 However, the POCA was amended 
in 2005 to include the proceeds of foreign offences that were held at any time in Ireland. 
Equally important, the amendment of POCA in 2005 was critical in remedying a number of 
deficiencies of the original Act. For instance, one element that affected CAB’s efficiency is 
that an interlocutory order must be in effect for seven years. The amendment now provides for 
a consensual disposition of assets much earlier than the seven-year period.1039  
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6.5.3     ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UWO REGIME IN IRELAND 
After years of implementation of POCA and CAB in Ireland, there are a number of studies that 
evaluates its effectiveness. This thesis adopts a study conducted by Boos Allen Hamilton for 
the United States Department of Justice, wherein the author comparatively evaluated the 
Unexplained Wealth Order regimes in selected jurisdictions with particular focus on Ireland in 
order to inform policymakers on a number of issues when contemplating the introduction of 
UWOs in the US.1040  
Hamilton’s study of the effectiveness of Irish’s POCA and CAB involved, interviewing people 
and agencies directly involved with the UWO regime who were able to express informed 
opinions on the impact of the Act. Those interviewed include former and current 
representatives of the CAB, defence lawyers, academics and police. The CABs yearly annual 
report is also instrumental in this regard as it helps in reviewing the number of successful 
applications and total value of assets forfeited to the State by the CAB.  
According to Hamilton, both anecdotal and statistical evidence suggests that POCA and CAB, 
with its extensive powers have had a positive impact in reducing criminal activities, particularly 
financial crime in Ireland. The data on the number of cases commenced, orders made, as well 
as successful application of the cases show that CAB has continued to work consistently in 
disrupting the proceeds of crime and is doing so successfully.1041 This is also as interviewees 
expressed the prevailing view of law enforcement authorities stating with certainty that POCA 
has had a significant impact on dismantling and disrupting serious profitable crime in Ireland, 
particularly offences relating to financial crime. Furthermore, research and reports point to a 
very high success rate in UWO proceedings in Ireland, with this success attributed to CAB’s 
efforts in conducting investigations that led to confiscations of criminal assets in Ireland.1042  
Statistically, from 1998 through 2005, the CAB made 107 applications for interim order, 110 
applications for interlocutory order, which have resulted in 68 disposal orders forfeiting 
criminal assets to the State. Available data from CABs annual reports states that from 2005-
2015, the value of assets forfeited under section 4 POCA to the State after legal processes was 
$941,550, 239.1043 Under section 3, eleven cases before the High Court resulted in forfeiture 
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of assets, the value of $7,225,092.98 in 2015.1044 In 2018, the number of assets which an order 
was obtained increased from 100 assets in 2017 to 150 assets in 2018. Thirty cases commenced 
in 2018, the largest number of cases commenced in a single year by the Bureau resulting in the 
forfeiture of $8,393,582.30. 1045  In 2019, the value of assets frozen was $1,559,726 was 
transferred to the Minister for Finance after forfeiture.1046 
These figures are broadly typical for the Republic of Ireland, and while they may not appear to 
be substantial, they are high compared to asset recovery in other jurisdictions.1047 The Irish 
approach to attacking the proceeds of crime is regularly used as an exemplar of best practice 
in other jurisdictions, both common law and civil law, such as Australia, France, South Africa 
and the United Kingdom when developing non-conviction-based forfeiture legislations in their 
countries.1048  
As has been noted in the course of this chapter, although the UWO has been seen as a radical 
and drastic law which has been effective in confiscating and forfeiting criminal assets to the 
state without the requirement of a criminal conviction, their retention has been subject to a 
wave of criticisms by both academics and legal practitioners because they involve fundamental 
departures from the normal legal processes and an extraordinary intrusion of state powers. 
Unsurprisingly, a number of legal challenges have ensued which is dealt with in the section 
that follows.  
6.6 CONCERNS RELATING TO CONSTITUTIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN UWO 
According to human rights scholars, the promotion and protection of human rights is essential 
to the fulfilment of all aspects of an anti-corruption and AML strategy; however, this goal is in 
tension with the enactment of UWO statues.1049 In as much as the UWO regime have been 
widely embraced and promoted by law enforcement officials, they are viewed with scepticism 
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and criticism by human rights groups and lawyers who consider the UWO a drastic response 
to financial crime.1050  
Consequently, issues have arisen in relation to their compatibility with various articles and 
conventions on human rights, particularly in connection with certain civil rights such as the 
right to own property. As a result, the UWO have not been without a plethora of legal 
challenges regarding their operation as courts in different jurisdictions where they have been 
promulgated have been called upon to interpret the constitutionality of the UWO legislations. 
Human rights challenges have been abundant but unsuccessful. The key arguments and 
concerns advanced while challenging the UWO legislations merit further attention. 
1. In Ireland, POCA has been labelled radical and a disproportionate response to crime 
and has been challenged on the grounds that it is a de-facto criminal law, not civil law, 
violating basic constitutional principles and depriving respondents of traditional 
criminal law safeguards.1051  
2. Furthermore, there are some concerns that the provisions of UWO dispense with 
presumption of innocence, the bedrock of human rights; the right to silence, the 
principles of fair hearing and the privilege against self-incrimination because they 
require the respondent to disclose critical information relating to ownership of 
assets.1052  
3. It has been equally submitted that the UWO legislations has the tendency to arbitrarily 
deprive people of their property, thereby eroding the right to own property. 
4. Additionally, many contend that the reversed burden of proof on the accused to put 
forth evidence demonstrating the legitimate origin of the assets in issue encroach upon 
fundamental rights that protect the defendant.  
5. Scholars also argue that the UWO amounts to convicting people of offences on a lower 
standard of proof while circumventing the protections of the criminal law. 
6. Equally important is the argument that the UWO has retrospective effect against the 
rule of law of most jurisdictions which prohibits a person from being penalised if the 
conduct was not an offence before the enactment of a new legislation.1053 
                                                             
1050 Fernandez-Bertier (n869) 
1051 Gilligan v CAB [1997] 1 IR 526 
1052 Colin King,’ Civil Forfeiture in Ireland: Two Decades of the Proceeds of Crime Act and the Criminal Asset 
Bureau’ in Katalin Ligeti and Michele Simonato (eds), Chasing Criminal Money: Challenges and Perspective on 
Asset Recovery in the EU (Hart Publishing 2017) 12 




7. Finally, opponents of the UWO legislation believe that power vested in the state are too 
far-reaching and create a gross imbalance of power between the state and the respondent. 
Thus, there is a risk that it may be subjected to abuse and used as an instrument of 
political vendetta.1054  
Despite these arguments and criticisms, the UWO legislation has withstood constitutional 
scrutiny when challenged in court. Courts in different jurisdictions have addressed each of 
these arguments in turn and in light of judicial expositions have upheld the constitutionality of 
the UWO legislations. For instance, in South Africa, the court upheld as constitutional a 
number of challenges made on non-conviction-based asset forfeiture including rights to fair 
trial, silence, presumption of innocence and the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of 
property.1055 South African court rulings recognise that UWO as a critical tool for recovering 
proceeds of corruption since conventional remedies to fighting financial crime have failed.  
In Ireland, on the authority of Gilligan v CAB1056, Irish court recognised POCA’s far reaching 
character, but went further to consider it an appropriate measure against the sophisticated 
methods of operation adopted by criminals. With regards to issues bothering on human rights, 
the courts have also made pronouncements in support of the UWO. Firstly, on the issue of 
property rights, there is considerable authority to the effect that civil recovery proceedings do 
not constitute an unjustified breach of property rights.1057  
The courts have held that the right to property is not absolute but qualified ,therefore, 
deprivation of property is permitted where the law is in pursuit of a legitimate purpose, such as 
in the interest of the common good; where it is in accordance with the law such as confiscation 
of property consequent to an order of a court of competent jurisdiction.1058 In other words, the 
state is entitled to encroach on property rights by imposing forfeiture to recover assets acquired 
with the proceeds of public funds. 
Secondly, with regards to the issue of fair trial as it relates to the UWO, the court have held 
that so long as the alleged owner of the property is not liable to be criminally convicted in the 
process and he is given adequate hearing notice and opportunity to explain the means of 
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acquisition of the property, the right to fair hearing has not been violated.1059 The court also 
held regarding fair trial that such orders were the states response to the need to recover from 
those who seek to benefit from crime, the proceeds of unlawful act. In the United Kingdom, on 
the authority of Gale v Serious Organised Crime Agency1060 the first time the Supreme Court 
in the UK considered civil forfeiture legislation and the tension between fundamental human 
rights to a fair trial, presumption of innocence, the burden and standard of proof contained 
within civil forfeiture laws which allows for the finding of a criminal act on the civil standard 
and therefore capable of circumventing criminal procedural safeguards. Gale was decided on 
the basis of POCA 2002, which introduced civil forfeiture in its present form into English law 
where law enforcement may bring civil proceedings to recover the proceeds of unlawful act 
even if there has been no criminal conviction.  
The Supreme Court made it clear that although the commission of criminal offences had to be 
proved to the criminal standard, that could be distinguished from cases where property was in 
the hands of an alleged offender and he had not adequately explained how he acquired it. The 
Supreme court confirmed that civil forfeiture proceedings, and by extension, the UWO are not 
criminal proceedings in nature designed to penalise any person; therefore, the presumption of 
innocence and the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not apply. The court went 
further to state that the procedure and the rules of evidence involved for making and 
implementing UWO are civil rather criminal and under the control of a civil court. The object 
and focus of the proceeding are recovery of assets and profits, not imposition of criminal 
punishment.  
The UWO has survived many constitutional challenges and continues to be implemented 
successfully.  
 6.7       THE NECESSITY OF ENACTING THE UWO IN NIGERIA 
In Nigeria, corrupt political elites are one of the most significant obstacles to economic 
development and good governance.1061 Grand corruption and money laundering has grown 
exponentially over the years, and with this growth has come an increase in underdevelopment 
and poverty. Steps to tackle this menace has proved unsuccessful as most corruption and money 
laundering cases against high level PEPs have stalled in court for years. Most PEPs charged 
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with corruption and money laundering have already spent more years standing trial than they 
would have spent in prison if convicted for these offences1062; meanwhile assets purchased with 
the proceeds of corruption remains in their possession. They retain the benefit while the society 
suffers as a result of diverting public funds which would have been used for the public good.  
Acknowledging the serious problems of grand corruption and money laundering perpetuated 
by PEPs and the need for enhanced mechanisms to combat their devastating impact in Nigeria, 
this thesis recommends the urgent promulgation of the UWO in Nigeria. Given the very large 
amount of proceeds of corruption flowing from Nigeria, together with low asset recovery rate 
and the limited and unrealistic timeframe for achieving effective suspicious transaction report 
for meaningful investigations on corrupt PEPs, the UWO would be a welcome development in 
Nigeria. The power of confiscation/forfeiture is a fundamental tool for taking the profit out of 
corruption and money laundering. Based on the ever-increasing rampancy of grand corruption 
and money laundering, the UWO would be a decisive development in the scrutiny of PEPs who 
have amassed significant unexplained wealth by virtue of being in public service.  
Although Nigeria have in place legal framework for confiscation of criminal proceeds after a 
criminal conviction, the avenues for recovering the proceeds of crime through civil courts have, 
however, not been established within Nigeria’s legal framework. It has therefore become 
imperative that there is an urgent need for a more focused and robust legal framework 
underpinned by civil law administration.  
The extant conviction-based approach to money laundering in Nigeria has been grossly 
insufficient and have failed to have an impact upon those at the pinnacle of stealing public 
funds. Criminalising money laundering, together with criminal sanctions and punishment is no 
longer substantially disruptive for PEPs who steal and launder public funds in Nigeria. 
Moreover, slow criminal justice system in addition to technical complexities involved in the 
criminal justice system have been a major challenge to the enforcement of AML laws in Nigeria. 
The conviction-based asset recovery statutes in Nigeria is now out-dated and are likely to be 
of little value in practice. Consequently, grand corruption and money laundering has flourished 
while PEPs in Nigeria continue to acquire assets far above their legitimate income emboldened 
by the deficiencies in the criminal justice system. It is therefore imperative to deploy a more 
versatile tool that does not supplant but transcends the narrow confines of criminal jurisdiction.  
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 It has been this chapter’s argument that only a paradigm shift away from criminal to tougher 
civil forfeiture options can effectively address the problem of PEPs engaging in grand 
corruption and the laundering of the proceeds of crime. To reiterate, there are numerous reasons 
that call for recourse to or a paradigm shift to civil forfeitures. This includes difficulty in 
obtaining evidence to prove cases of corruption and money laundering beyond reasonable 
doubt and the possibility of a failed prosecution. Civil forfeitures or confiscation without 
conviction is one of the strategic weapons that are being deployed to disrupt and dismantle the 
economic infrastructure of criminals.1063 Therefore, it is paramount to have a legal framework 
which hinges on taking the profit out crime by recovering criminal proceeds. 
Accordingly, the scope of UWO as currently applied in the UK and Ireland as analysed can be 
adopted in Nigeria in order to facilitate confiscation and forfeiture of assets acquired with the 
proceeds of corruption without a formal criminal conviction. The UWO is one that can address 
the particularly topical issue of corruption and money laundering on the one hand, and the 
failure of conventional criminal law to stem the tide of these phenomenon. Furthermore, the 
value of the UWO is also not limited to civil recovery. The information provided in response 
to the order could trigger an investigation into the conduct of financial institutions and 
regulated professionals such as banks and lawyers.  
This is because these regulated entities are crucial and indispensable to public officials who are 
desirous of laundering the proceeds of corruption. As has been noted, the desire to maintain 
wealthy clients and maximise profit makes it extremely difficult for regulated persons such as 
banks in Nigeria to place priority on AML compliance, and this comes at the expense of 
disrupting money laundering. The implication of UWO is that it could expose complicit banks 
to huge fines or withdrawal of licence if it is found that they aided PEPs launder the proceeds 
of corruption.   
To allow corrupt PEPs enjoy the profit of their crimes have offended the sense of justice of 
Nigerians. It is therefore submitted that Nigeria needs to introduce a law that would provide a 
clear framework for the use of non-conviction-based laws to help law enforcement to be 
increasingly effective in recovering illicit assets and the proceeds of corruption. This thesis 
strongly believes that removing unexplained wealth from the hands of corrupt public officials 
is one way of disrupting money laundering and fighting corruption.  
                                                             




In this respect, it is submitted that enacting the UWO to the Nigerian legal framework would 
strengthen the laws tackling corruption and money laundering and it would aid the recovery of 
a significant number of illicit assets acquired by PEPs with public funds without a formal 
criminal prosecution or conviction of PEPs. This thesis of the opinion that laws of this nature 
if applied successfully, remove the financial incentive to commit financial crimes and they do 
so more effectively than the current conviction-based system currently practiced in Nigeria. 
The law can be seen to be effective in so far as the corrupt PEPs are stripped of their assets. 
Because corrupt PEPs tend to place greater value on the money and assets rather than time in 
prison, a well-known law enforcement strategy consists of taking the profit out of crime.1064 
The UWO could be an important and powerful tool in the effort to tackle corruption and money 
laundering. It will permit the state to go after illicit assets that are the proceeds of corruption 
rather than the person which has often resulted in stalled or failed prosecutions.  
Introducing the UWO legislation in Nigeria would go a long way in controlling, interrupting, 
and recovery of proceeds of corruption and financial crime, and help in changing the perceived 
existing culture of corruption and money laundering which has become prevalent by PEPs in 
Nigeria.  
6.8 CHALLENGES WHICH MAY BE ENCOUNTERED IN ADOPTING THE UWO IN NIGERIA 
Nigeria is a member state and signatory to the UNCAC. Article 54 enjoins state parties to 
consider taking measures as may be necessary to allow confiscation of property suspected to 
be the proceeds of unlawful activity without a criminal conviction.1065 Whilst the promulgation 
of the UWO which is in line with NCBAF is imperative in Nigeria and would go a long way 
in aiding the recovery of significant public funds stolen and laundered by PEPs, there could be 
potential challenges which this sort of legislation might encounter. In other jurisdictions as 
highlighted in this chapter, some of the main challenges directed at the UWO/NCBAF 
legislations which might also be encountered in Nigeria revolves around its constitutionality 
and the potential to encroach on human rights with respect to right to own property and right 
to fair hearing.  
One of the rights guaranteed by the constitution in Nigeria is the right to property. Under the 
constitution, every citizen of Nigeria shall have the right to acquire and own immovable 
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property anywhere in Nigeria.1066  However, parliament envisaged that an unqualified and 
unrestrained property right would breed all forms of corrupt or illegal practices. Thus, the 
constitution enumerates legitimate circumstances when the enjoyment of that right can be 
validly interrupted by law. It includes, inter alia: 
• For the imposition of penalties or breach of any law, whether under civil process or 
after conviction for an offence. 
• Relating to the execution of judgements or orders of court.1067 
In Dangabar v FRN,1068 the court noted that although every Nigerian has the right to acquire 
and own property anywhere in Nigeria, the practice of depriving a person from dealing with 
assets suspected to be the proceeds of crime is not unconstitutional because the right to own 
property is not absolute. It follows from court decisions that NCBAF would not constitute an 
unjustified breach of property rights in Nigeria and would be compatible with the rights to own 
property on the basis that the rights are qualified and not absolute. 
Another challenge which the UWO legislation might encounter is the potential violation of 
traditional criminal law safeguards, such as the right to fair hearing. Fair hearing is captured 
under s36(1) of the Nigerian constitution which holds that, ‘In the determination of his civil 
rights and obligations, including any question or determination by or against any government 
or authority, a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time.’1069 S36(2) of 
the same constitution also states that ‘Without prejudice to the foregoing provisions of this 
section, a law shall not be invalidated by reason only that it confers on any government or 
authority power to determine questions arising in the administration of a law that affects or 
may affect the civil rights and obligations of any person if such law inter alia: 
• Provides for an opportunity for the persons whose rights may be affected to make 
representations to the administering authority before that authority makes the decision 
affecting that person.1070 
In Nigeria, the right to fair trial as it relates to forfeiture proceedings have come before the 
courts in instances where the EFCC have sought interim and final forfeiture orders pursuant to 
their powers of confiscation and forfeiture provided under s29 and 30 of the EFCC Act 
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2004.1071 The courts have noted that it is empowered to grant application for interim forfeiture 
and final forfeitures in respect of money or property suspected to be proceeds of unlawful 
activity.1072 In this respect, the court have noted that it is a condition precedent to the order 
being made that the person against whom the order is made be simultaneously given notice of 
the order commanding him to show cause within the time specified by the court why property 
should not be forfeited to the Federal government of Nigeria. Forfeitures are only ordered after 
the defendant is heard having been notified of such orders within the time allowed. If the 
defendant has been given notice and the opportunity to show cause (explain) the source of the 
assets, it means that his right to a fair hearing has not been violated. 
Furthermore, another issue that can arise with the enactment of the UWO is the reverse burden 
of proof on the accused to explain the provenance of his wealth. One of the biggest challenges 
to the recovery of the proceeds of corruption in Nigeria has been establishing the nexus between 
suspicious assets, and a specific offence.1073 The requirement to establish this link is a pre-
requisite to the confiscation of assets in Nigeria. However, the enactment of the UWO can 
make it easier to recover stolen assets without the need to prove a predicate offence and with 
fewer procedural requirement. To achieve this, the UWO reverses the burden of proof on the 
respondent to prove how he/she came about such wealth in question. Recently, the Supreme 
Court of Nigeria had the opportunity to decide on the issue of burden of proof with respect to 
unexplained wealth.1074 The court held that proving money laundering cases is a herculean task 
because it requires the establishment of a predicate offence. To obviate this problem, a remedy 
was introduced by statutorily inferring money laundering from not only the conduct of the 
defendant, but his lifestyle which is similar to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 of the UK.  
Under s36(5) of the constitution, the law establishes and guarantees the suspect’s right to be 
presumed innocent until he is proved guilty. It also provides legitimate circumstances that will 
justify a legislation that imposes on citizens the burden of proving particular facts. In the 
context of forfeiture, it was held that the respondent being in the best placed position to know 
the provenance of his assets, be required to prove such facts.1075 By virtue of s19(3) of the 
MLPA 2012, if an accused is in possession of pecuniary resources or property which is 
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disproportionate to his known income, or be obtained an accretion to his pecuniary resources 
or property, the burden of giving satisfactory account of how he made the money or obtained 
the accretion shifts to him.1076 The prosecution is relieved of the burden of having to prove that 
the money found in the account of the accused is proceeds from unlawful activity. 
Therefore, under Nigerian law and decided case law, there is nothing unusual or 
unconstitutional in imposing on the respondent the burden of proving particular facts, i.e., that 
the funds sought to be forfeited are not proceeds of unlawful activities. Other issues relate to 
implementing such laws in Nigeria, particularly on politically exposed persons. For instance, 
the immunity clause is one which can frustrate the implementation of the UWO on certain PEPs. 
As earlier mentioned, Presidents, Vice Presidents, Governors and Deputy Governors are 
constitutionally immune from criminal or civil proceedings; despite the fact that a substantial 
amount of corruption related money laundering cases have been perpetuated by these persons 
in Nigeria. Based on the fact that the UWO is civil in nature, this can frustrate its 
implementation on PEPs in Nigeria.  
 This thesis has argued that the immunity clause be expunged from the constitution because it 
strengthens the culture of impunity and protects PEPs from accountability for their crimes 
while in office. The immunity clause seems like a constitutional licence to steal. Nevertheless, 
there are still a host of senior PEPs not covered by the immunity clause which can be caught 
by the UWO legislation; besides, those who are covered by immunity can be caught by the 
UWO when their tenure in office expires.  
Given the vast assets held by corrupt PEPs in Nigeria acquired with the proceeds of corruption, 
their return is matter of the highest priority. By focusing on the assets, they can provide AML 
enforcement authorities with an effective and efficient means to recover the proceeds of crime, 
particularly as no predicate offence needs to be established. 
In the final analysis, it is necessary that this thesis provides a nuanced presentation of the 
potential role of the UWO in addressing the challenges of grand corruption in Nigeria beyond 
the challenges in the criminal justice system. Just a few years ago, it would have been 
unthinkable to have a situation where, with no proof of criminal activity, let alone a charge or 
a conviction, an individual could be compelled to provide authorities with detailed information 
as to their finances. This is now the reality with the UWO legislation. Criminals have continued 





to show that they are way ahead of not just law enforcement, but financial institutions. However, 
the UWO could ameliorate some of the problems earlier discussed in this thesis.  
Firstly, the UWO will enable law enforcement to be significantly more alert to money 
laundering saving time, energy and resources incurred in investigating financial crimes. 
Secondly, the promulgation of UWO would warrant banks and others in the regulated sector to 
sharpen their scrutiny of PEP client. This is because an investigation into alleged financial 
crime of a PEP could expose the involvement of banks in aiding such PEP launder the proceeds 
of corruption as a result of their failure to file a suspicious transaction report where necessary. 
This could in turn warrant heavy fines on such banks or the withdrawal of their licence in 
extreme cases of lack of compliance with AML laws.  
Recently, the chairman of EFCC disclosed in a meeting for members of the association of chief 
audit executives of banks in Nigeria that the EFCC will start holding banks liable for fraud and 
money laundering pertaining to financial deposits, where there are established cases of 
complicity with those seeking to launder the proceeds of crime through their institutions; 
mandating banks to know the source of wealth and source of funds of their customers, 
particularly PEPs.1077 The promulgation of the UWO can provide a legal framework which 
could make this task easier for the EFCC to identify financial institutions who aid PEPs and 
other financial criminals launder the proceeds of crime. 
Furthermore, the UWO would help tackle judicial corruption. As mentioned earlier, empirical 
studies on the issue of judicial corruption are by the nature of things very difficult to come by. 
Yet, the weight of anecdotal evidence and indeed disciplinary history within the justice sector 
in Nigeria is indicative of a deep problem. The importance of a frontal and determined attack 
on this growing problem is fundamental. It is the view of this thesis that the promulgation of 
UWO would make judicial officers less inclined to corruption as it would be easier to ascertain 
a situation where a judge is living above his/her means as their salaries and allowances are 
quantifiable. Corruption is most likely to occur where incentives outweigh risks. This 
legislation would detect, prevent, and limit the opportunities and increase the risk of detecting 
financial crime.  
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Lastly, it is trite that an effective judiciary is a powerful weapon against corruption. Based on 
the fact that courts have the final determination whether or not to grant the UWO on the 
application of relevant law enforcement agents, it is my view that taking these cases to federal 
high court judges in Nigeria will be suitable based on the antecedence and integrity of judges 
at the federal high court level who are much more independent when compared to state high 
court judges as they are not appointed by state Governors and therefore not under political 
influence or pressure as witnessed in most high-profile cases in Nigeria.  
Furthermore, this thesis subscribes totally to calls being made by members of the legal 
profession as well as law enforcement agencies for the creation of specialised anti-corruption 
courts.1078 This has emerged as a response to legal reform for faster and better justice system 
due to the frustration, complexity and difficulty in prosecuting corruption cases; especially 
those involving high profile corruption and money laundering cases. Specialised courts refer 
to a court system where judges with special knowledge and expertise in a particular area of law, 
such as economic and financial crimes (corruption, money laundering, cybercrime) dispenses 
justice as it relates to those areas of law within their competence speedily and efficiently, often 
through streamlined procedures, as well as higher quality and more consistent decisions in 
complex areas of law.1079 It is expected that designated corruption court judges would be 
persons of integrity and high moral standard with impeccable track record as there are still 
judges in Nigeria who make up their mind to dispense justice regardless of who is involved. 
This is an option that will be a welcome development and that which would give effect to laws 
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6.9                                     CONCLUSION 
To summarise, available research and a consensus of assessments suggest that vast amounts of 
corrupt wealth which are public funds are stolen from Nigeria frequently. This thesis initiated 
and informed a much-needed debate about providing a proportionate legal response to the 
impunity achieved by perpetrators of grand corruption and money laundering. The economic 
and developmental problems in Nigeria caused by grand corruption and money laundering by 
PEPs remain acute. The amount of stolen public funds used to acquire assets is of such a 
staggering magnitude. Yet, Nigeria’s performance in freezing, seizing and recovering stolen 
assets is undeniably poor compared to the scale of public funds stolen by corrupt PEPs. The 
problems are exacerbated by the failure of regulated entities such as banks to comply with their 
AML obligations or implement them in an effective manner.  
At present, the asset recovery regime is not fit for purpose. It has been this thesis’s argument 
in the course of this chapter that the extant AML legal framework in Nigeria, which is 
predicated on, and overly reliant on confiscation following conviction no longer provides an 
effective deterrence for PEPs who steal and launder public funds. The legal framework and 
measures with which to fight grand corruption and recover the proceeds of crime need to 
constantly evolve to close loopholes and improve efficiency.  
This chapter provided comprehensive analysis of the way in which non-conviction-based asset 
forfeiture regimes can contribute immensely to the fight against grand corruption and money 
laundering in Nigeria. In this regard, this thesis argued that civil jurisdiction of extracting the 
proceeds of criminal activities from corrupt PEPs without the need of a conviction provides a 
better mode of deterrence than any criminal sanction could hope to achieve. In the grand 
scheme of things, this would be much more beneficial to the public who have suffered loss in 
the hands of public officials.  
 Importantly, the chapter argued that NCBAF proceedings are against the assets themselves, 
rather than against the individual. Inter alia, the powers are designed for cases where the 
proceeds of crime have been identified but not feasible to secure a conviction, or where a 
conviction has been secured but no confiscation order is made. There is now a growing global 
commitment to tackle money laundering as a result of the plunder of public funds by PEPs, 
especially those from developing countries. In essence, the global political will to combat 
financial crime has led to a tilt towards civil forfeiture of criminal assets. This approach is 




traditional criminal conviction-based asset forfeiture regimes. The chapter argued that 
recovering the proceeds of crime through the traditional criminal law is hampered by the 
procedural safeguards inherent in criminal proceedings which is seen as providing excessive 
protection for criminals. 
The chapter argued extensively that one powerful weapon which is an innovative legal tool in 
the fight against illicit wealth have been the Unexplained Wealth Order. Although a relatively 
new concept, the introduction of UWOs into the confiscation and forfeiture jurisprudence in a 
number of jurisdictions such as the UK and Ireland are geared towards making these 
jurisdictions hostile environments to financial crimes, while addressing the considerable 
practical difficulties under the traditional conviction-based regimes.  
The UWO has proved to be a significant piece of legislation, with Transparency International 
citing it as the most important piece of anti-corruption legislation of the past 30 years.1080 The 
chapter discussed extensively their primary objective which is to deprive criminals from 
acquiring or benefiting from unlawful activities. By using UWOs, the state does not have to 
first prove a criminal charge, as is the case with conviction-based forfeitures. Likewise, the 
state does not have to first prove that the property in question is the instrument or proceeds of 
a crime, as is generally the case in the conventional conviction-based regime. Also, because 
the UWO proceedings are seen as civil, criminal procedural protections do not apply. 
Importantly, it has been argued that the very effectiveness of UWO legislation depends on the 
ability to shift the burden of proof to the asset owner. This is a fundamental feature of the UWO 
regime. Requiring the one who is better able to prove a fact to be the one to prove it has helped 
circumvent evidentiary problems encountered by law enforcement in proving underlying 
unlawful activities which gave rise to such wealth. In practice, they lighten the load on the 
prosecution, and tends to make asset forfeiture altogether speedier.  
As a result of its stringent characteristics, the chapter posited that the UWO attracts a great deal 
of debate. Human rights challenges have been abundant but unsuccessful. Those who criticise 
it hold the view that they are an assault on due process which raises serious constitutional 
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concerns with regards to its consistency with human rights provisions.1081 On the other hand, 
those who embrace UWO have done so because they believe that civil remedies offer speedy 
solutions that are unencumbered by the rigorous of constitutional protections associated with 
criminal trials. Despite the numerous challenges, the UWO legislation has withstood 
constitutional scrutiny when challenged in court. The courts have played an important role in 
interpreting the nature and scope of the UWO. As earlier examined, courts have held that the 
UWO serves a legitimate public purpose and is a proportionate response to the fundamental 
problem of corruption, money laundering and other financial crimes.  
As seen in the UK and Ireland, a robust system of measures to confiscate the proceeds of crime 
is an important part of an effective anti-money laundering and anti-corruption regime. In the 
UK, various UWOs have been issued successfully few months after the law came into effect 
in early 2018. The introduction of UWOs in the UK is seen as an important step forward in 
bridging an important legal gap and would help curb the influence of the UK as a facilitator for 
global money laundering.1082 The UWO provides a swift and efficient way to recover assets, 
not only because of its broad scope of application, but also since the alternative, criminal 
confiscation, entails a level of technical complexity that often acts as a deterrent against 
pursuing financial crime cases. 
In view of the findings of this research, this thesis recommends the urgent promulgation of the 
UWO which would be pivotal in combating grand corruption and money laundering in Nigeria. 
This thesis challenges lawmakers and policymakers to consider this drastic legislation which 
could consolidate the extant AML legal framework in Nigeria. Of course, much work is still 
needed and it is right to feel optimistic that the problems of PEPs and money laundering in 
Nigeria will become a thing of the past. While much remains to be done, there are reasons to 
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